_Book_NM_Chief_Works-1
1. Cf Ariosto’s address to the musket: “Through you the soldier’s glory is destroyed, through you the business of arms is without honor, through you valor and courage are brought low, for often the bad man seems better than the good; through you valor no more, daring no more can come to a test in the.field” (ORLANDO FuR10s0 11. 26).
DISCOURSES 2. 17
If he is inside a city, either this city is little, as most fortresses are, or it is large. In the first case he who defends himself is wholly lost, because the battering power of artillery is such that there is no wall, even though very great, that it does not break down in a few days; and ifhe who is inside does not have good places for retiring to, with both ditches and embankments, he is lost. He cannot repel the rush of the enemy who attempt then to enter through the break in the wall, nor will any artillery he has avail him against them, because it is an axiom that when men go in a crowd and with a rush, artillery does not repel them. Therefore, in the defense of towns the furious charges of the Northerners are not repelled. Italian assaults are in,
deed repelled, for not in a body but in small numbers they are led to battles-which they, by a name very suitable, call skirmishes. And these who go in this disorder and with this lukewarmness to a breach in a wall defended by artillery go to an obvious death, and against them artillery is effective. But those who, formed in a close body, and so that one pushes on the other, go against a breach, if they are not repelled by ditches or by embankments, enter in every place and artillery does not hold them back; if some of them die, they cannot be so many as to prevent victory.
[ De Foix braved the cannon at Brescia]
That this is true is known from many assaults made by the Northerners in Italy, and especially from that on Brescia, because, when that town had rebelled against the French and the fortress still held out for the French King, the Venetians, in order to resist the onslaught that might come from it against the city, had provided with artillery the entire street that descended from the fortress into the city, and placed them in front and on the flanks and in every other suitable place. To these Monsieur de Foix paid no attention. On the contrary, he with his squadron, which had dismounted, passing through the midst of them occupied the city, nor do we hear that he received any remarkable damage. Hence, he who defends himself in a small town, as has been said, and sees the walls fallen to the ground and has no space for embankments and ditches to which he can retire, and has to trust in his artillery, loses quickly.
[ The defense of a large city against cannon]
If you are defending a large city, and do have opportunity for retiring, artillery is nonetheless without comparison more useful to those outside than to those inside. The reason is, first, that if a piece of artillery-is to injure those outside, you are obliged to raise yourself with it above the level of the city, because, if you remain on that level, if the enemy makes the slightest bank or ridge, he is safe, and you cannot injure him. Hence, since you must raise yourself and get on the passageway along the walls or in some fashion raise your… self above the ground, you run into two difficulties. The first is that you cannot hoist up there pieces of the greatness and the power with which he can shoot from outside, since in small spaces one cannot manage big things. The other is that if you actually can get them up there, you cannot make such trustworthy and secure embankments in order to protect the said artillery as the enemy outside can, being on the solid ground and having such opportunities and such space as they themselves wish. Hence it is impossible for one who is defending a city to keep his artillery in high places, when those outside have many pieces and powerful ones. And if he must put them in low places, they are then for the most part useless, as I have said. Thus the defense of the city becomes a matter of defending it with the hands, as was done in antiquity, and with light artillery.:i If such light artillery is of some use for that purpose, a disadvantage results that counterbalances the advantage of the artillery; because of it, the walls of towns have come to be built low and almost buried in the ditches, so that if there is resort to hand…to…hand combat, either through the beating down of the walls or through the filling up of the ditches, he who is within has many more drawbacks than he had earlier. And therefore, as was said above, these weapons give much more help to him who besieges cities than to him who is besieged.
[Cannon against a fort!fied camp; cannon at the battle of Ravenna]
As to the third thing, that of going into a camp within a stock… ade, in order not to fight a battle except at your advantage or with superiority, I say that in this position you have no better means, ordinarily, to keep yourself from fighting than did the ancients, and
2. Probably cannon of small caliber. There seems to be no instance in which Machiavelli clearly includes hand.firearms under artillery.
37° DISCOURSES 2. 17
sometimes, on account of the artillery, you have a greater drawback. Because if the enemy comes upon you and has a little superiority in ground, as easily can happen, and is higher than you, or if on his arrival you have not yet made your embankments and covered your,, self well with them, at once, and without your having any defense, he dislodges you, and you are forced to move out of your fortress and enter into combat. This happened to the Spaniards in the battle of Ravenna; where they encamped between the River Ronco and an embankment; since they had not built their bank high enough to be adequate, and the French had a little advantage in the lay of the land, the artillery forced the Spaniards to move out of their fortifica,, tions and enter into combat. But granting that, as usually happens, the place you have occupied with your camp will be higher than the others opposed to it and that the embankments are good and secure, so that, because of the site and your other preparations, the enemy dare not assail you, in that case you come to the methods used in antiquity, when an army was in a place that could not be attacked. These are to overrun the country, to take or besiege the towns friendly to you, to hinder you in getting supplies, until some necessity forces you to remove and come to battle, where the artillery, as I shall say further on, does not accomplish much. Considering, then, the kinds of war the Romans waged and seeing that they made almost all their wars by attacking others and not by defending themselves, it is plain, if the things said above are true, that they would have had more advantage and would have made their gains more quickly it there had been guns in those times.
[Courage and fire,arms]
As to the second thing, that on account of artillery men are un, able to show their courage as they could in antiquity, I say that it is true that where men have to show themselves in small groups they are exposed to greater dangers than at that time, whenever they have to scale a city wall or make like attacks, where men are not in close order but have to appear by themselves, one at a time. And it is also true that the generals and heads of the armies are more exposed to peril of death than then, since the artillery can reach them every,, where, and it does not help them to be in the rear squadrons and to be defended by the strongest men. Nevertheless we see that the one and the other of these two dangers seldom do extraordinary harm,
because cities well fortified are not scaled, and no army makes a feeble assault on them, but if they are to be taken, the matter is brought to a siege as was done in antiquity. And even in those that are taken by assault, the perils are not much greater than in ancient times, because then those who defended cities did not lack things to shoot with, which, if they were not so violent, had the same effects as to killing men.
[Generals killed by cannon fire]
As to the deaths of generals and leaders, the twenty,four years covered by the wars in Italy in times just past3 give fewer examples than do ten years among the ancients. After Count Lodovico della Mirandola, who died at Ferrara when the Venetians some years ago assailed that state, and after the Duke of Nemours, who died at Cirignuola, not one has been killed by the artillery; for Monsieur de Foix at Ravenna died from steel and not from fire. Hence if men do not show their ability individually, it comes not from the artillery but from bad discipline and from the weakness of the armies, which, lacking ability as a whole, cannot show it in part.
[Cannon against infantry]
As to the third thing they say, that it is not possible to come to close quarters and that war will be carried on entirely by the artillery, I say that this opinion is entirely false; so it will always be held by those who try to handle their armies with the efficiency of the ancients, because he who wishes to turn out a good army must, with proce, dures either simulated or real, accustom his men to getting close to the enemy and to exchanging sword,blows with them and standing up to them. Moreover we should rely more on infantry than on cavalry, for reasons that will be given below. When we do rely on infantry, and on the methods aforesaid, artillery becomes wholly use, less, because in approaching the enemy, infantry can with greater ease escape the discharge of artillery than in antiquity they could escape the rush of elephants, of scythed chariots and of other strange opponents that the Roman infantry opposed; yet against these they always found a remedy. And so much the more easily they would have found one against artillery, to the extent that the time in which
3. Presumably Machiavelli began to reckon with Charles VIIl’s invasion in 1494. If so, he
was writing this sentence in 1517.
372 DISCOURSES 2. 17, 18
it can injure you is shorter than that in which elephants and chariots could do injury. The latter throw you into confusion in the midst of close combat; the former hinder you only before combat. This hin… drance infantry easily escape either by moving in the shelter given by the nature of the site or by lying down on the ground when the guns are fired. Yet even this is shown by experience to be unnecessary, especially in order to defend oneself from heavy pieces of artillery, which cannot be in such a way balanced, if they aim high, that they do not miss you, or if they aim low, that they do not fall short of you. But when armies then come to hand strokes, it is clearer than noon,., day that neither heavy nor light can harm you, because if the artillery…
men are in front, they become your prisoners; if they are behind, they injure their friends before they do you. If the guns are on the flanks, they still cannot strike you in such a way that you cannot attack them, and the effect mentioned will follow. This cannot be much disputed.
The Swiss give an example. At Novara, in 1513, without artillery and without cavalry, they attacked in its fortifications the French army, furnished with artillery, and defeated it without being halted by cannon fire. The reason, in addition to the things aforesaid, is that artillery must be protected, if it is going to function, either by walls or by ditches or by embankments, for when it lacks such pro,., tection, it is captured or becomes useless, just as when it is defended by men, as happens in battles and combats in the field. On the flank, cannon cannot be used except as the ancients used their instru,., ments for shooting, which they placed outside their squadrons, so that they could fight outside the order of battle; and every time they were charged by cavalry or others, they took refuge behind the legions. He who otherwise relies on them does not well understand them and is trusting himself to a thing that easily can deceive him.
If with artillery the Turk has won victories against the Sophy and
the Soldan, he has done so not because of its effect, other than that the unaccustomed noise frightened their cavalry.
[Cannon are useful to the brave]
I conclude, then, coming to the end of this discussion, that artillery is useful in an army when the valor of the ancients is com… bined with it, but that without that, it is quite useless against a valorous army.

CHAPTER 18. ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE ROMANS AND BY THE EXAMPLE OF THE ANCIENT SOLDIERY, INFANTRY OUGHT TO BE VALUED HIGHER THAN CAVALRY
With many reasons and with many instances I can show clearly how much higher in all military actions the Romans valued soldiers on foot than on horseback; on it they based all the plans of their forces. This appears in many instances: among them is their battle with the Latins at Lake Regillus; there, when the Roman army was falling back, they had their men on horseback dismount to fight on foot, to give it aid; renewing the battle in that way, they gained the victory.1 Here it is evident that the Romans had more confidence in their horsemen when they were on foot than when they were on horseback. They used this same plan in many other battles, and always found it the best remedy for their dangers.
[ Hannibal on cavalry]
To this we should not oppose the opinion of Hannibal, who, seeing in the battle of Cannae that the Consuls had made their knights dismount, said in mockery of such a plan: “Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites” (Livy 22. 49)! That is: “I should prefer that they would give them to me in chains.” Though this opinion came from the mouth of a very able man, nevertheless, if one has to follow authority, one ought to believe a Roman republic and her many very able generals rather than a single Hannibal.
[The foundation of an army is infantry]
Besides, without authorities, there are obvious reasons for it. A man on foot can go into many places where a horse cannot go. He can be taught to keep in formation and, if disordered, to re,.form; it is difficult to make horses keep their formation, and impossible, after disorder, to get them back into it. Besides this, there are some horses that, like some men, have little courage, and some that have plenty; and many times it happens that a courageous horse is ridden by a cowardly man, and a cowardly horse by a courageous man. In
Livy 2. 20.
374 DISCOURSES 2. 18
whatever way this disparity goes, it causes loss and disorder. Infan.­ try, in good order, are able easily to defeat cavalry, and are with difficulty defeated by them. This opinion is corroborated, in addi.­ tion to many instances ancient and modern, by the authority of those who give rules for civil affairs, in places where they show that in early times wars were first made with cavalry, because there was as yet no discipline for the infantry, but when these were disciplined, at once it was realized how much more valuable they were than cavalry. It is not, however, for this reason true that cavalry are not necessary in armies, to do scouting, to overrun and lay waste the country, to follow the enemy when they are in flight, and also in part to oppose the hostile cavalry. But the foundation and the strength of an army, and that which ought to be most highly valued, are the infantry.
[Foolish neglect of infantry in Italy]
Among the sins of the Italian princes, who have made Italy the slave of foreigners, none is greater than to have made little account of this type, and to have turned all their attention to soldiers on horse,, back. This fault has arisen because of the malice of the leaders and the ignorance of those who rule states. When Italian warfare was turned over, twenty,five years ago and earlier, to men who had no territory, but were like soldiers of fortune, they at once went to con, sidering how they might maintain their reputations, since they were armed and the princes were unarmed. Because they could not pay regularly a great number of infantry, and they did not have subjects of whom they could make use, and a small number did not give them reputation, they turned to keeping cavalry, because two bun,, dred or three hundred cavalry that were paid by a condottiere would keep up a reputation for him, and the payment was not such that it could not be met by men who had territory. That this might more easily continue, and to keep their reputation higher, they took away all the esteem and reputation of infantry and turned it over to their cavalry. And they so prospered in this mistake that in the largest army there was the least possible number of infantry. This practice, together with many other mistakes mixed with it, made this Italian soldiery of ours so weak that this country has easily been trampled on by all the Northerners.
[ A Roman instance]
More plainly this folly of esteeming cavalry higher than infantry is shown by another Roman instance.2 The Romans were besieging Sora, and when a squadron of cavalry came out of the town to attack the camp, the Roman Master of Horse moved against them with his cavalry, and as they met face to face, chance brought about that at the beginning of the fight the leaders of both the armies were killed. The others remaining without leadership and the fight never.­ theless going on, the Romans, to conquer the enemy more easily, dismounted and forced the hostile cavalry, if they wished to defend themselves, to do the same. And with all this the Romans carried off the victory. There could not be a better example than this for showing how much more strength there is in infantry than in cavalry, because if in other actions the Consuls had the Roman cavalry dis.­ mount, it was to aid infantry that was suffering and had need of help. But in this place they dismounted not to aid infantry nor to fight with footmen of the enemy, but when they were fighting on horse.­ back with cavalry, they judged that since they could not overcome them on horseback, they could by dismounting more easily defeat them. I conclude, then, that well.-ordered infantry cannot without the greatest difficulty be overcome except by other infantry.
[ Roman infantry and Parthian cavalry]
Crassus and Marc Antony, Romans, moved freely through the domain of the Parthians many days with very few cavalry and many infantry, and had opposed to them the countless cavalry of the Parthians. Crassus was left there with part of his army, dead. Marc Antony ably saved himsel( Nevertheless these hardships of the Romans make plain how much the infantry was superior to the cavalry, because, being in an open country where the mountains are few, the rivers very few, the seas far off, and distant from every convenience, nonetheless Marc Antony, in the judgment of the Parthians themselves, very ably saved himself; nor did all the Parthian cavalry ever have the courage to attempt the ranks of his army. If Crassus died there, anyone who reads of his actions will see that he was rather deceived than overpowered, and never in all his troubles did the Parthians dare to charge him. On the contrary,.
2. Livy 9. 22.
376 DISCOURSES 2. 18, 19
always keeping on his Ranks, impeding his supplies, and making him promises and not observing them, they brought him to a state of utter misery.
[ The Swiss at Novara and Marignano]
I should believe I had to take more trouble in demonstrating how much the strength of infantry surpasses that of cavalry if there were not many modern instances that give testimony in great abundance. We have seen nine thousand Swiss at Novara, mentioned earlier, go to confront ten thousand cavalry and the same number of infantry and overcome them, because the cavalry could not damage them; the infantry, for the most part men from Gascony, badly disciplined, they did not respect. Later, near Milan, we see twenty,six thousand Swiss attack Francis, the King of France, who had with him twenty thousand cavalry, forty thousand infantry, and a hundred cannon.3 And if they did not win the battle as at Novara, they fought valor, ously for two days; and then, when they were defeated, half of them escaped. With his infantry, Marcus Regulus Attilius was so bold as to resist not merely cavalry but elephants. And if his plan did not succeed, it was not because the efficiency of his infantry was so slight that he could not rely on them to overcome that difficulty.
[Good infantry yields only to better infantry]
I repeat, therefore, that to overcome disciplined infantry, one must oppose them with infantry better disciplined; otherwise one goes to obvious defeat. In the times of Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan, about sixteen thousand Swiss descended into Lombardy. Hence that duke, then having Carmignuola as his general, sent him against them with about four thousand cavalry and a few infantry.4 Not knowing their method of fighting, he attacked them with his cavalry, in the belief that he could defeat them quickly. On finding them immovable, he retired with loss of many of his men. But as a most vigorous man, able in new events to take up new plans, after getting more soldiers, he went to meet them. When he approached,
Modern historians somewhat diminish the numbers on both sides, keeping about the same proportions.
My copy of the.first Florentine edition of the DrscoRSI (1531) reads IIII. mila cavagli. The usual reading is mille, but one thousand seems too few for sixteen thousand enemies. For this battle Machiavelli cannot have drawn on one of his important sources, the DECADES of Flavius Blondus (3. 1), who reckons the Swiss at four thousand.
he dismounted all his men..-at..-arms and put them at the front of his infantry; then he attacked the Swiss. The latter had no remedy, because Carmignuola’s men..-at..-arms, who were on foot and well armored, easily entered into the Swiss ranks without receiving any wounds, and when they had entered among them, they could easily destroy them; hence of all the Swiss there remained alive only that part which the humanity of Carmignuola preserved.”
[ Roman infantry discipline must be revived]
I believe that many realize this difference in efficiency between the one and the other of these types, but so great is the misfortune of these times that neither ancient instances nor modern ones nor the confession of the error is enough to make modern princes take heed. Yet they should consider that if they are going to give reputation to the soldiers of a province or of a state, they must revive those methods, stick to them, give them reputation, give them life, in order that in return they may give him6 life and reputation. As they deviate from these ways, so they deviate from the other ways spoken of above. From this it comes that acquisitions bring harm rather than greatness to a state, as I shall explain below.
Modern historians decrease both the number of the Swiss and the completeness of the victory {Charles Oman, THE ART OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES [London, 1924], II, 263).
him. Singular in the original, though them is required to fit with they {i.e., modern princes). Such shifts are characteristic of Machiavelli’s style.

CHAPTER 19. CONQUESTS BY REPUB… LICS NOT WELL ORGANIZED AND NOT PROCEEDING IN ACCORD WITH RO… MAN ABILITY BRING THEM RUIN, NOT PROSPERITY
[The power of infantry shown at Novara]
These opinions contrary to the truth, founded on the evil exam..­ ples that have been introduced by these corrupt ages of ours, keep men from any attempt to deviate from the accustomed ways. Was it possible, up to thirty years ago, to persuade an Italian that ten thousand infantry could attack ten thousand cavalry and the same number of infantry on level ground, and not merely fight with them
DISCOURSES 2. 19
but beat them, as happened, in the instance we have many times brought forward, at Novara And though the histories are full of these, nevertheless men would not put any faith in them. Or if they did, they would say that in these times arms are better, and that a squadron of men…at…arms is fit to charge a rock and not merely a body of infantry. And so with these false excuses they would corrupt their judgments, nor would they consider that Lucullus with a few infantry defeated a hundred and fifty thousand cavalry of Tigranes; and that among those horsemen there was a sort of cavalry in every way like our men,.at,.arms;1 and also that this fallacy has been re,. vealed by the example of the Northerners.2
[Conquests, except by Roman methods, are foolish]
And since this shows that about infantry everything the histories tell is true, they ought to believe that all the other ancient ways are true and useful. And if this were believed, republics and princes would make fewer mistakes; they would be better able to resist any attack made on them; they would not trust to running away; and those who had a commonwealth in their hands would know better how to direct it, whether in expanding it or in maintaining it. And they would believe that to increase the inhabitants of their city, to get for themselves associates and not subjects, to send colonies to guard countries conquered, to make capital of the spoil, to overcome the enemy with raids and battles and not with sieges, to keep the treasury rich, the individual poor, to support military training with the utmost zeal, is the true way to give greatness to a republic and to gain power. And if this method for growing great does not please them, they should remember that conquests through any other course are the ruin of a republic, and they will draw rein on every ambition, regulating their city well inside with laws and with customs, pro,. hibiting its expansion, thinking only of self…defense and of keeping defenses well regulated. Thus the republics of Germany do, which by these methods are living free and have so lived for some time.
1. In THE ART OF WAR (2. oo, p. 601) Machiavelli is less sweeping, admitting that ancient cavalry did not have arched saddles and stirrups and that their armor was poorer. He might also have said that the Parthians fought with the bow as well as with the lance.
2. The Swiss. Apparently Machiavelli did not know of the English bowmen, so successful against the French chivalry in the Hundred Years War. They, however, could be effectively employed only in co,operation with other troops; the Swiss infantry acted alone.
[ It is difficult for a republic to stand still]
Nevertheless, as I said before when I discussed the difference between organizing for expansion and organizing for maintenance, it is impossible for a republic to succeed in standing still and enjoying its liberties in its narrow confines, because if she does not molest some other, she will be molested, and from being molested rises the wish and the necessity for expansion; and when she does not have an enemy outside, she finds him at home, as it seems necessarily happens to all great states. And if the republics of Germany can live in that way and have lasted for some time, it results from certain conditions in that country, which do not exist elsewhere, without which such a mode of life could not be continued.
[ The free cities of Germany]
That part of Germany of which I speak was, like France and Spain, subject to the Roman Empire. But when the authority of that Empire had declined and had grown slight in that province, the more powerful of those cities, according to the meekness or the neces,, sity of the Emperors, began to free themselves, buying themselves off from the Empire by reserving to it a small annual tribute, so that, little by little, all those cities that were direct dependents of the Emperor, and were not subject to any prince, have in such a fashion bought themselves off. It happened in these same times when these cities were buying themselves off that certain communities subject to the Duke of Austria rebelled against him. Among these were Fri,, bourg, and the Swiss, and the like, who, prospering in the beginning, little by little increased so much that not merely have they not re,, turned under the yoke of Austria but are a cause of fear to all their neighbors. These are the people who are called the Swiss.
[How the German cities live in peace]
This region is, then, divided among Swiss, republics that are called free cities, princes, and Emperor. And the reason why, among so many different kinds of government, wars do not spring up there, or if they do spring up, do not last long, is that symbol of the Emperor, who, though he does not have forces, yet has such reputa,, tion among them that he is their conciliator and, with his authority interposing himself as mediator, quickly gets rid of all strife. And
the greatest and the longest wars that have been fought there are those that have gone on between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria. And though for many years the Emperor and the Duke of Austria have been the same, he has not therefore been able to overcome the bold., ness of the Swiss, with whom there has never been a way of agreement except through force. Nor has the rest of Germany given him much aid, both because the communities do not like attacking anyone who wishes to live in freedom like themselves and because those princes partly cannot, because they are poor, partly do not wish to, because they envy his power. Those communities, then, live content with their small dominion because they do not have reason, on account of the imperial authority, to wish it greater. They live united within their walls, because they have an enemy who is near and would take his opportunity to seize them if ever they came to discord.
But if conditions were different in that region, it would be necessary
for them to seek to grow greater and to break that quiet of theirs.
[Florence and Venice have grown weaker by their conquests]
Because such conditions are not found elsewhere, this way of living cannot be adopted, so states must either grow greater by the method of leagues, or grow as did the Romans. He who conducts himself otherwise seeks not life but death and ruin, for in a thousand ways and for many causes gains are damaging, since he is very likely at one time to gain dominion and not strength. Yet he who gains dominion and not at the same time strength, must fall. He cannot gain strength who grows poor in wars even though he is victorious, because he lays out more than he gets from his conquests, as the Venetians and the Florentines have done, who have been much weaker since the one has had Lombardy and the other Tuscany than they were when one was content with the sea and the other with six miles ofsurrounding territory.3 The whole comes from having wished to make gains and not having known how to take the means. These cities deserve blame the more in so far as they have the less excuse, because they have seen the means the Romans used and could have followed their example, whereas the Romans, without any example, through their prudence, by themselves knew how to find means.
3. Territory extending six miles from the walls in all directions.
[ Conquest injured even Rome]
Besides this, conquered territories sometimes do no small damage to the best.,organized state, as when she conquers a city or province full of dissipations, from which she borrows some of their bad cus., toms in the course of her dealings with them, as in the conquest of Capua happened first to Rome, later to Hannibal.4 Indeed if Capua had been more distant, so that the soldiers’ dissipation had not had a remedy near at hand, or if Rome had been to any extent corrupt, without doubt that conquest would have been the ruin of the Roman republic. Titus Livius confirms this with these words: “Even then not at all wholesome for military discipline, Capua, a storehouse of all the pleasures, turned away the captivated spirits of the soldiers from the remembrance of their country” (Livy 7. 38). Truly such cities or provinces revenge themselves upon the conqueror without combat and without bloodshed, because, filling him with their evil customs, they expose him to be conquered by whoever assails him. Juvenal in his Satires could not have dealt better with this matter, saying that because of their conquest of foreign lands, foreign customs had entered the breasts of the Romans, and instead of frugality and other very excellent virtues, “gluttony and luxury fastened upon her and revenged the conquered world.” If, then, success in conquest was beginning to destroy the Romans in times when they were acting with such prudence and such vigor, what will happen then to those whose actions are far different from theirs, and who, besides the other mistakes they make, of which I have spoken at length above, depend on soldiers who are either mercenary or auxiliary From this there often come upon them those afflictions of which mention will be made in the following chapter.
Livy 7. 38-41; 23. 18.

CHAPTER 20. THE SORT OF DANGER RISKED BY A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC MAKING USE OF AUXILIARY OR MERCENARY SOLDIERS
If I had not treated at length, in another work of mine,1 how valueless mercenary and auxiliary soldiers are, and how valuable
1. PRINCE 12 and 13. See also the Index. Possibly Machiavelli’s reference is to his ART
OF WAR, printed in 1521. With the ideas of that work he would have been familiar as early as
one’s own, I should linge further over this Discourse, but having elsewhere spoken of the subject at length, I shall be brief in this section. Yet I have not been willing to pass it by completely, since as to auxiliary soldiers I have found in Titus Livius so extensive an example. Auxiliary soldiers are those that a prince or a republic sends, officered and paid by him, for your aid.
And coming to the text of Livy,2 I say that the Romans in two different places defeated two armies of the Samnites with their own armies, that they had sent to the aid of the Capuans, and by this freed the Capuans from the war that the Samnites were making on them; thereupon returning to Rome, they left two legions in the city of Capua to defend her, so that the Capuans, deprived of a garrison, would not again become the booty of the Samnites. These legions, rotting in idleness, were delighted with that city; hence, forgetting their native city and the respect due to the Senate, they determined to take arms and make themselves masters of that land which with their valor they should have defended, since they believed that the inhabit… ants were not worthy to have those goods they could not protect. Foreseeing this business, the Romans crushed it and set it right, as we shall show at length where we speak of conspiracies.3
[ Auxiliaries the worst of soldiers]
I say therefore, again, that of all the types of soldier, the auxiliaries are most harmful, because that prince or that republic that uses them to aid him has no authority over them, but only the prince who sends them has such authority, because auxiliary soldiers are those who are sent to you by a prince, as I have said, under his own officers, under his own ensigns, and who are paid by him, as was the army the Romans sent to Capua. Such soldiers as these, when they have conquered, usually plunder the one who has hired them as much as the one against whom they have been hired, and they do it either through the wickedness of the prince who has sent them or through their own ambition. The intention of the Romans was not to break the agreement and the treaties they had made with the Capuans; nevertheless, those soldiers were persuaded by what they thought so
the time when he was organizing militia in rural Tuscany. Could he not have written much of
it as early as that?
Livy 7. 32, 33.
DISCOURSES 3. 6.
easy a conquest to determine on taking from the Capuans their city and their state. It would be possible to give many instances of this, but I intend to stop with the preceding, and with that of the people of Regium, whose lives and whose city were taken away by a legion that the Romans had put there as a garrison.
[Foolish ambition causes the employment of auxiliaries]
A prince-or a republic-then, ought to adopt any other plan before he resorts to bringing auxiliary soldiers into his state for defense, ifhe must depend wholly on them; for any pact, any treaty, however hard, that he can make with the enemy will be easier on him than such a plan. When past things are carefully read and present ones reviewed, it appears that for one who has succeeded with this plan, great numbers have been deceived. Indeed a prince or an ambitious republic cannot have a better chance for seizing a city or a province than to be asked to send armies for its defense. Therefore anyone so ambitious as to call in such aid not merely to defend himself but to attack others is seeking to gain what he cannot hold and what can easily be taken from him by the ally who conquers it for him. But the ambition of men is so great that when they can satisfy a present desire, they do not imagine the ill that in a short time will result from it. Moreover, in this matter as in the others I have discussed, ancient examples do not move them, because if such examples did move them, they would see that the more liberality they show their neigh… hors and the less they incline to seizing them, the more those neighbors throw themselves into their laps, as I explain below with the example of the Capuans.

CHAPTER 21. THE FIRST PRAETOR THAT THE ROMANS SENT OUT THEY SENT TO CAPUA, AFTER THEY HAD BEEN MAKING WAR FOUR HUNDRED YEARS
[The Romans allowed conquered cities to keep their old laws]
How different in their way of going about expansion the Romans were from those who in the present times enlarge their dominion, has been sufficiently discussed above;1 I have also said that they let
1, DISCOURSES 2. J, 41 19.
cities which were not destroyed live under their own laws, even those which surrendered themselves not as companions but as sub,, jects. In such cities they did not leave any sign of control by the Roman People, but laid down certain conditions; if these were observed, the Romans kept the cities in their situation and dignity. We know that these methods were practiced until they went outside Italy and turned states and kingdoms into provinces. A very clear example is that the first praetor they sent anywhere went to Capua; they sent him not through their ambition but because the Capuans asked for him, for, being at variance with one another, they judged it necessary to have in their city a Roman citizen who would rear,, ganize and reunite them. Moved by this example and forced by the same need, the people of Antium also asked for a prefect. Titus Livius says on this affair and on this new way of ruling, “because now not merely arms, but Roman laws were dominant” (Livy 9. 20 ). So we see how much this method facilitated the expansion of Rome.
[ The advantages of local rule]
Those cities especially that are used to living in freedom or are used to being governed by their own countrymen are contented to live more quietly under a rule they do not see, even though there is some severity in it, than under one which they think reproaches them every day with their servitude, since they see it every day. In addition, it is a benefit to the prince that, since his ministers do not have under their power the judges and magistrates who judge civil and criminal cases in those cities, there never can be a sentence to the blame or reproach of the prince; hence there are few causes for slander and hatred against him.2 Besides the ancient instances that might be brought up, there is a recent one in Italy. As everybody knows, Genoa has often been occupied by the French; at such times, except at present, the king has always sent there a French governor to govern in his name. Only now, not through the choice of the king, but because necessity has so ordered, he allows that city to be governed by herself and by a Genoese governor. And he who investigates which of these two ways brings more security to the king in his rule over the city, and more contentment to the people, without doubt will approve this last way.
2. This and the following sentence suggest THE PRINCE rather than a work on republics.
[ Ambitious protectors are suspected]
Besides this, men so much the more quickly throw themselves into your lap as you appear the less inclined to take possession of them; and they fear you so much the less, with respect to their liberty, the more humane and friendly with them you are. This friendliness and liberality made the Capuans run to ask the praetor from the Romans; yet if the Romans had shown the least desire to send him, the Capuans would at once have been made suspicious and would have drawn back.
[Florence dealt humanely with Pistoia]
But why is it necessary to go for instances to Capua and to Rome, since we have them in Florence and in Tuscany? Everybody knows how long ago it was that the city of Pistoia came willingly under Florentine rule. Everybody also knows how much hatred there has been between the Florentines and the Pisans, the Lucchese, and the Sienese. And this diversity of feeling has not arisen because the Pistolese do not value their liberty as much as do the others and do not reckon themselves as high as the others, but because with them the Florentines have always conducted themselves like brothers, but with the others as enemies. For this reason the Pistolese have run willingly under their rule; the others have made and now make every effort not to come under it. And without doubt if the Floren., tines either by way ofleagues or of aid had tamed their neighbors and not made them wild, at this hour they would be lords of Tuscany. It is not to be understood by this that I think one never has to use arms and force, but they ought to be reserved for the last place, where and when other methods do not suffice.

CHA TER 22. HOW FAR WRONG IN JUDGING GREAT THINGS MEN’S OPINIONS OFTEN ARE
[Corrupt republics employ excellent men only in necessity]
How far wrong the opinions of men often are, those who witness their decisions have seen and still see, for often their decisions, if not made by excellent men, are contrary to all truth. Yet, especially in quiet times, excellent men in corrupt republics, as the result of envy and other ambitious reasons, are looked on as enemies; hence the
386 DISCOURSES 2. 22
people follow either someone who through general selGdeception is thought good, or someone put forward by men interested in what they can get from the public, rather than in its good. In adverse times this deception is finally uncovered, and of necessity the people turn for help to those who in quiet times were almost forgotten.
This matter will be fully considered in its place.1
[ Inexperienced men easily deceived]
Various things also happen about which men oflittle experience in affairs are easily deceived, since there is in these happenings much that seems true, such as to make men believe about such a matter whatever they have been persuaded to think.
[Pope Leo’s mistake]
I have spoken of these things because of what Numisius, the praetor, when the Latins were defeated by the Romans, convinced them of,2 and because of what many believed a few years ago when Francis I, the King of France, came to take Milan,3 which was defended by the Swiss. When Louis XII was dead, Francis of Angouleme, who succeeded to the Kingdom of France, desired to restore to his kingdom the dukedom of Milan, which a few years before had been captured by the Swiss with the aid of Pope Julius II; he wished therefore to have helpers in Italy who would make his undertaking easy. And besides the Venetians, whose friendship Louis had regained, he tried the Florentines and Pope Leo X, for he thought his undertaking would be easier when he had regained their friendship, since the King of Spain had forces in Lombardy, and the Emperor had forces in Verona. Pope Leo did not yield to the wishes of the King but was persuaded by those who advised him (it is said) to remain neutral; for they demonstrated that in this plan lay certain victory, because it did not tend to the good of the Church to have either the King or the Swiss powerful in Italy; if he wished to bring her back to her ancient liberty, he would have to free her from slavery to both of them. And because the Pope could not conquer either one, whether separate or united, the only possibility was that
DISCOURSES 3· 16.
2. Livy 8. 11. See also the end of this chapter.
In 1515. Can Machiavelli’s ”few years” be reckoned as fewer than three? If not, he wrote the passage in 1518 or later.
one should conquer the other, and that the Church with her friends should afterward attack the winner. And it was impossible to find a better occasion than the present, since both of them were in the field, and the Pope’s forces were in such a condition that they could present themselves on the borders of Lombardy, and near both armies, with the excuse of wishing to guard his property, and there remain until they came to battle. It was probable, since both armies were valiant, that this would be bloody on both sides and would leave the victor so weak that the Pope could easily attack and defeat him. Thus with renown he would come to be lord of Lombardy and arbiter of all Italy. And how false this opinion was is shown by the outcome: when the Swiss were beaten after a long fight, the Pope’s soldiers and the Spanish did not have courage to attack the victors; on the contrary, they prepared to flee. Even that would have been useless to them if it had not been for the kindness or the slug,, gishness of the King, who did not seek a second victory, but thought it enough to make an agreement with the Church.
[Victorious armies are formidable]
There are certain reasons for this opinion that at a distance seem true but are altogether foreign to the truth. It rarely happens that the victor loses many of his soldiers; to the victors death comes in battle, not in flight,4 yet in the heat of combat, when men are face to face, few of them fall, especially because it usually lasts but a short time. And if indeed it does last a long time and many of the victors are killed, so great is the reputation resulting from victory, and such is the terror it carries along with itself, that it far outweighs the damage the victor suffers through the death of soldiers. Hence an army that attacks him, believing him weakened, finds itself deceived, if indeed that army is not so strong that at any time, whether before the victory or after, it could engage the victor. In this case it might, according to its fortune and strength, win or lose, but the one that fought earlier and won would have the advantage rather than the other.
This is proved true by the experience of the Latins, by the fallacy
that N umisius the praetor accepted, and by the damage suffered by those cities who believed him. When the Romans had beaten the Latins, he proclaimed through all the country of Latium that then was the time to attack the Romans, weakened by the battle they had
4. A beaten army loses heavily when it flees, without organized resistance.
388 DISCOURSES 2. 22, 23
fought, and that the Romans had nothing but the name of victory, but had borne all the other losses just as if they had been beaten, and that the smallest force that would assail them afresh would be enough to put an end to them. Therefore the cities who believed him formed a new army, and were at once defeated and suffered all the loss that those holding such an opinion always suffer.

CHAPTER 23. HOW FAR THE ROMANS IN PUNISHING SUBJECTS FOR SOME AFFAIR REQUIRING PUNISHMENT DEPART..­ ED FROM A MIDDLE COURSE
[A prince, or a republic, must measure his forces]
“Now in Latium such was the state of things that they could endure neither peace nor war” (Livy 8. 13). Of all unhappy condi,, tions, the most unhappy is that of a prince-or a republic-brought to such extremities that he cannot accept peace or carry on war. In such a position are those too much injured by terms of peace, yet who, if they try to make war, are forced either to throw themselves away as the booty of those who aid them or to be the booty of the enemy. To these extremities men are brought by worthless theories and worthless plans, because of not measuring well their forces, as I said above.1 For any republic or any prince that measures them well is with difficulty brought to such an extremity as were the Latins: when they should not have made an agreement with the Romans, they made one; when they should not have started war against them, they started one. Thus they succeeded in so acting that the hostility and the friendship of the Romans were equally harmful to them. The Latins, then, were beaten and altogether ruined, first by Manlius Torquatus and afterward by Camillus; the latter forced them to surrender and resubmit themselves to Roman power; then putting garrisons in all the cities of Latium, and taking hostages from all, he returned to Rome and reported to the Senate that all Latium was in the hands of the Roman people.
DISCOURSES 2. 10.
[ The Romans avoided half.,,way measures]
And because this punishment is noteworthy and deserves to be heeded, so that princes can imitate it when they have similar op”‘ portunities, I wish to quote the words of Livy, put in the mouth of Camillus. They make certain the method of expansion used by the Romans, who in punishments of state always avoided half…way measures and turned to complete ones. For government is nothing other than holding your subjects in such a way that they cannot harm you or that they do not wish to. This is done either by making your… self entirely secure against them, taking from them every means for injuring you, or by benefiting them to such an extent that they cannot reasonably wish to change their fortunes. All this is covered, first, by Camillus’ statement, and then by the Senatls decision on it. His words were these: “The immortal gods have made you so power… fol in this matter that they have put in your power to decide whether Latium is to exist or not. Therefore, so far as Latium is concerned, you can provide peace for yourselves forever, either by destroying or by forgiving. Do you wish to make harsh decisions against those who have surrendered and are beaten You can annihilate all Lati… um, make vast deserts of the places from which you have so often drawn an excellent allied army for many great wars. Do you wish, after the example of your fathers, to increase the Roman state by receiving the conquered as citizens You have at hand material for rising to the greatest glory. Certainly the most solid rule by far is that under which subjects are happy. Therefore while the spirits of these Latins are benumbed with expectation, you must subdue them with either punishment or benefit” (Livy 8. 13). This statement was followed by the decision of the Senate, in accord with the words of the Consul. Bringing to judgment, city by city, all those of im… portance, they either showed them favor or destroyed them, granting exemptions and privileges to those who were favored, giving them citizenship, and in every way assuring their security. As for the others, they destroyed their cities, sent colonies there, brought their people to Rome, and scattered them in such a way that thereafter they could do no harm either with arms or with prudence. As I have said, the Romans never used indecisive measures.
390 DISCOURSES 2. 23
[The Valdichiana’ s rebellion against Florence]
This decision princes should imitate. This the Florentines should have adopted when in 1502 Arezzo rebelled, with all the Valdi…. chiana. If they had done so, they would have made the city of Florence very great, and provided her with those fields she lacked for food. But they used that half,,way policy I have mentioned, which is very dangerous in punishing men; part of the Aretines they exiled, part they fined; from all they took away their offices and their ancient ranks in the city; they left the city unharmed. And if any citizen in the consultations advised that Arezzo be destroyed, those who thought themselves wiser said that it would be little credit to the republic to destroy her, because it would appear that Florence lacked forces to hold her. These reasons are of the sort that seem true and are not, because for this same reason it would not be possible to execute a parricide or a wicked and rebellious person, since it would be dis,. graceful for a prince to show that he did not have force to restrain one man alone. And they do not see-such men as hold opinions of this kind-that men individually and a city as a whole sin sometimes against a state, so that, for an example to the others, for security to himself, a prince has no other remedy than to destroy them. And honor consists in being able and knowing how to punish such a city, not in being able with a thousand perils to hold her. For that prince who does not punish him who errs, in such a way that he cannot afterward err, is held ignorant or worthless.
[ Subjects to be either benefited or destroyed]
As to this punishment that the Romans inflicted, its necessity is confirmed also by the judgment they gave on the people of Privern,, um. In this we ought, according to the passage in Livy, to mark two things: one, what is said above, that subjects ought to be either benefited or wiped out; the other, how much nobility of spirit, how much speaking the truth helps, when it is spoken in the presence of wise men. The Roman senate was brought together to pronounce judgment on the inhabitants of Privernum, who, having rebelled, were then by force brought back under Roman sway. The people of that town sent many citizens to ask pardon from the Senate, and when they came into its presence, one of the senators asked one of them what punishment he thought the Privernati deserved. To this
the man answered: “That which they deserve who think themselves worthy ofliberty.” To this the Consul replied: “And if we should remit the penalty to you, what sort of peace could we hope to have with you ” To which he replied: “If you grant a good one, loyal and lasting; if a bad one, not very long.” Therefore the wiser part of the Senate, though many were disturbed by it, said “they had heard the voice of one who was free and a man, and they did not believe it possible for any people, or even an individual, to remain longer in a painful condition than they must. Peace would be sure where willing men had made it, and where they tried to get servitude, they could not hope to have loyalty” (Livy 8. 21). Andon these words they determined that the men of Privernum should be Roman citizens, and honored them with the privileges of citizenship, saying that “only those who consider nothing except liberty are worthy to be Romans.” So pleasing to noble minds was this true and noble reply, for every other reply would have been lying and cowardly. And those who believe otherwise about men, especially about any who are used either to being or to seeming to themselves to be free, are deceived; and under this deception they adopt plans not good for themselves and sure not to satisfy others. From which come frequent rebellions and the destruction of states.
[Halfway measures imprudent]
But to return to our theme, I conclude, both because of this and because of that judgment pronounced on the Latins, as follows: when one has to judge powerful cities and those used to living in liberty, it is necessary either to wipe them out or to treat them with kindness; otherwise, every decision is vain. And above all one should avoid any hal£way measure, which is hurtful, as it was to the Sam,. nites when they had shut up the Romans at the Caudine Forks; then they did not choose to follow the opinion of that old man who advised them that the Romans should be allowed to go away with honor or that they should all be killed.2 But taking a hal£way measure, after disarming them and sending them under the yoke, they allowed them to go away full of shame and anger. So a little later they learned to their damage that the opinion of that old man
2. Livy 9.3.
392 DISCOURSES 2, 23, 24
had been valuable and their decision damaging, as in its place will be discussed more fully.3
3. DISCOURSES 3. 40-42.

CHAPTER 24. FORTRESSES GENERALLY ARE MUCH MORE HARMFUL THAN USEFUL
[Free Rome did not build fortresses to overawe subjects]
It will seem perhaps to those who think themselves wise in our times a thing not well considered that the Romans, in their wish to make sure of the peoples of Latium and of the city of Privernum, did not consider building fortresses as a bridle to keep them faithful, especially since it is a saying in Florence, brought forward by our wise men, that Pisa and other like cities must be held with fortresses. And truly if the Romans had been of their sort, they would have decided to build them, but because they were of different ability, different judgment, different power, they did not build them. And while Rome was free and kept her laws and her wise and vigorous institutions, she never built any fortresses to hold either cities or provinces; she did, however, keep some of those already built. So, having seen the actions of the Romans in this matter and that of the princes of our times, I wish to consider whether it is good to build fortresses and if they bring loss or profit to him who builds them. We must observe, then, that fortresses are built either to defend one,, self from enemies or to defend oneself from subjects. In the first case they are not necessary; in the second, harmful.
[ A Prince cannot by means of fortresses retain subjects who hate him]
So giving the reasons why, in the second case, they are harmful, I say about a prince or a republic that is in fear of subjects and of their rebellion, first, that such fear must come from hate which the subjects feel for their ruler; that hate comes from his evil conduct; his evil conduct comes either from his believing he can hold them by force or from his imprudence as ruler. One of the things causing his belief that he can rule by force is that he has fortresses holding his subjects down; because the bad actions that are the cause of their hatred come in good part from that prince or that republic having such fortresses, which, when that is true, are far more harmful than
profitable. Because, first, as I have said, they make you more rash and more violent with your subjects. Second, they do not give such security as you imagine, for all the forces, all the kinds of violence used to hold a people are worthless, except two: either you are always ready to put a good army in the field, as the Romans were; or you scatter, destroy, disarrange, and disunite the people, so that they cannot join together to attack you. If you make them poor, “weap,, ons are left to the plundered”; if you disarm them, “rage supplies weapons”;1 if you kill their heads and go on to injure the others, the heads spring up again, like those of the Hydra. If you build for,, tresses, they are serviceable in times of peace, because they give you more courage to mistreat your people, but in times of war they are most unserviceable, for they are attacked by your enemy and by your subjects, and it is not possible for them to resist both. And if ever they were unserviceable, they are in our times, because of artillery; through its destructive power small places, and those where embank,, ments cannot be placed in the rear, are impossible of defense, as we said above.2
[ A good prince relies on his people’s good will]
I am going to debate this matter in more detail. Either you, prince, plan with these fortresses to hold in check the people of your city, or you, prince or republic, plan to curb a city taken in war. I am going to turn to the prince, and I say to him: to hold the citizens in check, nothing can be more useless than such a fortress, for the reasons given above, because it makes you quicker and less hesitant about oppressing your subjects, and that oppression makes them so disposed to your ruin and stirs them up in such a way that your fortress, which is the cause of it, cannot then defend you. So a wise and good prince, to keep himself good, in order not to give his sons reason or courage to become bad, will never build a fortress, so that his sons will rely not on fortresses but on the people’s good will.
[The Sforzas damaged by the Castle of Milan]
Though Count Francesco Sforza, who became duke of Milan, was reputed wise, and yet he built a fortress in Milan, I say that
Juvenal, SATIRES 8. 124; Virgil, AENEID 1. 150.
2. In DISCOURSES 2. 17, Machiavelli tells of building additional fortifications to the rear of
walls destroyed by bombardment. See also ART OF WAR, book 7.
therein he was not wise, for the outcome has shown that the fortress tended to the harm, not the safety, of his heirs. They, thinking it enabled them to live in security and they could do injury to their citizens and subjects, did not refrain from every sort of violence. Hence, becoming beyond measure hated, they lost that state as soon as an enemy attacked. That fortress did not defend them; in war it did them no good and in peace it did them harm in plenty. If they had not had it and through imprudence had dealt harshly with their citizens, they would have discovered their danger more quickly and would have drawn back. Then they could have resisted the French attack more courageously with friendly subjects, but having no fortress, than they could with hostile subjects, though having the
fortress. Fortresses do not help you in any way, because you lose them either through the treachery of their garrisons or through vigorous attacks or through starvation. If you expect them to be of use in helping you recover a state you have lost, where only the fortress is
left to you, you must have an army for attacking the enemy who has driven you out; if you have this army, you will get the state again in any case, just as though the fortress were not there-and more easily, in so far as men will be more friendly to you than they will after pride derived from the fortress has led you to mistreat them. Thus experi,. ence has shown that this fortress of Milan, in times adverse either to the Sforza family or to the French, has done no good to either. On the contrary, it has brought much damage and injury to both, since, by reason of it, they have not tried to find more creditable ways for holding that state.
[ The Duke of Urbino destroyed fortresses]
Guidobaldo Duke of Urbino, son of Frederick (who in his time was so greatly esteemed as a general), was driven out of his state by Cesare Borgia, Pope Alexander VI’s son, and later, through an unexpected event, returned; thereupon he had all the fortresses in that province destroyed, thinking them injurious. Since he was loved by the people, he did not wish fortresses on their account; and
as to the enemy, he saw that he could not defend his fortresses, since they need an army in the field to defend them. Hence he decided to destroy them.
[ Pope Julius and Niccolo da Castello]
Pope Julius, after driving the Bentivogli from Bologna, built a fortress in that city and then allowed a governor of his to maltreat the people. So the city rebelled, and at once he lost the fortress. Thus the fortress was of no use to him and did him harm, though, if he had acted differently, it would have been of use to him. Niccolo da Castello, father of the Vitelli, having returned to his native city, from which he was an exile, at once demolished two fortresses that Pope Sixtos IV had built there, believing that not the fortress but the good will of the people must keep him in that state.
[ The fortress dominating Genoa]
But of all examples the latest and the most worthy of note in every way, and fit to show the uselessness of building them and the value of demolishing them, is that of Genoa, in very recent times. Everybody knows that in 1507 Genoa rebelled against Louis XII King of France, who came in person and with all his forces to regain it. When he had got it back, he built a fortress, the strongest known upto the present, for in site and in every other way it was impregnable, placed on the summit of a hill, extending into the sea, which the Genoese call Codefa.; with it he commanded all of the harbor and a great part of the city of Genoa. Then in 1512, when the French were driven from Italy, Genoa rebelled notwithstanding the fortress, and Ottaviano Fregoso took control of her. With the utmost effort, at the end of sixteen months he captured the fortress through famine. Everybody believed and many advised that he should preserve it as a refuge for himself in any unforeseen event, but as a very prudent man, knowing that not fortresses but the people’s will keeps princes in power, he destroyed it. Thus founding his government not on the fortress but on his ability and his prudence, he has held and still holds it.3 And whereas a thousand infantry are usually enough to change the government of Genoa, his adversaries have attacked him with ten thousand and have not been able to hurt him. We see, then, that the destruction of the fortress did not hurt Ottaviano and the building of it did not help the King. For if he had come into Italy with his army, he could have recovered Genoa, though he did
3. Fregoso’s rule as doge lasted until 1515. In that year he yielded to the French and becamt their governor of the city, so continuing until 1522.
not have a fortress there; but when he could not come into Italy with his army, he could not hold Genoa, though he had the fortress there. It was, then, expensive for the King to build it and disgraceful for him to lose it. To Ottaviano, glorious was its recovery and profitable its destruction.
[Fortresses in conquered cities]
But let us come to republics that build fortresses not in their own country but in cities they acquire. And to show the fallacy of this, if the example I have given-that of France and Genoa-does not suffice, I am sure the instance of Florence and Pisa is enough. There the Florentines built fortresses in order to hold that city. They did not realize that when a city had always been an enemy of the Floren… tine state, had been free, and in rebellion had had liberty as a resource, they must, if they expected to hold her, use upon her the Roman method, that is, either make her an associate or demolish her. The value of the fortresses there is shown by the coming of King Charles; they surrendered to him either through the infidelity of their garrisons or through fear of a greater ill. Yet if they had not existed, the Florentines would not have founded their power to hold Pisa on them, and that king could not in that way have deprived the Floren… tines of the city. And the methods by which up to that time she had been kept would possibly have been enough to preserve her, and beyond doubt would not have made a worse showing than did the fortresses.
[ Tarentum and Brescia as instances]
I conclude then, that in holding his hereditary city, a fortress hinders a prince. In holding cities that he conquers, fortresses are useless. I am sure the authority of the Romans is enough for me; in cities they wished to hold by force they tore down walls and did not build them. And if anyone against this opinion of mine brings forward in ancient times Tarentum and in modern ones Brescia, as places that through fortresses were recovered from rebellious subjects, I answer that for the recovery of Tarentum, Fabius Maximus was sent at the end of a year with the entire army, which would have been enough to recover her if there had been no fortress. And though Fabius did use that method, if the fortress had not been there he would have used some other that would have had the same effect.
And I do not know of what use a fortress is in restoring a city to you if her recovery demands a consular army with a Fabius Maximus as general. That the Romans would have regained the city in any case is seen from the instance of Capua, where there was no fortress; yet by virtue of their army they recaptured her.
But let us come to Brescia. I say that what happened in that rebellion seldom happens, namely that the fortress remaining in your power, after the city has rebelled, is connected with an army large and near at hand, like that of the French, because Monseigneur de Foix, the king’s general, was at Bologna with the army when he heard of the loss of Brescia. Without wasting time, he marched off that moment, and arriving at Brescia in three days, by means of the fortress retook the city. Even the fortress of Brescia, therefore, to be of value needed a Monseigneur de Foix and a French army that in three days could relieve it. So this one instance, over against con,.. trary ones, is not enough, because in the wars of our times fortresses are often taken and retaken with the same fortune with which open country is retaken and taken, not merely in Lombardy, but in Ro… magna, in the Kingdom of Naples and in all parts ofltaly.
[Good armies better than fortresses]
As to the building of fortresses to defend oneself against enemies from without, I say that they are not necessary to peoples and king,.. dams that have good armies, and to those that do not have good armies they are useless, for good armies without fortresses are enough for defense; fortresses without good armies cannot defend you. This is evident in the experience of those who have been held excellent both in affairs of government and in other things, such as the Ro,.. mans and the Spartans. For if the Romans did not build fortresses, the Spartans not merely refrained from them but did not allow any walls for their cities, because they intended that each man’s valor­ not any other defense-should protect them. This is the reason why a Spartan, asked by an Athenian if the walls of Athens seemed to him splendid, answered: “Yes, if they sheltered women.”
[Fortresses useless to princes]
A prince who has good armies, then, will find fortresses on the shores and frontiers of his state useful-sometimes-in holding off the enemy a few days, until he is in order; but they are not essential.
398 DISCOURSES 2. 24, 25
But to a prince who does not have a good army, fortresses throughout his state or on his frontiers are harmful or useless. Harmful, because they are easily lost, and when they are lost they make war on you; or if they are actually so strong that the enemy cannot occupy them, they are left behind by the hostile army and are without profit. For good armies, when they do not meet very strong resistance, enter into hostile countries without hesitation over cities or over fortresses that they leave behind, as we see in ancient histories or as we see that Francesco Maria did, for in recent times, in order to attack Urbino, he left behind him ten hostile cities, without any hesitation.4 A prince, then, who can form a good army can get on without building fortresses; one whose army is not good ought not to build them; he should, however, strengthen the city where he lives, and keep it supplied and its citizens friendly, so that he can resist hostile attack until either agreement or external aid frees him. All other plans are expensive in time of peace and useless in time of war.
[ Roman wisdom]
And so he who considers all I have said must see that the Ro,. mans, as they were wise in all their other arrangements, so they were prudent in this decision about the Latins and the men of Privernum; not thinking of fortresses, with stronger and wiser methods they made sure of them.
4. Francesco Maria della Rovere captured Urbino 6 Feb. 1517.

CHAPTER 25. TO ATTACK A DISUNITED CITY, HOPING TOT AKE HER THROUGH HER DISUNION, IS FOOLISH
[Roman disunion]
There was such disunion in the Roman republic between the populace and the nobility that the Veientians, together with the Etruscans, imagined that through such disunion they could destroy the Roman state.1 And when they raised an army and overran the country near Rome, the Senate sent against them Gaius Manlius and Marcus Fabius. When their army was near the Veientian army, the
1. Livy 2. 44. For the narrative z. 43-45. The name of the first general is better given as Cn. Manlius.
V eientians did not cease, both with attacks and with insults, to injure and berate the Roman republic. So great was their rashness and insolence that the Romans united, instead of continuing dis,, united; coming to combat, they broke and defeated the allies. We see, therefore, how much men deceive themselves, as we showed above, in taking up plans, and how many times they think to gain something, and they lose it. The Veientians expected by attacking the Romans when disunited to defeat them, but their attack caused Roman union and their own destruction. The disunion of republics usually results from idleness and peace; the cause of union is fear and war. Therefore, if the V eientians had been wise, the more disunited Rome was, the more they would have kept war away from her and sought to overcome her with the arts of peace.
[ How to gain a disunited city]
The right method is to seek to gain the confidence of the dis,, united city, and as long as her factions do not come to arms, to act as arbitrator between the parties. If they do come to arms, give sluggish support to the weaker party, both to keep them longer at war and to make them exhaust themselves, and that large forces may not arouse in both factions the fear that you plan to conquer them and become their prince. When this policy is well handled, it will almost always end as you have been expecting.
[Disunion in Pistoia, Siena, and Florence]
The city of Pistoia, as I said in another Discourse and for another purpose/ was subjected by the Florentine republic with no other art than this. Since the city was divided and the Florentines favored now one party, now the other, without getting the ill will of either, they brought her to such a pass that, wearied out by her harassed life, she came ofher own accord to throw herself into the arms of Florence. The city of Siena has never changed her government with Florentine aid except when this aid has been weak and infrequent. Because when it has been frequent and strong, it has united that city in the defense of the government in power. I wish to add another instance to those given above. Filippo Visconti Duke of Milan many times began war against the Florentines, relying on their dissensions, and he always came out the loser. Hence he was forced to say, grieving
DISCOURSES 2. 21.
over his undertakings, that Florentine follies had made him spend uselessly two millions in gold.
So as I said above, the V eientians and the Tuscans were deceived
by this opinion and at last were defeated in battle by the Romans. Similarly in the future anybody will be deceived who in a like way and for a like reason believes he can conquer a people.

CHAPTER 26. CONTEMPT AND INSULT ROUSE HATRED AGAINST THOSE WHO EMPLOY THEM, WITHOUT ANY PROFIT TO THEMSELVES
I believe it very prudent to abstain from menacing and insulting anybody with words, for neither of them takes any strength from the enemy. But menaces make him more cautious, insults make him hate you more and plan with greater zeal to harm you.
[ The Veientians pay the penalty of insolence]
The Veientians, of whom I spoke in the chapter above, serve as an example, for to the injury of war against the Romans they added abuse in words. From this every prudent general will make his soldiers refrain, because such words inflame the enemy and egg him on to revenge, yet in no way impede him, as I said, in attack. Hence they are all weapons turned against you. Of this there once was a noteworthy instance in Asia, where Gabade, general of the Persians, encamped before Amida a long time; tired out by the tedium of the siege, he decided to leave. So when he did strike his camp, the garrison, having all come on the walls, in their pride of victory did not refrain from any sort of insult, but abused, scoffed at and insulted the enemy for their worthlessness and cowardice. Irritated by this, Gabade changed his plan, and when he returned to the siege, so great was his indignation at the insult that in a few days he took and sacked the town. And this same thing happened to the Veientians, for whom, as I have said, it was not enough to make war on the Romans, but thry also affronted them with words and, going as far as the stockade of the ‘-amp to speak insults to them, irritated them much more with words than with arms, so that those soldiers who at first fought unwillingly forced the Consuls to join battle. Hence the Veientians, like the aforesaid, bore the penalty of their insolence.
[ Good leaders do not allow taunting]
Good leaders of armies, then, and good rulers of republics em,. ploy all suitable measures against the use of insults and taunts either in their city or in their army, either among themselves or against an enemy, because, if used against an enemy, the troubles above men… tioned result from them; among themselves they produce something worse, if not guarded against as prudent men always do guard against them.
[The Romans forbade taunting jests]
The Roman legions left at Capua plotted against the Capuans, as will be related in its place,1 and this conspiracy produced a mutiny. When Valerius Corvinus settled this, among the articles put in the agreement, very heavy penalties were laid down for those who ever twitted a soldier with that mutiny. Tiberius Gracchus, having in the war with Hannibal been made leader of a certain number of slaves whom the Romans through lack of men had armed, very early decreed a capital penalty to anybody who twitted any of these men with slavery. So injurious a thing did the Romans esteem it, as has been said above, to taunt men and to twit them with any disgrace, for there is nothing that inflames the minds of men more or raises greater anger whether it is said in earnest or jokingly, “For rude jests, when too much founded on truth, leave a bitter memory.m
1. D1scouRSES 3. 6, near the end.
2. Tacitus, ANNALS 15. 68.

CHAPTER 27. FOR PRUDENT PRINCES AND REPUBLICS, TO CONQUER IS ALWAYS ENOUGH; GENERALLY, WHEN THAT IS NOT ENOUGH, LOSS RESULTS
[False hopes lead to excessive demands]
The use of disrespectful words to an enemy generally comes from haughtiness caused by victory or false hope of victory. This false hope makes men err not only in speech but also in action. Because such hope, when it enters men’s breasts, makes them go beyond bounds and lose-generally-their opportunity to gain a good thing that is sure, through hoping to gain a better one that is unsure. And
because this is a topic that deserves reflection, for men often deceive themselves about it, with injury to their states, I shall demonstrate it in detail with instances ancient and modern, since with arguments I cannot give such a clear demonstration.
[Carthage should have been satisfied with Cannae]
Hannibal, after defeating the Romans at Cannae, sent messengers to Carthage to announce his victory and ask assistance.1 The Senate debated what was to be done. Hanno, an old and prudent Car., thaginian citizen, advised them to use the victory wisely in making peace with the Romans, since, having conquered, they could do so with honorable conditions, and they could not expect to do so after a defeat; the Carthaginians should intend to show the Romans that they were strong enough to fight them, and after winning a victory they should strive not to lose it in the hope of a greater one. They did not adopt this plan, but nevertheless it was later recognized by the Carthaginian senate as indeed wise, after their chance was lost.
[ The Tyrians should have accepted terms from Alexander]
When Alexander the Great had already taken all the East, the Republic of Tyre, noble in those times, and powerful because the city was surrounded by water, like that of the Venetians, observed Alexander’s greatness; hence she sent him ambassadors saying that the Tyrians were willing to be his good servants and to give him the obedience he wished, but that they would not receive him or his people into their city. Alexander, angered because one city expected to close to him such gates as all the world had opened, rebuffed them and, not accepting their conditions, besieged the city. She was sur., rounded by water, and very well provided with food and other supplies necessary to defense, so that after four months Alexander realized that one city to its glory was taking from him more time than had been taken by many other conquests. Hence he determined to attempt an agreement and to yield them what they had asked. But the people of Tyre, who had grown haughty, not merely did not accept the agreement, but killed those who came to negotiate about it. Alexander, angered by this, set himself to the siege with such force that he took and demolished the city, and killed and enslaved the people.
1. Livy 23. 11-13.
[ Florentine overconfidence led to ruin]
In 1512 a Spanish army came into Florentine territory to put the Medici back in Florence and to lay tribute on the city; they had been brought there by men inside the city, who had given them hope that as soon as they were in Florentine territory, the citizens would take arms in their favor. But afier the Spanish entered the plain, and no one showed himself, and they were in need of food, they tried to make a truce. The people of Florence, made haughty by this, did not accept it. From this came the loss of Prato and the ruin of that government.
[No offer of terms is so bad that it does not include some gain]
Rulers who are attacked, then, cannot make a greater mistake, when the attack is made by men far exceeding them in power, than to refuse every agreement, especially when it is offered to them, be,, cause there will never be an offer so bad that it will not in some way benefit him who accepts it, and contain something of victory for him. It should have been enough for the people of Tyre that Alexander would accept those conditions that he had first refused, and their victory was sufficient when, with weapons in their hands, they had made so great a man comply with their will. It should also have sufficed the Florentine people, because it was victory enough for them if the Spanish army yielded to some of their wishes and did not secure all of its own. That army’s intention was, first, to change the government of Florence, second, to break off her alliance with France, third, to get money from Florence. If of these things the army gained two, the second and third, and to the people one was lefi, the preservation of their government, each party had in the agreement some honor and some satisfaction. The people should not have cared for the two things, if they were lefi alive. They should not have been willing, even though they looked for a greater and almost certain victory, to tum the outcome over in any way to the pleasure of Fortune, putting up their last stake, which no prudent man risks unless he must.
[Hannibal’s example]
Hannibal, having lefi Italy, where he had won renown for six… teen years, on the summons of the Carthaginians to rescue his native
404 DISCOURSES 2. 27, 28
city, found Hasdrubal and Syfax defeated; he found the kingdom of N umidia lost and Carthage confined to the space within her walls, with no resource left save himself and his army. Knowing that the city was his country’s last stake, Hannibal did not wish to risk her until he had tried every other remedy; and he was not ashamed to ask for peace, judging that if his country had any remedy, it was in that and not in war. But when peace was then denied to him, he deter,, mined not to refrain from fighting, even though he might lose, judging that it was still possible for him to win or, losing, to lose gloriously. And if Hannibal, who was so able and whose army was intact, sought peace rather than battle, when he saw that if it were lost his native land would become a slave, what should be done by a man less able and less experienced But men make this blunder because they do not know how to put limits to their hopes. And when they rely on these and do not make an estimate of themselves, they fall.

CHAPTER 28. IT IS DANGEROUS FOR A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE NOT TO AVENCE AN INJUR y. DONE TO THE PUB..­ LICOR TO AN INDIVIDUAL
[The Romans did not punish the Fabii]
What anger makes men do can easily be learned from what happened to the Romans when they sent the three F abii as ambas,, sadors to the French who were attacking Tuscany and in particular Chiusi. The Romans sent these ambassadors because the people of Chiusi applied to Rome for aid against the French; in the name of the Roman people the three were to require the French to hold back from making war on the Tuscans. But being on the spot and better fitted to act than to speak, the ambassadors, seeing the French and the Tuscans in battle, put themselves at the front of the army to fight against the French. The result, since they were recognized, was that the French turned against the Romans all the anger they had felt against the Tuscans. After the French through ambassadors had complained to the Roman Senate about such an offense and asked that in satisfaction of the injury it should deliver up to them the aforesaid Fabii, their anger grew greater because not merely did
Rome not hand the Fabii over or in any way punish them, but when the elections came she made them Tribunes with consular power. Hence the French, seeing those honored who should have been punished, took it as all done to dishonor and humiliate themselves. Fired with scorn and rage, they marched against Rome and took it, except the Capitol. This defeat came upon the Romans merely as a result of their failure to observe justice, because, when their ambas..­ sadors had sinned “against the law of nations,”1 and should have been punished, they were honored.
[ A prince must not injure an individual]
So it must be remembered that every republic and every prince should take great care not to do such injury, not merely to a large body but even to an individual. Because if a man is greatly injured either by the state or by a single person, and is not avenged to his satisfaction, if he lives in a republic, he seeks, even with its ruin, to get his revenge. If he lives under a prince and has any nobility in himself, he is never quiet until in some way he has avenged himself on him, even though he sees therein his own injury.
[Philip of Macedon’s failure]
To verify this, there is no finer or truer instance than that of Philip, King of Macedonia, Alexander’s father. He had in his court Pausanias, a youth handsome and highborn; with him Attalus, one of the chief men close to Philip, fell in love. Having many times endeavored to get him to consent to him, and finding him averse to such things, Attalus determined to get by deception and force that which he saw he was not going to get in any other way. And giving a splendid banquet, to which Pausanias and many other highborn barons came, when each one was full of food and wine, he had Pausanias seized and put into bonds; then he not merely vented his lust by force, but also, for greater ignominy, had many others in the same way violate him. Of this injury Pausanias again and again complained to Philip; yet, after keeping him for a time in the hope that he would avenge him, Philip not merely did not avenge him, but put Attalus at the head of the government in one of the Greek provinces. Hence Pausanias, seeing his enemy honored and not punished, turned all his rage not against the one who had done him
1. Livy 5. 36.
406 DISCOURSES 2. 28, 29
the injury, but against Philip, who had not avenged him. And on the morning of a feast for the wedding of Philip’s daughter, whom he had married to Alexander of Epirus, when Philip was going to the temple to celebrate it, Pausanias killed him between the two Alexanders, son,,in,,law and son.
This instance is much like that of the Romans, and noteworthy for whoever governs, for he ought never to esteem anyone so lightly as to believe that, when injury is piled on injury, an injured man will not decide on getting revenge, in spite of all danger and personal harm to himsel£

CHAPTER 29. FORTUNE BLINDS THE INTEL,, LECTS OF MEN WHEN SHE DOES NOT WISH THEM TO OPPOSE HER PLAN Sr
[ The Heavens control human affairs]
If we observe carefully how human affairs go on, many times we see that things come up and events take place against which the Heavens do not wish any provision to be made. And if this I am going to speak of happened at Rome, where there was such great efficiency, so much religion, and such good organization, it is not strange that such things happen more often in cities or countries which lack the things aforesaid.
[ The Heavens determined Roman history]
Because this instance is very noteworthy for showing Heaven’s power over human affairs, Titus Livius explains it at length in very effective words, saying that since Heaven for some reason wished the Romans to know its power, it first caused the blunder of those Fabii who went as ambassadors to the French and by their actions stirred up the French to make war on Rome; then it arranged that nothing worthy of the Roman people should be done in Rome to put a stop to that war; before that, it had arranged for Camillus, who was their sole and only resource against such a great evil, to be sent in exile to Ardea. Then when the French came toward Rome, those who many times-to deal with attacks by the V olscians and other neigh,, boring enemies-had set up a Dictator, on the coming of the French
1. Livy S· 37.
did not establish one. Also in making their choice of soldiers, they did it feebly and without any exceptional effort; and they were so slow about taking arms that they were hardly in time to meet the French on the River Allia, ten miles distant from Rome. There the Tribunes pitched their camp, without any of their usual attention, not examining the place beforehand and not surrounding it with a ditch and a stockade, not using any resource human or divine. And in drawing up for the battle they made their order loose and feeble; as a result, neither the soldiers nor the leaders did anything worthy of Roman discipline. Then they fought without any bloodshed, for they fled before they were attacked; the larger part of them went off to Veii, the rest went back to Rome; these, without at all going into their houses, went into the Capitol, so that the Senate, without thought of defending Rome, did not even do so much as close the gates. Part of the people fled, part went with the soldiers to the Capitol. Still, in defending that, they used some methods that were not disorderly, for they did not burden it with unserviceable persons, they put there all the grain possible, so that they could endure a siege, and of the unserviceable throng of old men, women, and children, the greater part fled into the surrounding cities; the rest remained in Rome in the power of the French. Hence, he who has read the things done by that people for so many years before would not at all believe that it was the same people. When Titus Livius has spoken of all the aforesaid blunders, he concludes by saying: “To such an extent does Fortune blind men’s intellects when she does not wish them to check her gathering might.,,2 Nothing can be more true than this conclusion.
[Fortune and the Heavens]
Hence men who commonly live amid great troubles or successes deserve less praise or less blame, because most of the time we see that they have been pushed into a destructive or an elevated action by some great advantage that the Heavens have bestowed on them, giving them opportunity-or taking it from them-to work effec..­ tively. Skilfully Fortune does this, since she chooses a man, when she plans to bring to pass great things, who is of so much perception and so much ability that he recognizes the opportunities she puts before him. So in the same way when she intends to bring to pass
2. See n. 1 above.
DISCOURSES 2. 29, JO
great failures, she puts there men to promote such failure. And if somebody there is able to oppose her, she either kills him or deprives him of all means for doing anything good.
[Fortune caused Rome’s greatness]
From this passage we easily see that Fortune, in order to make Rome stronger and bring her to the greatness she attained, judged that it was necessary to affiict her (as we shall discuss at length in the beginning of the following book) but did not wish entirely to ruin her. And for this reason she had Camillus exiled and not killed, had Rome captured but not the Capitol, arranged that the Romans in order to protect Rome should not plan anything good, and that later to defend the Capitol they should not fail to use any good measure. She arranged, in order that Rome might be taken, to have the greater part of the soldiers defeated at Allia run off to Veii. Thus she removed every way for defending the city of Rome. Yet in ar” ranging this she prepared everything for its recapture, having brought a Roman army unharmed to Veii, and Camillus to Ardea, in order to be able to make a great muster, under a general not spotted with any ignominy through defeat and unharmed in reputation, for the recapture of their native city.
[Men can assist Fortune; they cannot thwart her]
We could bring up in support of what we have said some modern instances, but because we do not consider them necessary, since this is enough to satisfy anybody, we omit them. I assert, indeed, once more that it is very true, according to what we see in all the histories, that men are able to assist Fortune but not to thwart her. They can weave her designs but cannot destroy them. They ought, then, never to give up as beaten, because, since they do not know her purpose and she goes through crooked and unknown roads, they can always hope, and hoping are not to give up, in whatever fortune and what” ever affiiction they may be.

CHAPTER 30. REPUBLICS AND PRINCES TRULY POWERFUL DO NOT BUY FRIEND..­ SHIP WITH MONEY BUT NITH THE MIGHT AND REPUTATION OF THEIR FORCES
[Fortune aided the Romans at last]
So the Romans were besieged in the Capitol, and though they looked for aid from V eii and from Camillus, yet being pressed by hunger they came to an understanding with the French to ransom themselves for a certain amount of gold. But when according to the agreement they were already weighing out the gold, Camillus came up with his army; this, says the historian, Fortune brought about “that the Romans might not live as bought with gold.m The event is noteworthy not merely in this matter but also in the course of this republic’s history, in which it may be seen that they never gained cities with money, never made peace with money, but always by force of arms-something that I do not believe was ever true of any other republic.
[If a state is powerful, its friendship is sought]
And among the other signs by which a state’s power is known is the way she lives with her neighbors. And when she conducts her..­ self in such a manner that the neighbors, in order to have her as a friend, are her tributaries, that state gives a sure sign of power. But when the said neighbors, though inferior to her, get money from her, she gives an important sign of her weakness. Read all the Roman histories and you will see that the Massilians, the Aedui, the Rho..­ dians, Hiero of Syracuse, Kings Eumenes and Massinissa, who all were near the boundaries of the Roman Empire, in order to have her friendship, competed in payment and tribute for her needs, not seeking from it any other return than to be defended.
[ States that hire friends are not strong]
The opposite appears in weak states. And beginning with ours of Florence, in times past, when her reputation was greatest, there was not a lordling in the Romagna who did not have a subsidy from her. And besides she gave them to the Perugians, to the Castellani,
1. Livy 5. 49. Fortune is less prominent in Livy than Machiavelli suggests.
41 o DISCOURSES 2. JO
and to all her other neighbors. Yet if this city had been armed and strong, everything would have gone in the opposite way, for many, in order to have her protection, would have given money to her, and would have sought not to sell their friendship but to buy hers. Nor have the Florentines alone lived in such baseness, but also the V ene-, tians and the King of France, who, with so great a kingdom, lives as a tributary to the Swiss and to the King of England. This all comes from his having disarmed his people and from having pre-, ferred-that king and the others named before-to enjoy an immedi-, ate profit, to be able to plunder the people, and to escape an imagined rather than a real danger, instead of doing things that would give them security and make their states happy for ever. This bad policy, if sometimes it does produce some years of quiet, is in time a cause of want, of damage, and of destruction that cannot be remedied. It would take too long to tell how many times the Florentines, the Venetians, and this kingdom have in their wars bought themselves off, and how many times they have been subjected to insult-which the Romans once only submitted to. It would take too long to tell how many cities the Florentines and the Venetians have bought­ the folly of which appeared later, for what they acquire with gold they cannot defend with steel. Yet the Romans kept to this noble conduct and this policy as long as they were free, but when they came under the emperors, and the emperors were wicked and loved the shade more than the sun, they also bought themselves off, now from the Parthians, now from the Germans, now from other peoples nearby. This began the downfall of so great an empire.
[ Strong states arm their own people]
Such troubles come, therefore, from having disarmed your people. From this results another still greater, that the closer an enemy comes to you, the weaker he finds you. For he who lives in the ways spoken of above treats badly those subjects that are within his empire, and treats well those on its boundaries, in order to have men well dis-, posed for keeping the enemy at a distance. As a result of this, in order to keep him more distant, he gives subsidies to those lords and peoples who are near his boundaries. The result is that states of that sort make some little resistance on their boundaries, but when an enemy has passed them, they have no recourse. And they do not see that such a way of proceeding is opposed to every good method.
The heart and the vital parts of a body should be kept armored, and not the extremities. For without the latter it lives, but when the former is injured, it dies; and these states keep their hearts unarmored and their hands and feet armored. What this error has done to Florence has been seen and is seen every day; and when an army passes her boundaries and comes within them close to her heart, she has no further resource. About the Venetians, a few years ago, the same thing was proved, and if their city had not been surrounded by the waters, we should have beheld her end. This has not been ex,, perienced so often in France, because that kingdom is so great that it has few enemies more powerful. Nevertheless, when the English attacked in I 5 I 3, the entire country trembled. And the King him,, self and everybody else realized that a single defeat might take away his kingdom and his government.
[ Roman power founded on an armed people]
To the Romans the opposite would have happened, because the nearer an enemy approached to Rome, the stronger he found that city in resisting him. When Hannibal invaded Italy, after three defeats and after the deaths of so many generals and soldiers, they not merely held out against the enemy but won the war. It all was caused by having the heart well armored and taking less account of the extremities, because the foundation of her state was the Roman people, the Latin power, the associated cities in Italy, and the colo,, nies, from which they drew so many soldiers that with these they were strong enough to fight and hold the world. That this is true is shown by the question Hanno the Carthaginian asked the messengers Hannibal sent after the defeat of Cannae. After they had enlarged on what Hannibal had done, Hanno asked if anybody had come from the Roman people to seek peace and if any city of the Latin nation and of the colonies had rebelled against the Romans, and when both questions were answered in the negative, Hanno replied: “This war is still as undecided as before.”2
[Fortune shows her power when men are weak]
We see, therefore, both from this discussion and from what we have many times said elsewhere, how much in their way of pro, ceeding present republics differ from ancient ones. We also see, for
z. Livy z3. 13.
412 DISCOURSES 2. J0-“]2
this reason, every day miraculous losses and miraculous gains. Be., cause, where men have little ability, Fortune shows her power much, and because she is variable, republics and states often vary, and vary they always will until some one arises who is so great a lover of antiquity that he will rule Fortune in such a way that she will not have cause to show in every revolution of the sun how much she can do.

CHAPTER 31. IT IS DANGEROUS TO BELIEVE BANISHED MEN
[The mistake of Alexander of Epirus]
It does not seem to me apart from the subject to consider in one of these Discourses how dangerous it is to believe those who have been driven from their native lands, since such matters must be dealt with every day by those who occupy places of authority. I do this especially since I can demonstrate it with a memorable example brought up by Titus Livius in his History,1 though it is little related to his theme. When Alexander the Great crossed over into Asia with his army, Alexander of Epirus, his brothmin.,Iaw and uncle, came with soldiers into Italy, summoned by the banished Lucanians, who led him to expect that with their assistance he could take possession of that whole province. When therefore, by reason of their pledge and expectation, he came into Italy, they killed him, for their fellow citizens promised to take them back into their native city if they slew him.
[Vain are the pledges of exiles]
It should be observed, therefore, how vain are the pledges and promises of those who are excluded from their native city. For as to their loyalty, it must be reckoned that whenever through other means than yours they can enter again into their native city, they will leave you and ally themselves with others, notwithstanding any promises they have made. And as to vain promises and hopes, so violent is their desire to return home that they naturally believe many things that are false, and to these they artfully join many others. Hence, between what they believe and what they tell you they believe, they
1. Livy 8.3.
The Treachery of Exiles 413
fill you with such hope that, if you rely on it, you either enter into useless expense or go into an enterprise in which you are ruined.
[ Themistocles in exile]
I hope the example of the aforesaid Alexander is enough, with the addition of Themistocles of Athens. The latter, when con, demned as a rebel, Red into Asia to Darius, where he made such great promises, if the king would attack Greece, that Darius under, took the enterprise. When Themistocles later could not fulfil his promises, he took poison, either from shame or fear of punishment. And if Themistocles, a man of great ability, made such an error, we can estimate how much more they err in such matters who, having weaker minds, allow themselves to be more moved by their desires and passions. It is well then for a prince to be slow about getting into any undertaking on a banished man’s information, because al, most always he will at the end suffer shame or very heavy damage. And because also only on rare occasions do men succeed in taking cities by fraud and by connections that they have inside them, it seems to me not inappropriate to discuss it in the next chapter,
adding the many ways in which the Romans took them.

CHAPTER 3 2. IN HOW MANY WAYS THE ROMANS TOOK CITIES
[The Romans did not use slow methods]
Since all the Romans were experienced in war, they carried it on always with every advantage, both as to expense and as to everything that is needed in it. From this it came that they avoided taking towns by investment, because they believed the trouble and expense of this method much greater than the benefit they could get from the capture. Therefore they believed it better and more profitable to subjugate cities by any other method than by blockading them. Hence in so many wars and in so many years they carried out very few investments.
[Methods of attack]
The methods, then, by which they gained cities, were either direct attack or surrender. Direct attack was either by force and
DISCOURSES 2. 32
open violence, or by force mixed with fraud. The first method of open violence was assault, without battering the walls (which they called “to attack the city with a circle,”r because they surrounded the city with the whole army and attacked it on all sides); many times they were successful in taking a city, even though it was a very great one, by one assault, as when Scipio took New Carthage in Spain.2 When such an assault failed, they set themselves to break the walls with rams and with their other machines of war; or they made a mine and through that entered into the city (in that way they took the city of V eii); or, to be on a level with those who defended the walls, they made towers of wood, or they made banks of earth resting against the walls from outside, in order to reach the height of the walls on them.
[ Attack on all sides]
Against these assaults, the defenders of the city, in the first case, that of being attacked on all sides, were subject to more sudden danger and had more doubtful means of resistance; though they needed to have everywhere enough defenders, yet their soldiers were not so many that they could be adequate everywhere, or could be shifted to places in danger; or if they could be, they were not all of equal spirit to resist, and if the battle was yielded at one point they all were lost. For this reason, as I have said, this method many times had a fortunate outcome. But when it did not succeed at first, the Romans did not often try it again; it was dangerous because, being spread out through so much space, their army was everywhere too weak to resist a sally that those within might make, and also the soldiers were in disorder and scattered; but for once and as a surprise they would try that method.
[Methods of defense]
As to the breaking of the walls, the defenders thwarted it, as at the present time, with embankments. And to resist mines, they made a countermine, and thus combated the enemy, either with arms or with other devices. Among the latter was this: They filled tubs with feathers in which they put fire, and when they were burning they put
1. Livy 10. 43; 23. 44.
2. The attempt to take New Carthage at the first attack failed {Livy 26. 45); a later assault succeeded.
Night Attacks
them in the mine, so that with their smoke and stench they impeded the entrance of the enemy. And if they were assailed with towers, they tried to destroy them with fire. And as to the mounds of earth, they broke the wall at the base, where the banks rested against it, and drew into the city the earth that those outside heaped up there; hence, since earth was put down outside and taken away inside, the bank did not increase.
[ Assault and blockade]
These methods for capture cannot be tried at great length, but it is necessary either to give up the siege or to seek to win the war by other methods, as Scipio did when, after invading Africa, he as., saulted Utica and did not succeed in taking it, for then he retired from the place and sought to defeat the Carthaginian armies.3 Or investment can be tried, as at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem, and like cities, which the Romans took by investment.
[ Stratagem and surprise]
The conquest of cities by stealthy violence comes about as at Palaepolis, which the Romans took through secret dealings with those in the city. Many captures of this sort have been attempted by the Romans and others, but few of them have succeeded. The reason is that the slightest obstacle breaks the plot, and obstacles come easily. The conspiracy may be discovered before it is put into action; for such discovery is not difficult both through the disloyalty of those with whom the conspiracy is shared and through the difficulty of planning it, since arrangements must be made with enemies and with those to whom you are not allowed to speak, except under some pretext. But when the conspiracy is not discovered in the planning, there then rise a thousand difficulties in putting it into action. Be., cause if you come before the time set, or if you come after it, everything is spoiled; if an accidental noise is raised, like the geese of the Capitol, if an accustomed routine is broken-the slightest error, the least mistake ruins the affair. To this must be added the shades of night, which cause great fear to those who work in these dangerous enter… prises. And since most of the men who are taken into such enterprises are not expert in the layout of the city and of the places where they are led, they are upset, grow timid, are confused by the slightest
3· Livy 29· 34-35; 3o. 3 ·
DISCOURSES 2. 32, 33
accident, and any deceptive appearance is enough to make them take to Right. There has never been anybody more fortunate in these tricky expeditions at night than Aratus of Sicyon, yet, however much he was worth in these, in open operations by daylight he was to the same extent a coward. It can be judged that this was rather the result of an occult power in him than because night attacks ought naturally to be more successful. Of these types, then, many are planned, few are put to the test, and very few succeed.
[ The surrender of cities]
As to gaining cities by surrender, either they are given up will,, ingly or they are taken by force. Willingness comes either from some external need that drives them to take refuge with you, as did Capua with the Romans, or through a desire to be governed well, since they are attracted by the good government that some prince furnishes those who willingly put themselves into his arms, as did the Rhodians, the Massilians, and other like cities that gave themselves to the Roman people. As to forced surrender, either such force comes from a long investment, as has been said above; or it comes from continual injury by raids, pillaging, and other acts of injury; to escape these a city gives up.
[Victory in the field more pr’!fitable than siege]
Of all the methods mentioned, the Romans used this last more than any other. And they gave their attention for more than 450 years to wearing out their neighbors with defeats and with raids, and by means of treaties getting ascendancy over them, as we have said in other places.4 And on such a method they always relied, though they would try all of them, but in the others they found things either dangerous or useless. For in an investment there are length of time and expense; in an assault, risk and danger; in conspiracies, un,, certainty. And they saw that by routing a hostile army they could gain a kingdom in a day, but in taking a stubborn city by investment they would use up many years.
4. DISCOURSES 2, 1, 4.
The Responsible General

CHAPTER 3 3. THE ROMANS GA VE THE GENERALS OF THEIR ARMIES PLENARY POWER
I judge that anyone reading this History by Livy, to get profit from it, must consider all the ways in which the Roman People and Senate conducted themselves. Among the matters deserving con, sideration is the sort of authority with which they sent out their Consuls, Dictators, and other army leaders; their authority was very great, and the Senate reserved nothing except authority to start new wars and to make treaties. Everything else they handed over to the judgment and power of the Consul. When a war was determined on by the people and the Senate, against the Latins for instance, they left all the rest to the Consul’s judgment; he could fight a battle or not fight one, and attack this city or the other, as he thought best.
[ The instance of Fabius]
These things are confirmed by many instances, and especially by what happened in an expedition against the Tuscans. After Fabius the Consul had beaten them near Sutri, and then planned to march his army through the forest of Cimina and go into Tuscany, not merely did he not take counsel with the Senate but he did not give them any warning, though war would have to be made in a region new, risky and dangerous. This is testified to also by the decision made in opposition to this by the Senate, which, learning of Fabius’ victory and fearing that he would resolve to march through the said forest into Tuscany, and judging it unwise to attempt that war and run that risk, sent two legates to Fabius to inform him that he was not to march into Tuscany. They arrived when he had already marched through and had won the victory; so instead of hinderers of the war they became announcers of his conquest and of the glory he had won.1
[A general must be on the spot]
He who will consider this method carefully will see that it was very prudently used; for if the Senate had decreed that in war a Consul should go along gradually, according to their directions, they
1. Livy 9.35-36.
would have made him less watchful and slower, since he would have felt that the glory of the victory was not all his but was shared by the Senate, by whose advice he had been controlled. Besides this, the Senate would have taken the obligation of giving advice on a matter about which they would not be informed, for notwithstanding that all the men in it were very well trained in war, nonetheless, not being on the spot and not knowing countless particulars that one must know in order to advise well, they would have made countless mistakes in their advice. Because of this they wished the Consul to act for himself and to have all the glory; love of that they judged would be his rule and prescript for doing his best.
[ Florentine and Venetian error]
This matter I note the more gladly because I see that the republics of the present times, such as the Venetian and the Florentine, under., stand it differently, and if their generals, overseers, and commissioners have to place one cannon, they wish to know it and to give advice. This method deserves the same praise as do their others, which, altogether, have brought them to the place they occupy at present.
‌BOOK THREE

CHAPTER 1. IF A RELIGION OR A REPUBLIC IS TO LIVE LONG, IT MUST OFTEN BE BROUGHT BACK TOWARD ITS BEGINNINGS
It is most certain that there is a limit for the existence of all things in the world; but they generally move through the entire course ordained for them by Heaven without getting their bodies into con,. fusion but keeping them in the way ordained; this way either does not change or, if it does, the change is to their advantage, not to their harm. And because I am speaking of mixed bodies, such as repub… lies and religions, I say that those changes are to their advantage that take them back toward their beginnings. And therefore those are best organized and have longest life that through their institutions can often renew themselves or that by some accident outside their organization come to such renewal. And it is clearer than light that if these bodies are not renewed they do not last. The way to renew them, as I have said, is to carry them back to their beginnings; because all the beginnings of religions and of republics and of king.., doms must possess some goodness by means of which they gain their first reputation and their first growth. Since in the process of time that goodness is corrupted, if something does not happen that takes it back to the right position, such corruption necessarily kills that body. The doctors of medicine say, speaking of the bodies of men, that”daily something is added that now and then needs cure.”
[Republics]
This regress toward the beginning-as observed in republics­ results from either external accident or internal prudence. As to the first, we see that Rome had to be captured by the French if she was going to be born again and that, being born again, she had to take on new life and new vigor and take up again the observance of religion and justice, which were getting corrupt. Livy’s History makes this very intelligible, for he shows that in leading out the army against the French and in setting up the Tribunes with consular power, the Romans observed no religious ceremony.1 So in the same
1. Livy 5. 38.
way not merely did they not punish the three Fabii who had fought the French “against the law of nationsm but they made them Trib,­ unes. And one can easily suppose that they were taking less account of other good laws, laid down by Romulus and their other prudent princes, than was fitting and necessary for keeping their government free. Then came this blow from outside, in order that the city might renew all her basic institutions and the people might learn the neces,, sity not merely of maintaining religion and justice, but also of esteeming good citizens and taking more account of their ability than of those comforts which, as a result of their deeds, the people themselves might lack. We see that this succeeded completely, be,, cause, as soon as they recaptured Rome, they renewed all the rites of their ancient religion; they punished those Fabii who had fought “against the law of nations”; and in addition they so much esteemed the ability and goodness of Camillus that the Senate and the others, abandoning all envy, put upon him the entire burden of the republic. It is necessary, then, as I have said, that men who live together in any organization often examine themselves, either as a result of such
external events or as a result of internal ones. As to the latter, the cause must be either a law, which often examines the record of the men who are in that body; or actually a good man who arises among them, who with his striking words and his vigorous actions produces the same result as the statute. This good effect, then, comes about in republics either by virtue of a man or by virtue of a law.
[ Renovation by law]
As to the effect oflaw, the legal means that brought the Roman republic back toward its beginning were the Tribunes of the People, the Censors, and all the other laws that opposed the ambition and pride of the citizens. These legal means need to be brought to life by the wisdom of a citizen who courageously strives to enforce them against the power of those who violate them. Of such enforcement, before the capture of Rome by the French, there were notable in,­ stances in the death of the sons of Brutus, the death of the Ten Citizens, and that of Maelius the corn,-merchant. After the capture of Rome came Manlius Capitolinus’ death, the death of Manlius Torquatus’ son, Papirius Cursor’s prosecution of Fabius his Master of the Horse, and the accusations against the Scipios.
2. Livy 5.36.
The One Rejormer 421
These things, because they were extreme and noteworthy, when., ever one of them came up, made men draw back to their proper stations; and as they became rarer, they also gave men more room for growing wicked and acting in a more dangerous and lawless fashion. For this reason, from one such enforcement of the law to the next, there should be a lapse of not more than ten years, because, when that time has gone by, men change their habits and break the laws; and if something does not happen to bring the penalty back to their memories and renew fear in their minds, so many offenders quickly join together that they cannot be punished without danger. On this matter, those who managed the government of Florence from 1434 to 1494 commonly said that every five years they needed to revise the government. Otherwise they could hardly maintain it. By revising the government they meant inspiring such terror and such fear in the people as they had inspired on first taking charge, for at that time they punished those who, according to that kind of government, had done wrong. When the memory of such punishment disappears, men take courage to attempt innovations and to speak evil; therefore it is necessary to provide against them by moving the government back toward its beginnings.
[ Renovation by one man]
This movement of republics back toward their beginnings is accomplished also by the mere excellence of one man, without re., liance on any law that spurs people on to action; yet these men are of such reputation and their example is so powerful that good men wish to imitate them, and the wicked are ashamed to live a life contrary to theirs. Those in Rome who especially produced these good results were Horatius Codes, Scaevola, Fabricius, the two Decii, Regulus Attilius, and some others, who with their extraordinary and noble
examples produced in Rome almost the same effect as laws and cus., toms. If such instances of enforcement as I mention above, together with such individual examples, had appeared at least every ten years in that city, their necessary result would have been that Rome would never have become corrupt. But as soon as both of these became rare, corruption increased, because after Marcus Regulus there is no other such instance. Though there were two Catos, so great was the distance from him to them and between them from one to the other, and they were so solitary, that with their examples they could ao
422 DISCOURSES 3; 1, 2
complish nothing good. Especially the last Cato, finding the city for the most part corrupt, could not with his example improve the citizens. Need I say more on republics
[Reform in religious bodies]
In religious bodies these renewals are also necessary, as we see through the example of our religion, which, if Saint Francis and Saint Dominic had not brought it back toward its beginnings, would have entirely disappeared. They with their poverty and with the example of Christ’s life brought it back into the minds of men when it had disappeared from them. The power of their new orders is the reason why the improbity of the prelates and the heads of our religion does not ruin it; for still living in poverty and having great influence with the people because of hearing confessions and preach,. ing, they give them to understand that it is evil to speak evil of what is evil, and that it is good to live under the prelates’ control and, if prelates make errors, to leave them to God for punishment. So the prelates do the worst they can, because they do not fear that punish,. ment which they do not see and do not believe in. This renewal, then, has maintained and still maintains our religion.
[ Reform of kingdoms]
Kingdoms also need to be renewed and to have their laws brought back toward their beginnings. We see what good results this plan produces in the kingdom of France, which lives under laws and under regulations more than any other kingdom. Of these laws and regulations the parliaments are the upholders, and especially that of Paris. They are renewed by it every time it prosecutes a prince of that kingdom and rules against the king in its decisions. Up to now it has held its own because it has been a firm enforcer oflaw against the nobility. But if at any time it fails to punish the nobility, and such cases multiply, without doubt either they will have to be corrected with great disturbance, or that kingdom will fall to pieces.
I conclude, therefore, that nothing is more necessary to a com,. munity, whether it be religious group or kingdom or republic, than to give back to it such a reputation as it had in its beginning, and to strive that either good regulations or good men may produce this effect and that it will not need to be done by an external force. Be,.
Tlie Subject of This Book 423
cause, though sometimes the latter may be the best remedy, as it was at Rome, it is so dangerous that it is not in any way to be desired.
[ The subject of the third book of the D1scoURSES]
To show everybody how the deeds of individuals increased Ro,. man greatness, and how in that city they caused many good effects, I shall now narrate and discuss them. Within such boundaries this Third Book and the last part of this First Decade will conclude. Though the deeds of the kings were great and noteworthy, nonethe..­ less, since history sets them forth at length, I shall omit them, speaking only of some things they did relating to their private benefit. I shall begin with Brutus, the father of Roman liberty.

CHAPTER 2. IT IS VERY WISE TO PRETEND MADNESS AT THE RIGHT TIME
Nobody was ever so prudent or looked upon as so wise because of any excellent action of his as Junius Brutus deserves to be con..­ sidered for his pretended idiocy. Though Titus Livius does not make plain more than one cause that would have led him to such pretense-namely, to be able to live more securely and keep his inherited property-nonetheless, considering his way of proceeding, we can believe that he pretended this also in order to be noticed less, and to have more chance for overcoming the king and freeing his country whenever he might have an opportunity. That he contem..­ plated this appears, first, in his interpretation of the oracle of Apollo, when he pretended to fall in order to kiss the earth, judging that as a result he would get the gods to favor his plans. Later, it appears when, standing beside the dead Lucretia, he, among her father and her husband and her other relatives, was the leader in drawing the knife from her wound and making those present take an oath never in the future to allow anybody to be king in Rome.1 From his example all those discontented with a prince can learn something. They ought first to measure and weigh their forces, and if they are powerful enough to reveal themselves as his enemies and make war openly upon him, they ought to take this way as less dangerous and more honorable. But if they are such that their forces are not strong enough for making open war, they should use every effort to make
1. Livy 1. 56-59.
424 DISCOURSES J· 2, J
themselves his friends; to this end they should take all the roads they judge necessary, devoting themselves to his pastimes and finding pleasure in everything which they see pleases him. This intimacy, first, lets you live in security; then, without your being in any danger, it lets you enjoy the prince’s good fortune along with him, and it furnishes you every opportunity for carrying out your intention. It is true that, with respect to princes, some say you should try to stand not so near them that their ruin will include you, nor so far away that when they are ruined you will not be in time to surmount their ruin. Such a middle course would be the best if you could take it, but because it is, I believe, impossible, you must choose between the two methods mentioned above, that is, either you must keep at a distance or you must bind yourself to them. Anyone who does otherwise, if he is a man whose position makes him noteworthy, lives in continual peril. It is not enough to say:”I do not care about anything, I do not desire either honors or profits, I wish to live in retirement and without trouble.” Such excuses are heard but are not accepted. Men of rank cannot decide to sit quiet even when they decide truly and without any ambition, because they are not believed. Hence even when they do wish to be quiet, other people will not leave them in quiet. You must, then, play the fool like Brutus, and often you play the madman, praising, speaking, seeing, and doing things contrary to your purpose, to please the prince.
Since we have spoken of the prudence of this man in regaining the liberty of Rome, let us speak now of his severity in maintaining it.

CHAPTER 3. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN NEWLY GAINED LIBERTY, BRUTUS’ SONS MUST BE KILLED1
Not less necessary than useful was Brutus’ severity in maintaining in Rome the liberty he had gained there. It is an instance striking among recorded events that the father should sit on the judgment seat and not merely condemn his sons to death but be present at their deaths. And those who read ancient history will always observe that after a change of government, either from republic into tyranny or from tyranny into republic, the enemies of present conditions must
1. Livy z. 5.
suffer some striking prosecution. For he who seizes a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, and he who sets a state free and does not kill Brutus’ sons, maintains himself but a little while. Because this is discussed at length above,2 I refer to what I said then.
I shall bring up here just one instance, which in our days and in our native city is worthy of notice. This is Piero Soderini, who believed that with patience and goodness he could overcome the longing of Brutus’ sons to get back under another government; but he deceived himsel£ And though, being prudent, he recognized the necessity I have mentioned, and though chance and the ambition of those who assailed him gave him opportunity to destroy them, none; theless he never made up his mind to do so. He hesitated because he believed that with patience and goodness he could extinguish evil factions, and with rewards dispose of some men’s hostility. More; over, he thought (and many times assured his friends of it) that in order vigorously to attack his opponents and to crush his adversaries, he needed to seize extralegal authority and to use the laws to destroy equality among the citizens. Such action, even if he did not then apply it tyrannically, would so greatly alarm the people generally that after his death they never again would agree to set up a gonfa., lonier for life-a custom which he judged it well to strengthen and maintain.
This scruple was wise and good. Yet on the other hand, he should never have allowed an evil to continue for the sake of a good, when that evil could easily crush that good. And since his works and his intention would be judged by their outcome, he should have believed that if Fortune and life were with him he could convince everybody that what he did was for the preservation of his native city and not for his own ambition. He could also have regulated things in such a way that no successor of his could do for a wicked end what he had done for a good one. But he was deceived in his first opinion, since he did not know that malice is not mastered by time nor placated by any gift. Hence, not having the wisdom to be Brutus.-like, he lost together with his native city his position and his reputation.
As it is hard to keep a free state safe, so it is hard to keep a king.,
dom safe, as will be shown in the next chapter.
2. Bk. 1, chap. 16.
DISCOURSES 3. 4, 5

CHAPTER 4. A PRINCE rs NOT SECURE IN A PRINCEDOM WHILE THOSE WHO HA VE BEEN DEPRIVED OF IT ARE ALIVE1
The death of Tarquinius Priscus, caused by Ancus’ sons, and the death of Servius Tullius caused by Tarquinius Superbus, show how difficult it is, and how dangerous, to deprive a man of a king,, dom and leave him alive, even though the usurper seeks to win his favor with benefits. We see that Tarquinius Priscus was deceived in his belief that because the Roman kingdom had been given to him by the people and confirmed by the Senate he possessed it lawfully, nor did he believe that the anger of Ancus’ sons was so strong that they would not be satisfied with what satisfied all Rome. But Ser,, vius Tullius deceived himself, since he believed he could win the favor of Tarquin’s sons with new benefits.
Wherefore, as to the first, every prince can learn that he has no lasting security for his princedom as long as they are alive whom he has deprived of it. As to the second, every ruler can be reminded that never have new benefits erased old injuries; and so much the less in so far as the new benefit is less than the injury. Without doubt Servius Tullius was imprudent in believing that Tarquin’s sons would patiently be the sons,-in..-law of him over whom they thought they ought to be king. For this appetite for being king is so strong that it enters the breasts not merely of those to whom the kingship belongs, but of those to whom it does not belong. So it was for the wife of young Tarquin, Servius’ daughter, who, moved by this fury, against all paternal devotion urged on her husband against her father to take away his life and his kingdom-so much higher she valued being queen than being daughter of a king.
If, then, Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius lost their king, dom through not knowing how to secure themselves against those from whom they had snatched it, Tarquinius Superbus lost it through not sticking to the methods of the ancient kings, as will be shown in the following chapter.
1. Livy 1. 35-48.

CHAPTER 5. WHAT CAUSES A KINGDOM TO BE LOST BY A KING WHO HAS IN., HERITED IT
Tarquinius Superbus, having killed Servius Tullius, who left no heirs, came into secure possession of the kingdom, not needing to fear those things that had harmed his predecessors. Though his manner of taking the kingdom had been unlawful and hateful, nonetheless, if he had followed the old methods of the other kings, he would have been endured and would not have stirred up the Senate and the populace to take away his position. He was not, then, driven out because Sextus his son raped Lucretia, but because he broke the laws of the kingdom and governed tyrannically, for he took all authority away from the Senate and transferred it to himself; and such business as had been carried on in public places with the approval of the Roman Senate, he had carried on in his own palace, thus bringing on himself blame and envy. Hence in a short time he deprived Rome of all the liberty which under the other kings she had preserved. Nor was it enough for him to make the Fathers his enemies, for he roused the populace as well against him, making them labor at lowly tasks, very different from those in which his predecessors had employed them. So, by his unceasing acts of cruelty and pride, he had already prepared the spirits of all the Romans for rebellion, whenever they had an opportunity for it. If the catastrophe of Lucretia had not occurred, as soon as some other came about it would have produced the same result. For ifTarquin had lived like the other kings, and Sextus his son had committed that crime, Brutus and Collatinus would have appealed to Tarquin for vengeance against Sextus, and not to the Roman people.
Princes should know, then, that they begin to lose their positions at the hour when they begin to break the laws and those old ways and customs under which for a long time men have lived. After they are deprived of their positions, if they ever become so prudent as to realize with what ease princedoms are held by those who take a wise course, they will grieve much more for the loss they have suffered and condemn themselves to a greater penalty than any to which others might condemn them. It is much easier to be loved by the good than
1. Livy 1. 4g-58.
DISCOURSES 3· 5, 6
by the wicked and to obey the laws than to try to dominate them. If princes wish to learn the method they must use in bringing this about, they do not have to endure other labor than to take for their mirror the lives of good princes, such as Timoleon of Corinth and Aratus of Sicyon. In their lives a modern prince can find so much security and so much satisfaction on the part of ruler and of ruled that he will desire to imitate them, since easily, for the reasons given, he can do it. For when men are well governed, they do not seek for nor wish any other liberty, as was true of the peoples governed by the two named above, who were compelled to be princes as long as they lived, though many times they attempted to retire to private life. Because in this and the two preceding chapters I have spoken of the seditions stirred up against princes and of the conspiracies formed against their native cities by Brutus’ sons, and of those formed against Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius, I think it not apart from my subject to speak of them at length in the next chapter, since they are
matters deserving the attention of princes and private persons.

CHAPTER 6. CONSPIRACIES
I have thought it improper to omit the discussion of conspiracies, since they are so dangerous to princes and to private persons, for we see that many more princes have lost their lives and their positions through them than through open war. Because power to make open war on a prince is granted to few; power to conspire against him is granted to everybody. On the other hand, private persons do not enter into any undertaking more dangerous and rash than a con., spiracy, for in all its stages it is difficult and very dangerous. For this reason, many are attempted and very few have the outcome desired. In order, then, that princes may learn how to guard themselves against these dangers, and that private persons may be more cautious about entering into them-or rather that they may learn to be content to live under whatever rule Chance provides-I shall deal with conspiracies at length, not omitting anything important for the in., struction of either sort of person. And certainly Cornelius Tacitus’ axiom is golden, in which he says that men must honor past things and obey present things; they should wish for good princes, but should endure those of any sort. Certainly he who does otherwise generally ruins himself and his native city.
We must, then, in dealing with the subject, consider first against whom conspiracies are made. We find that they are made either against the conspirator’s own city or against a prince. Of these two I intend to speak at present, because of those formed to give a city to enemies who besiege her, or that are in any way like them, we have said enough abover.
[ Conspiracies against princes]
We shall speak, in this first part, of conspiracies against a prince, and shall first examine their causes. These are many, but one is by far the most important. That is to be hated by the people generally, because when a prince has roused general hatred against himself, we rightly suppose that he has especially injured some individuals who are eager to revenge themselves. This desire of theirs is increased by the general hostile feeling that they see roused against him. It is important, then, for a prince to avoid such private hatreds. How he must act to avoid them, since I have dealt with the matter elsewhere/ I shall not discuss here, because if he keeps himself from general hostility, simple individual offenses will raise less opposition against him. One reason is that he will rarely encounter men who will estimate one injury so high that they will put themselves in such great danger to avenge it. The other is that even if they have the spirit and the power to do it, they are held back by the universal good will that they see the prince possessing.
[ Private injuries]
The injuries done by the prince affect property, life, or honor. Among injuries to life, threats are more dangerous than deeds; or rather, threats are very dangerous and there is no danger at all in deeds, because a dead man cannot be concerned with revenge. Those remaining alive usually leave concern about it to the dead.3 But a man who is threatened and knows himself forced by necessity to act or to suffer becomes very dangerous to the prince, as in its place I shall explain with examples. Apart from this necessity, property and honor are the two things over which more than anything else men take offense. From injuries in these a prince ought to guard himself,
1. DISCOURSES 2. 32.
2. PRINCE 19.
3. I follow the Florentine edition of 1531.
43° DISCOURSES J. 6
because he cannot plunder a man so completely as not to leave him a dagger for revenging himself; a man cannot be so dishonored as not to retain a spirit determined on revenge. And of the kinds of honor that can be taken from men, that of women is the most important; after this comes shame to his own person. Such shame armed Pausa… nias against Philip of Macedon; in our times Luzio Belanti conspired against Pandolfo tyrant of Siena for no other reason than that the latter, after giving him as wife a daughter of his, then took her away, as we shall tell in its place. The chief cause for the Pazzi conspiracy against the Medici was Giovanni Bonromei’s estate, taken from the Pazzi through a decision by the Medici.
[Conspiracies against tyrants]
Still another cause-a very great one-makes men conspire against a prince: this is the desire for liberating their native land which he has conquered. This cause moved Brutus and Cassius against Caesar; this has moved many others against Phalarises, Dionysiuses, and other conquerors of their native lands. From this passion no tyrant can protect himself except by laying down his tyranny. But because no one will do that, there are few tyrants who do not come to a bad end. This gave rise to that passage in Juvenal:
To the son…in …law of Ceres few kings go down without slaughter and wounds, and by a dry death few tyrants (ro. 112).
[One man against the prince]
The perils undergone in conspiracies, as I said above, are great and continue through their course, because in such affairs one runs risks in planning them, in carrying them out, and after they are carried out. Those who conspire are either one or many. When there is but one, we cannot speak of a conspiracy but of a firm determina… tion by one man to kill the prince. This single man escapes the first of the three dangers risked by conspirators. Before he carries out his plan, he is subject to no danger, since no other person possesses his secret; he therefore undergoes no danger that his intention will come to the prince’s ear. A determination of this sort can enter into the mind of anyone of any rank, great, small, noble, not noble, close to or not close to the prince, because everybody is allowed at some time
to speak to him; and he who is allowed to speak is allowed to carry out his intention. Pausanias, of whom I have spoken at other times, killed Philip of Macedon when he was going to the temple with a thousand armed men around him, and was between his son and his son…inAaw; but Pausanias was a noble and intimate with the prince. A Spaniard, poor and oflow rank, gave Ferdinand king of Spain a knife wound in the neck; the wound was not mortal, but evidently the man had spirit and opportunity to strike. A dervish, a Turkish priest, struck with a scimiter at Bajazet, father of the present Turk. He did not wound him, but still he had courage and opportunity to make the attempt. Of spirits of that sort many, I believe, resolve to do it because there is no pain or peril in resolving, but there are few who do it, and of those who do act, very few or none escape being killed in the attempt. For this reason you do not find anyone who plans sure death. But we drop these individual resolves and come to conspiracies among many.
[Conspiracies by weak men]
I say that, according to the histories, all conspiracies are made by men of rank or by those very intimate with the prince; others, if they are not actually mad, cannot conspire, because men without power and not intimate with the prince lack all the hopes and all the op… portunities needed for the execution of a conspiracy. First, men without power cannot find supporters who will keep faith with them, because no one can concur in their intention with any of those hopes that make men enter into great dangers. Hence whenever they increase their numbers to two or three persons, they get themselves an accuser and are ruined. Even when they are so lucky as not to have any accuser, in the execution of their plan they are surrounded by such difficulties-not having easy access to the prince-that in exe… coting the conspiracy they can by no possibility escape ruin. Hence if men of rank and those having easy access are overcome by such difficulties as I detail below, the difficulties of the weak must increase without end. Therefore (because in matters oflife and property men are not wholly insane) when conspirators know they are weak, they are cautious. So when weak men dislike a prince, they spend their strength in cursing him and wait for those who have higher rank than theirs to revenge them. Indeed if any oflow rank attempt such a thing, one may praise their intention and not their prudence.
432
DISCOURSES 3· 6
[Conspiracies by men of high rank]
We see therefore that conspirators have all been men of rank or
intimates of the prince. Many of them have been influenced to conspire rather by too many favors than by too many injuries, as was Perennius against Commodus, Plautianus against Servius, Sejanus against Tiberius. All these were established by their emperors in such great riches, honor and rank that for the perfection of their power they seemed to lack nothing else than the Empire; being unwilling to lack that, they went to conspiring against the prince. Their conspiracies all had the end befitting their ingratitude. Yet of similar attempts in more recent times, that of Jacopo di Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti the ruler of Pisa ended successfully, for Jacopo, brought up and supported and made important by Piero, then took away his position. Of the same sort was that of Coppola, in our times, against King Ferdinand of Aragon. This Coppola, having reached so high a position that he felt he lacked nothing except the kingdom, lost his life in trying to get that too. Yet truly if any conspiracy made against princes by men of rank could end successfully, it should have been his, since it was made by another king, so to speak, and by one having so excellent an opportunity for carrying out his plan. But the lust for ruling that blinds such plotters blinds them also in managing such an enterprise, because if they knew how to carry out their wickedness with prudence, not to sue,, ceed would be impossible.
[ A prince should fear those he has ben ted]
A prince who attempts to guard himself against conspiracies, then, is more afraid of the men to whom he has given too many favors than of those to whom he has done too many injuries, because the injured lack opportunity, the favored abound in it. Their inten,, tion is the same, because as great or greater is the desire to rule than the desire for revenge. Princes should therefore give their friends only such authority that there may be some interval between it and the princedom and that there may be something desirable in the middle. Otherwise it will be strange if they do not fare like the princes mentioned above. But let us return to our outline.
[ Three dangers in conspiracy]
Since I have said that conspirators must be men of rank having access to the prince, I may now consider what outcomes their under., takings have had and see what has made them successful or unsuo cessful. As I said above, they offer dangers at three periods: before the deed, at its time, and after it. Few of them are successful because it is impossible, almost, to get through all these periods with good fortune.
[ Danger in preparation]
First discussing the dangers before the deed, which are the most important, I say that conspirators must be very prudent and have great good luck if when they are planning a conspiracy it is not to be discovered. It can be discovered either through report or through suspicion. Report results from encountering disloyalty or impru., dence in the men to whom you communicate it. Disloyalty is easily encountered, because you cannot communicate it except to men you trust, who for love of you will expose themselves to death, or to men who are dissatisfied with the prince. Of those to be trusted, you can find one or two, but if you wish to include more, you cannot find them. Further, their love for you must be indeed strong if the danger and their fear of punishment do not seem to them stronger. Still further, men deceive themselves, usually, about the love you judge a man feels for you, and you can never assure yourself of it without testing it; and to test it in this matter is very dangerous. And even though you have tested them in some other danger in which they have been faithful, you cannot from that fidelity measure this, because this danger far surpasses every other sort. If you measure their fidelity from their dissatisfaction with the prince, you easily deceive yourself, because as soon as you show any discontented man your intention, you give him means for becoming contented. His hatred must be great or your authority very great if it is to keep him faithful.
[ How conspiracies are revealed]
Many conspiracies, therefore, are revealed and crushed in their first stages, and if one is kept secret by many men for a long time, everybody thinks it wonderful. Examples are that of Piso against
434 DISCOURSES 3. 6
Nero and, in our times, that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’Medici. These were known to more than fifty men, yet went into effect before they were revealed. As to being revealed through imprudence, this happens when a conspirator speaks with, out caution, so that a servant or a third person hears you, as in the case of Brutus’ sons, who, when planning the affair with the emissaries of Tarquin, were overheard by a servant, who accused them.4 Or you may foolishly communicate it to a woman or a boy whom you love or some similar foolish person; thus Dymnus, one of the conspirators with Philotas against Alexander the Great, did when he communi, cated the conspiracy to Nicomachus, a boy he loved, who at once told it to his brother Cebalinus, and Cebalinus to the King.
[Discovery by suspicion]
As to discovery by suspicion, an instance is the conspiracy of Piso against Nero, in which Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, on the day before he was to kill Nero, made his will, ordered Milichus his freedman to see to the grinding of a dagger of his that was old and rusty, freed all his slaves and gave them money, had bandages pro, vided to bind wounds. By these indications becoming aware of the matter, Milichus accused him to Nero. Scaevinus was taken, and with him Natalis, another conspirator, for, on the day before, they had been seen speaking together secretly and at length, and since they did not agree about their conversation, they were forced to confess the truth. Hence the conspiracy was discovered, with the ruin of all the conspirators.
[Courage prevents revelation]
From such causes for the discovery of conspiracies it is impossible for a plotter to guard himself so well that through malice or impru, dence or carelessness he will not be discovered, whenever those sharing his knowledge exceed the number of three or four. When more than one of them are caught, discovery cannot be avoided, because two will not agree in all they say. When only one of them is caught, if he is a strong man, he can in the strength of his courage keep silent about the conspirators. But necessarily the other con,.. spirators must have no less courage than he, so that they stand firm and do not reveal themselves by flight, because if a single man lacks
Livy 2. 4.
courage, whether the man who has been arrested or one of those who is free, he will reveal the conspiracy. Unusual is the instance told by Titus Livius of the conspiracy made against Hieronymus king of Syracuse: when Theodore, one of the conspirators, was arrested, with great fortitude he concealed all his associates and accused the King’s friends; on the other hand, the conspirators so trusted Theodore’s fortitude that none of them left Syracuse or gave any sign of fear.”
[ Precautions against discovery]
You pass through all these perils, then, in managing a conspiracy before it comes to accomplishment. If you wish to escape them, you can find remedies. The first and surest remedy, or rather, to put it better, the only one, is not to give the conspirators time to accuse you, but to communicate the plan to them when you decide to carry it out-not before. Those who act in this way certainly escape the dangers of preparation, and generally the other dangers. Indeed all conspiracies so managed have ended successfully; any prudent man
would have opportunity to conduct himself in this way. I think it enough to bring up two instances. Nelematus, unable to endure the tyranny of Aristotimus tyrant of Epirus, assembled in his house many relatives and friends whom he exhorted to liberate their country; some of them asked time to consider and to make arrangements. At once Nelematus had his servants lock the house and said to those he had invited: “Either you swear to put this into action now or I turn you all over to Aristotimus as prisoners.” Moved by these words, they swore, and going without any loss of time, successfully they carried out Nelematus’ plan. When a Magian by a trick had seized the kingdom of the Persians, Ortanes, one of the great men of the kingdom, learned of and uncovered the fraud. When he discussed it with six leading men of that state, saying that he was going to clear the kingdom from the tyranny of that Magian, some of them asked for time. Then Darius, one of the six summoned by Ortanes, rose and said: ” ither we go now to carry out this deed, or I go to accuse you all.” And so getting up together, without giving anybody time to repent, they executed their plans successfully.
Also like these two instances is the method the Etolians used in
killing Nabis, the Spartan tyrant. They sent Alexamenus, one of their countrymen, with thirty horsemen and two hundred infantry,
S· Livy 24. S·
to Nabis, under the pretense of sending him aid, and to Alexamenus alone they made known the secret; on the others they imposed, under pain of exile, the duty of obeying him in everything whatsoever. He went to Sparta and did not make his charge known until he was about to carry it out, so that he succeeded in killing Nabis. These men, then, in such ways escaped the dangers to which those who manage conspiracies are subject, and he who imitates them will always escape.
[Piso’s conspiracy against Nero]
That anybody can do as they did, I shall show by the instance of Piso, mentioned above. He was a prominent and highly reputed man, intimate with Nero and greatly trusted by him. Nero often went into Piso’s gardens to eat with him. Piso, then, was in a posi… tion to gain as his friends men of spirit and courage and whose dispositions were suited to conspiracy against the Emperor (a very easy thing for an important man). When Nero was in Piso’s garden, Piso could tell his friends of his plan and encourage them with suitable words to do something they did not have time to refuse and which could not possibly fail to succeed. Likewise if the others are examined, few will be found that could not have been carried on in the same way. But on the average, men who do not understand the ways of the world often make great errors, and so much the greater in affairs offering so much that is unusual as do conspiracies.
[ Avoiding evidence of conspiracy]
You should then never mention the conspiracy until you must and at the moment of action. If you do decide to tell it, tell it to one man only of whom you have had long experience or who is moved by the same causes as you are. To find one man of that sort is easier than to find more; for that reason the danger is less. Moreover, if even he deceives you, you have some possibility for protecting your… self, such as you do not have when many have conspired. I have heard a prudent man say that to one person only you can tell any… thing, because there is as much weight, if you do not let yourself be brought to writing with your own hand, in the yes of one as in the no of the other. But from writing one ought to guard oneself as from a shoal, because not a thing more easily convicts you than what is written with your own hand. Plautianus, wishing to have Severus
the Emperor and his son Antoninus killed, entrusted the matter to Saturninus the Tribune. He, wishing to accuse Plautianus and not to obey him, and fearing that if it came to an accusation Plautianus rather than himself would be believed, asked for a note in his em, player’s handwriting that would assure that commission. Plautianus, blinded by ambition, gave it to him. As a result, he was accused and convicted by the Tribune; yet without that note and certain other signs, Plautianus would have been the winner-with such boldness he denied it. There is, then, against the accusation of one man, some defense, when no piece of writing or other evidence convicts you; against that you must guard yoursel£
In Pisa’s conspiracy there was a woman named Epicharis, who had in the past been a mistress of Nero’s; she, judging that it would be advantageous to have among the conspirators a captain of some triremes that Nero kept for his guard, told him of the conspiracy but not of the conspirators. Then when that captain broke faith and accused her to Nero, so great was her boldness in denying that Nero, being puzzled, did not condemn her. There are, then, in telling the thing to one man only, two dangers: one, he may accuse you delib, erately; two, he may accuse you when he is overcome and compelled by torture, after he has been arrested as a result of some suspicion or some hint of guilt. Yet against both of these dangers there is some recourse: you can deny the first, giving as a reason the hatred the accuser has for you; you can deny the second, giving as a reason the force that compels him to tell the lies. It is, then, prudence not to tell the thing to anybody, but to act according to the instances written above; or if you do tell it, not to go beyond one person; in the last, though the danger is greater, yet it is much less than when you tell it to many.
[ Anticipating action against oneself]
Very like the preceding situation is that in which necessity forces you to do to the prince what you know the prince intends to do to you-necessity so great as to give you no time, except for resolving to make yourself safe. This necessity almost always brings a conspiracy to the desired end; to prove it I think I need but two instances. U oder the Emperor Commodus, Letus and Elettus were leaders of the Praetorian soldiers; they were among the Emperor’s chief friends and intimates. Marcia was among his chief concubines or mistresses.
Because they sometimes reproved him for the ways with which he disgraced his person and his imperial office, he determined to have them killed. So he wrote down in a list Marcia, Letus, Elettus, and some others he intended should be killed the following night; that list he put under the pillow of his bed. When he had gone to wash himself, a boy of whom he was fond, while playing about the chamber and on the bed, happened to find the list. Going out with it in his hand, he met Marcia, who took it from him. When she had read it and understood its contents, at once she sent for Letus and Elettus; since all three realized their danger, they decided to forestall it; so without letting any time go by, that night they killed Commodus. The Emperor Antoninus Caracalla was with his armies in Meso,, potamia; his prefect was Macrinus, a man peaceful rather than soldierly. Now since princes who are not good always fear that somebody will do to them what they themselves think they deserve, Antoninus wrote to his friend Maternianus at Rome asking him to learn from the astrologers if anybody was aspiring to the Empire, and to let him know. Maternianus replied that Macrinus was aspiring to it. Since the letter came into Macrinus’ hands before it came to the Emperor’s, and from it he learned that before another letter came from Rome he must either kill Antoninus or die himself, he com,, missioned Martial, a centurion whom he trusted (and moreover Antoninus had, a few days before, put his brother to death), to kill him. This he carried out successfully. You see, then, that a necessity which does not give time produces almost the same effect as the method, mentioned above, that Nelematus of Epirus took. You see also what I said almost at the beginning of this Discourse, that threats harm princes worse and are the cause of more effective conspiracies than injuries; from making threats a prince should guard himself, because prudence requires him either to befriend men or to make himself safe against them;6 he should never bring them to a condition in which they are convinced that either they must die or the prince
must die.
[ Dangers in executing a conspiracy]
As to the dangers undergone in executing a conspiracy, they come either from varying the arrangements or from lack of courage in
6. Make himself safe: as often in Machiavelli, deprive them of power to do injury, usually by violence. Security can also be gained through kindness {e.g., D1scouRSES 2. 24 end).
their executor or from a blunder he makes through imprudence or through not completing the thing, so that part of those remain alive whom he planned to kill. I say, then, that there is nothing that causes so much disturbance or hindrance to all men’s actions as suddenly, without having time, to be obliged to change an arrange,, ment and to shift from what was arranged before. If this change causes confusion anywhere, it does so in matters of war and in actions like those of which we speak. For in such deeds nothing is so necessary as that men resolve on carrying out the part assigned to them. If men have fixed their imaginations for many days on one method and one arrangement, and that suddenly changes, by no possibility can they avoid being completely upset and everything ruined. Hence they had much better carry a thing out according to the plan laid down, even though there is something unsuitable in it, than to enter into a thousand difficulties by trying to cancel the unfitness. This advice applies when there is no time for replanning; when there is time, a man can conduct himself as he wishes.
[ The Pazzi conspiracy against the Medici]
The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici is well known. The plan fixed was that the Pazzi should give a breakfast for the Cardinal of San Giorgio and at that breakfast kill the Medici brothers. Certain men were assigned to kill them, others to take the Palace7 and others to run through the city and summon the people to liberty. It happened that when the Pazzi, the Medici and the Cardinal were in the cathedral church of Florence at a solemn office, news came that Giuliano would not breakfast with them that morning. This caused the conspirators to assemble, and what they were going to do in the house of the Medici they deter,, mined to do in the church. This disturbed the whole plan, because Giovambatista da Montesecco would not join in the murder, saying he would not do it in the church. Hence they had to substitute new agents in every action; these, not having time to settle their courage, made such mistakes that in carrying out their plan they were over,, powered.
The Palace of the Signory, the City Hall, as it were, of Florence, now called the Palazzo
Vecchio.
DISCOURSES J, 6
[Failure in courage]
The courage of one who carries out a plot fails either through reverence or through the agent’s personal cowardice. So great are the majesty and reverence accompanying a monarch’s presence that they easily soften or frighten one deputed to act. To Marius, when he was taken by the people of Minturnum, a slave was sent to put him to death; but terrified by the presence of Marius and by the memory of his name, the slave became cowardly and lost all power to kill him. And if this capacity is to be found in a man who is bound and a prisoner and overwhelmed by bad fortune, we easily suppose it much greater in a prince who is at liberty, with the majesty of his insignia, of his splendor and of his retinue. Such splendor can terrify you or actually, when joined with a pleasant greeting, mollify you. Certain persons plotted against Sitalces King of Thrace; they set the day for carrying it out; they came together at the place assigned, where they found the prince; none of them made a move to harm him. After leaving without having attempted any,, thing and without knowing what had impeded them, they accused one another. They fell into the same mistake several times, so that when the plot was discovered they suffered punishment for the evil they could have done and did not have the will to do. Against Alphonso Duke of Ferrara two of his brothers plotted, using as their instrument Giannes, a priest and singer of the Duke. At their re,, quest, he many times brought the Duke among them, so that they had it in their power to kill him. Nonetheless, never did either of them dare do it. Hence when they were found out, they suffered the penalty of their cowardice and imprudence. This inaction could not have resulted from anything except that his presence must have frightened them or some kindness of the prince made them humble.
[ Bewildered assassins]
In such attempts, confusion and mistake come from imprudence or from lack of courage, because these two things bewilder you and make you, when you are carried away by that perplexity of brain, say and do what you should not. That men are thus bewildered and confused, Titus Livius cannot show better than when he tells of Alexamenus the Aetolian, when he planned to kill Nabis the Spar,­ tan, whom we have mentioned above. When the time for action
came and he revealed to his followers what was to be done, “he himself settled his courage, bewildered by the thought of so great an act,” as Titus Livius says (35. 35). Indeed it is impossible for any man, even though of firm courage and wonted to killing men and to the use of steel, not to be bewildered. Hence men experienced in such affairs should be chosen and no others trusted, though held very courageous. About courage in important matters no one with… out experience can promise himself certainty. It can happen, then, that perplexity will make your weapons fall from your hands or make you say something that will have the same result. Lucilla, Commodus’ sister, planned that Quintianus should kill the Emperor. Waiting at the entrance to the amphitheatre and meeting Commodus with a naked dagger, Quintianus shouted: “This the Senate sends you.” These words caused his arrest before he could bring down his arm to strike. Messer Antonio da Volterra, chosen to kill Lorenzo de’Medici, as I said above,8 coming toward him said: “Ah traitor!” These words were the salvation of Lorenzo and the ruin of that conspiracy.
[Conspiracy against two princes]
A conspiracy can fail of execution, for the reasons given, when directed against one ruler, and can easily fail of execution when directed against two. Indeed the latter is so difficult that success is almost impossible, because to carry out parallel assassinations at the same time in different places is almost impossible, yet two such deeds cannot be done at different times, if the first is not to ruin the second. Hence if conspiring against one prince is an uncertain thing, danger… ous and imprudent, to conspire against two is altogether vain and foolish. And ifl did not respect the historian, I should never believe what Herodian says of Plautianus possible, namely, that he charged Saturninus a centurion that he alone should kill Severus and Anto” ninus, who lived in different places, because the story is so far from reasonable that any support other than this authority would not make me believe it. Certain Athenian young men plotted against Diodes and Hippias, tyrants of Athens. They killed Diodes, but
Antonio da Volterra is not named earlier, or later, in the DISCOURSES. See HISTORY OF FLORENCE 8.5,6. Did Machiavelli shift material from the manuscript of the D1scouRSES
to that of the HISTORY? Was the HISTORY in manuscript when this DISCOURSE was written?
442 DISCOURSES 3. 6
Hippias, who escaped, avenged him. Chion and Leonidas, citizens of Heraclea and disciples of Plato, conspired against Clearchus and Satirus, tyrants. They killed Clearchus, but Satirus, who was left alive, avenged him. The Pazzi, whom I use many times as an example, succeeded in killing only Giuliano. Hence everybody ought to abstain from such conspiracies against several rulers because they do no good either to oneself or to one’s country or to anybody. On the contrary those who remain become more unbearable and harsher, as is known to Florence, Athens and Heraclea, which I have earlier mentioned. It is true that Pelopidas’ conspiracy to liberate Thebes, his native land, confronted all these difficulties (nevertheless it had a most successful end), because Pelopidas con,. spired not merely against two tyrants but against ten; not merely was he not intimate with the tyrants, so that his entry to them was not easy, but he was an outlaw. Nonetheless he was able to come into Thebes, to kill the tyrants and to liberate his native city. He did it all with the aid of one Charon, adviser to the tyrants, through whom he had an easy entry for his action. Nobody nonetheless should take him as an example because, just as it was an impossible attempt and marvelous in its success, so it was and now is thought by the histori,. ans who praise it a thing rare and almost unparalleled.
[ The false suspicions of conspirators]
Such an action can be interrupted by a false suspicion or by an unforeseen accident that arises in the course of execution. That morning when Brutus and the other conspirators intended to kill Caesar, it happened that he spoke at length with Gnaeus Popilius Laenas, one of the conspirators. The others, seeing this long con,, versation, feared that the said Popilius would reveal the conspiracy to Caesar; hence they were going to try to kill Caesar there, without waiting until he was in the Senate. They would have done it if, when the conversation ended, they had not seen that Caesar made no unusual motion; then they were reassured. These false suspicions are to be considered and to be prudently respected, and so much the more as they are easy to form, because if your conscience is not clear you easily believe you are spoken of; you can hear a word, spoken for another purpose, that disturbs your courage and makes you believe it spoken about your affair. The result is that you yourself reveal the conspiracy by Right, or upset the deed by hastening it at
the wrong time. This comes about so much the more easily when many are aware of the plot.
[ Accidents may reveal conspiracies]
Accidents, because they are unexpected, I can present only by examples, to make men cautious in accord with them. Luzio Belan, ti of Siena, whom I mentioned above,9 in his anger against Pandolfo, who took away from him the daughter that earlier he had given him as his wife, determined to kill the ruler. Luzio chose his time as follows. As Pandolfo went almost every day to visit one of his sick relatives, he passed Giulio’sr0 dwelling. The latter, noting this, planned to have his fellow conspirators in his house to kill Pandolfo as he passed. When they were placed with their weapons in the entrance, he stationed one man at a window to give a signal when Pandolfo in passing was near the door. It happened that as Pan, dolfo approached, and after the signal was given, he met a friend who stopped him, while some of his companions kept on going;
these men, hearing and understandingrr the noise of arms, discovered
the ambush. So Pandolfo was saved and Giulio and his compan, ions had to Ree from Siena. The chance of that meeting impeded their action and made Giulio’s attempt fail. For such chances, because they are rare, no remedy can be provided. It is, however, very necessary to consider all the possibilities and to provide against them.
[Dangers after an assassination]
Nothing now remains to discuss except the dangers that a con, spirator runs after the deed is done. There is but one, namely, that someone is left to avenge the dead prince. Those left can be brothers or sons or other adherents, who would succeed to the princedom. Either through your negligence or through the causes mentioned above, persons can be left who will execute this vengeance. So it happened to Giovanni Andrea da Lampognano who, with other conspirators, killed the Duke of Milan; since the Duke’s son and two brothers were left, they stood ready to avenge his death. Truly in such cases conspirators are excusable, because there is no remedy.
In the present chapter.
10. The same as Luzio, just above.
u. Not a literal rendering.
444 DISCOURSES 3· 6
But when revengers are left alive through their imprudence or their negligence, then they do not deserve excuse. In Forli conspirators killed Count Girolamo their ruler and captured his wife and small children. These conspirators knew they were not secure if they were not masters of the fortress, but the castellan was unwilling to sur, render it. Then Madonna Caterina (for so the Countess was called) promised that if the conspirators would let her enter the fortress, she would have it surrendered to them; they might keep her children as hostages. With that promise, they let her enter. As soon as she was inside, she reproached them from the wall with the death of her husband, threatening them with every kind of revenge. And to show that she did not care about her children, she uncovered to them her genital members, saying she still had means for producing more children. So, unprovided with a plan and realizing too late their mistake, with lifelong exile they paid the penalty for their imprudence.
[ Dangers from the angry people]
Of all the dangers that can appear after the deed, there is none more certain or more to be feared than when the people love the prince you have killed; for this, conspirators have no remedy, because they can never make themselves safe from the people. Caesar is an instance; since the Roman populace loved him, it avenged him, for by driving the conspirators from Rome, it became the cause why all of them, at various times and places, were killed.
[Conspiracies against republics]
Conspiracies against their own cities are less dangerous for con, spirators than those against princes, because in preparing them the dangers are fewer; in carrying them out the dangers are the same; after their execution there is no danger. In preparing them there are not many dangers because a citizen can fit himself for power without showing his determination or design to anybody and, if his plans are not interrupted, can complete his enterprise successfully. If some law does interrupt him, he can bide his time and try some other way. This applies to a republic where there is some corruption, because in one not corrupt, where no evil has begun, such thoughts cannot enter a citizen’s mind. Citizens can, then, strive for the princedom by many means and in many ways without undergoing any danger of opposition, both because republics are slower than a prince, are
less suspicious and therefore less cautious, and because they have more regard for their important citizens; therefore the latter are rasher and bolder in acting against them. Everybody has read about the conspiracy of Catiline as narrated by Sallust, and knows that when the conspiracy was discovered, Catiline not merely remained in Rome but went into the Senate and spoke insultingly to the Senate and to the Consul-so great was the regard that city had for its citizens. And when he had gone from Rome and was already with his army, Lentulus and those others would not have been arrested except that letters in their handwriting declared their guilt plainly. Hanno, a very great citizen in Carthage, aspiring to the tyranny, planned at the marriage of one of his daughters to poison all the Senate and then to make himself prince. When this plan was learned, the Senate did not make any other provision than a law that limited the expense of banquets and weddings-so great was their regard for his rank and abilities.
[ Dangers in carrying out a conspiracy against a republic]
It is true, however, that in carrying out a conspiracy against your own country, the difficulties and the dangers are greater because it rarely happens that your own forces are enough for conspiring against so many, and not everybody is leader of an army, as was Caesar or Agathocles or Cleomenes, and the like, who have at one stroke and with their own forces conquered their native countries. For to such as these the way is very easy and very secure; but the others, who do not have such additions to their forces, have to do things either with deception and ingenuity or with foreign forces. As to deception and ingenuity, when Pisistratus the Athenian had conquered the Mega,. rians, and through this gained favor with the people, he went out one morning, wounded, saying that the nobility had injured him through envy, and asked that he be allowed to have armed men to guard him. By means of this authority he easily rose to such greatness that he
became tyrant of Athens. Pandolfo Petrucci returned, with other exiles, to Siena, and into his charge was given the guard of the Public Square, as a base thing that others refused. Nonetheless those armed men, at an opportune time, gave him such reputation that in a short time he became prince. Many others have employed other schemes and other means, and in the course of time and without danger have succeeded. Those who with their own forces or with foreign armies
have plotted to conquer their native lands have had varied success, according to Fortune. Catiline, mentioned above, was ruined at it. Hanno, of whom we have spoken above, when poison did not succeed for him, armed inany thousands of persons who were his partisans, and they and he were killed. Some leading citizens of Thebes, in order to make themselves tyrants, called to their aid a Spartan army and seized the tyranny of that city. Hence, if you examine all the plots formed against native cities, you will find none or but few that were crushed when they were being prepared, but all of them have either succeeded or been ruined in the carrying..out. When they have been carried out, they then are not subject to dangers other than those to which by nature the princedom is subject, be,, cause when a man becomes a tyrant, he is liable to the natural and ordinary dangers which tyranny brings upon him, for which he has no other remedies than those discussed above.
[ Assassination by poison]
This is all I think of to write about conspiracies. If I have discussed those carried out with steel and not with poison, I have done so because they are all subject to the same laws. Those with poison are in truth more dangerous through being more uncertain, because opportunity for them is not open to everybody; hence they must be delegated to those who do have opportunity, and this neces,, sity for delegating brings danger. Then for many reasons a drink of poison may not be deadly, as when conspirators poisoned Com,, modus; he vomited the poison, so they were obliged to make sure of his death by strangling him.
[How to thwart a conspiracy]
A prince, then, does not have a greater enemy than the conspfra,, cy, for when a conspiracy against him is carried out, it either kills or disgraces him: if it succeeds, he dies; if he discovers it and executes the conspirators, he is always believed to have invented the charge to satisfy his avarice and cruelty against the property and lives of the men executed. I do not wish, however, to fail in offering this caution to all princes and republics conspired against: when a conspiracy is revealed to them, they should postpone any attempt at vengeance, while they cautiously seek a clear understanding of its nature and measure well the conditions of the conspirators and their own; when
they find the conspiracy great and powerful, they should never make it public until they are ready with sufficient forces to crush it. If they do otherwise, they will make public their own ruin. Hence they ought with every device to pretend not to know it, because conspira… tors, on seeing themselves discovered, being driven by necessity, act without hesitation. The Romans are an instance. r:z When they left two legions of soldiers to guard the people of Capua against the Samnites, as we said elsewhere, the leaders of those legions conspired to subjugate the people of Capua. When their plan was learned at Rome, Rutilius, the new Consul, was charged to take measures against it. In order to put the conspirators to sleep, he spread a report that the Senate had renewed the assignment of the Capuan legions. These soldiers, believing it and supposing they had time to carry out their plan, did not try to hurry the matter up, but kept quiet until they saw that the Consul was separating one legion from the other. This made them suspicious and caused them to reveal them., selves and put their plan into practice. There cannot be a better instance than this on either side, because it shows how slow men are in things in which they think they have time, and how rapid they are when necessity drives them. Princes and republics that for their own advantage wish to defer revealing conspiracies cannot use better means than artfully to offer in the immediate future an opportunity to the conspirators. They will wait for it, supposing they have plenty of time, and thus will give the prince or the republic time to punish them. He who does otherwise hastens his own ruin, as did the Duke of Athens and Guglielmo de’ Pazzi. The Duke, when tyrant of Florence, learning that there was a conspiracy against him, without examining further, arrested one of the conspirators. This made the others at once seize their weapons and take away his position. Guglielmo, Florentine commissioner in Valdichiana in 1501, having heard that there was a conspiracy to take Arezzo from the Florentines in favor of the Vitelli, at once went into that city; without considering the conspirators’ forces or his own, and without providing himself with any force, on the advice of the bishop his son, arrested one of the conspirators. After that arrest, the others at once took up arms and snatched away the city from the Florentines; and Guglielmo was no longer a commissioner but a prisoner. Yet when conspiracies are weak, they can be and should be crushed without regard.
12. Livy 7. 38-41.
[Unwise procedure in time of conspiracy]
Further, two methods that have been used, almost opposite to each other, are in no way to be imitated. The Duke of Athens, named above, tried one of them when in order to show that he believed he had the good will of the Florentine citizens, he put to death a man who revealed a plot to him. Dion of Syracuse tried the other, when to test the intention of a man he suspected, he allowed Callippus, whom he trusted, to pretend a conspiracy against him. Both of these came out badly. The first took away courage from accusers and gave it to anybody who wished to plot. The other made easy the road to Dion’s death, or rather he was the real head of the conspiracy against himself. So indeed it came out, because Callippus, enabled to conspire against him without caution, con; spired so well that he took from him his position and his life.

CHAPTER 7. WHY CHANGES FROM FREEDOM TO SLAVERY AND FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM ARE SOMETIMES WITHOUT BLOOD… SHED, SOMETIMES ABOUND IN IT
Some will wonder perhaps why, of the many changes made from free government to tyranny, and the opposite, some are made with bloodshed, some without it. As we learn from history, in such shifts sometimes countless men are killed; yet sometimes no one is injured, for in the change Rome made from kings to consuls, no one was driven away except the Tarquins, without injury to anybody else. That depends on the following: any government that is changed came into existence with violence or not. Since when it originates with violence, it must originate with injury to many, of necessity on its fall the injured try to revenge themselves; from this desire for revenge come bloodshed and deaths. But if that government was established by the common consent of a large group that has made it great, there is no reason, if then the said large group falls, for injuring anyone else than its leader. And of this kind was the government of Rome and the expulsion of the Tarquins. And so too was the government of the Medici in Florence, for at their fall in 1494 none other than they was injured. So such changes do not turn out very dangerous. On the other hand, exceedingly dangerous are those
made by men who have to revenge themselves, and they have always been of a sort to terrify him who only reads of them. Because histories are full of instances of these, I am going to omit them.

CHAPTER 8. HE WHO WISHES TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT OF A ST A TE MUST CONSIDER ITS MATTER1
[Spurius Cassius tries to buy Roman liberty]
I explained above that a wicked citizen cannot damage a state that is not corrupt-a conclusion that is strengthened, in addition to the reasons I gave,l by the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus. This Spurius was an ambitious man, eager to seize unlawful authority in Rome and to gain the plebeians’ good will by doing them many favors, as by dividing among them the fields the Romans took from the Hernici. Yet the Fathers, discovering his ambition, so far brought it under suspicion that when he spoke to the people offering them the money derived from the grain the state imported from Sicily, they wholly refused it, believing that Spurius was trying to give them the price of their liberty. But if the people had been corrupt, they would not have refused that price, but would have opened to him the road to tyranny that they closed.
[ The subversive designs of Manlius Capitolinus]
A more important instance of this is Manlius Capitolinus, who reveals how much excellence of mind and of body, how many good deeds done for the advantage of a man’s country are later canceled by a vicious longing to rule. This longing, as it seems, was caused by his envy of the honors given to Camillus; his mind became so blinded that, not thinking on the city’s mode oflife, not examining its matter, which was not yet fit to receive a bad form, he set out to raise rebellion in Rome against the Senate and against his country’s laws. The incident reveals the perfection of that city and the goodness of its material, because in his case none of the nobility, though very fierce defenders of one another, did anything to support him; none of his relatives undertook any action in his behalf; yet for others who were
1. Matter, that of which it is made, as opposed to its form.
2. DISCOURSES 3• 6.
accused they were in the habit of appearing unkempt, clad in black, full of sadness, to gain pity for the accused; but in Manlius’ behalf not one of them was seen. The Tribunes of the plebeians, who usually gave their support in matters that seemingly would result to the people’s advantage-and the more any actions opposed the wishes of the nobles, the more the Tribunes pushed them ahead-in this case united with the nobles, to put down a common plague. The populace of Rome, very eager for their own advantage and loving what worked against the nobility, might have given much support to Manlius. Nevertheless, when the Tribunes laid a charge against him and gave over his case to the judgment of the populace, that populace, changed from defender into judge, without any hesi,.. tation condemned him to death.
[ All classes united in defense of liberty]
So I do not believe that Livy’s History gives any instance better suited to show the goodness of all classes in that republic, for we see that no one in Rome attempted to defend a citizen abounding in every sort of ability and who publicly and privately had done a great many praiseworthy deeds. In all the people love of country was more powerful than any other consideration, and they thought much more on present perils for which he was responsible than on past deserts-so much so that with his death they set themselves free. So Titus Livius says: “Such was the end of a man who, if he had not been born in a free state, would have been worthy of remembrance” ( 6. 20 ). In this two things are to be considered: one, that in a corrupt city men have to seek glory in other ways than they do in a city still living in accord with law; the other (which is almost the same as the first), that men in their conduct, and so much the more in their great actions, ought to think of the times and adapt themselves to them.
[Harmony with the times]
Those who because of a bad choice or natural inclination are out of harmony with the times, generally live in misfortune and their actions have a bad outcome; it is the opposite with those who are in harmony with the times. Without doubt, then, according to the words of the historian earlier quoted, if Manlius had been born in the times of Marius and of Sulla, when the material was already corrupt and he could have imprinted on it the form of his ambition, he
would have had the same career and the same end as Marius and Sulla and the others who after them strove to gain tyrannical power. So likewise, if Sulla and Marius had lived in Manlius’ times, in their first undertakings they would have been crushed. A man can indeed with his schemes and his bad measures begin corrupting the people of a city, but one man’s life cannot be long enough to corrupt them so much that he himself will be able to get advantage from it. Even if he could do so as to length of time, he could not on account of the way men conduct themselves, for they are impatient and unable to defer long any passion of theirs. Besides, they deceive themselves in their affairs, and especially in those that they much desire; hence, either because of impatience or because they deceive themselves, they enter into an undertaking contrary to the times and come out badly.
[Only in corrupt times can liberty be overthrown]
Of necessity, therefore, a man wishing to get authority in a repub… lie and to imprint a bad form on it, must come to it when its matter is already injured by time, having been little by little, from generation to generation, brought to evil. And a republic necessarily gets to that place, as is explained above,3 when it is not often reinvigorated by good examples, or is not by new laws brought back to its first condition. Manlius, then, would have been an unusual man and worthy of remembrance ifhe had been born in a city already corrupt. Therefore citizens in a republic who make some move either in the direction of freedom or in the direction of tyranny should consider the material on which they must work, and determine from that the difficulty of their undertakings. For it is as difficult and dangerous to try to set free a people that wishes to live in servitude as it is to try to bring into servitude a people that wishes to live free. Since I said above that men in their activities should consider the qualities of the times and proceed according to them, I shall speak of the topic at length in the following chapter.
3. Ibid. 3. 1.
452 DISCOURSES J· 9

CHAPTER 9. HE WHO EXPECTS ALWAYS TO HAVE GOOD FORTUNE MUST CHANGE WITH THE TIMES
Many times I have observed that the cause of the bad and of the good fortune of men is the way in which their method of working fits the times, since in their actions some men proceed with haste, some with heed and caution. Because in both of these methods men cross the proper boundaries, since they cannot follow the true road, in both of them they make errors. Yet a man succeeds in erring less and in having prosperous fortune if time fits his ways, for you always act as Nature inclines you.1
[The times of Fabius fitted his nature]
Everybody knows that with his army Fabius Maximus proceeded heedfully and cautiously, far from all impetuosity and all Roman boldness, and good fortune caused his method to fit well with the times. Hannibal, a young man and with a youthful fortune, had come into Italy and had already defeated the Romans twice, so that the republic was almost bereft of her good soldiers and was frightened. Hence no better fortune could come to her than to have a general who by slow movement and caution would impose delay on the enemy. Likewise Fabius could not have met with times more suited to his ways-the result was that he became famous. That Fabius so acted through nature and not through choice is plain, because when Scipio wished to cross into Africa with his armies to end the war, Fabius was much opposed to it, being unable to give up his habits and his customary conduct. So, if it had been left to him, Hannibal would still be in Italy, for he was a man who did not understand that times changed methods of warfare. If Fabius had been king of Rome, he could easily have lost that war, because he would not have known how to vary his policy as times varied; but he was born in a republic where there were different citizens and different opinions; hence, just as Rome had Fabius, who was the best in times requiring that the war be endured, so later she had Scipio, in times fit for winning it.
1. An instance of Machiavelli’s frequent shift from the third person to the second.
[ A republic can employ diversity of temperaments]
Thence it comes that a republic, being able to adapt herself, by means of the diversity among her body of citizens, to a diversity of temporal conditions better than a prince can, is of greater duration than a princedom and has good fortune longer. Because a man accustomed to acting in one way never changes, as I have said. So of necessity when the times as they change get out of harmony with that way of his, he falls.
[ Pim, Soderini]
Piero Soderini, already mentioned, acted in all his affairs with kindness and patience. Prosperity came to him and to his native city while the times were in harmony with his way of acting, but when afterward times came in which he needed to break off his patience and humility, he could not do it. Hence, along with his city, he fell. Pope Julius II, throughout his pontificate, proceeded with haste and vehemence, and because the times fitted him well, his enterprises succeeded-all of them. But if times requiring a different plan had come, of necessity he would have fallen, because he would not have changed either his method or his rule of action.
[ Republics shift slowly]
We are unable to change for two reasons: one, that we cannot counteract that to which Nature inclines us; the other, that when with one way of doing a man has prospered greatly, he cannot be persuaded that he can profit by doing otherwise. That is why For., tune varies for the same man; she varies the times, but he does not vary his ways. This also brings about the ruin of cities, because republics do not vary their methods with the times, as we explained at length above, but they are slower, since it is more trouble for them to vary, because variation must result from times that agitate the entire state. To make the state vary, one man alone who varies his own mode of action is not enough.2
Because we have mentioned Fabius Maximus, who kept Han.,
nibal delaying, I shall in the following chapter discuss whether a general wishing in any case to fight a battle with the enemy, can be hindered by them from doing so.
2. See D1scouRSES 1. 59. A prince of vigorous character can make an immediate change, but in a republic a man of such character must.first bring many of the less vigorous over to his views.
454 DISCOURSES J. 1 O

CHAPTER 10. A GENERAL CANNOT ESCAPE BATTLE WHEN HIS OPPONENT IS DETER.­ MINED TO FIGHT IN ANY CASE
[The value of ancient example in warfare]
“Gneus Sulpitius the Dictator dragged out the war against the Gauls, being unwilling to commit himself to Fortune against an enemy whom time and a foreign land were daily making weaker” (Livy 7. 12). When an error persists, in which all men or the greater part deceive themselves, I hold that to censure it is frequently not a bad idea. Therefore, though already I have several times shown how much our actions in great affairs are unlike those of ancient days, nonetheless I think that to repeat it at present is not superfluous. Because if at any point we deviate from ancient customs, we deviate especially in military actions, in which at present we do not practice any of the things that the ancients greatly valued. We are in this bad condition because republics and princes have given this duty to others, and to avoid danger have drawn away from military activity. If we do sometimes see a king in our times going to war in person, we are not therefore to believe that he is fostering other customs that deserve further praise. Indeed when they do undertake this activity, they undertake it for display and not for any other praiseworthy reason. Yet by sometimes visiting their armies and keeping in their own power the title of commander, they make smaller mistakes than republics do, especially those in Italy. These, trusting in someone else and not understanding in any way what pertains to war, yet on the other hand undertaking to decide about it, in order that they may appear to be in control, make in such decisions a thousand mistakes. Though I have discussed some of them elsewhere, I wish at present not to be silent about a very important one.
[ The dangers of refusing battle]
When these lazy princes or effeminate republics send out one of their generals, the wisest command they think they can give him is that he shall by no means come to battle, but rather, above everything else, shall refrain from combat. Yet though they believe that in this they imitate the prudence of Fabius Maximus who, by deferring combat, saved their state for the Romans, they do not understand
that in most instances their command is worthless or damaging. We have to accept this conclusion: a general who decides to remain in the field cannot escape battle whenever his adversary intends to engage in it no matter what. So orders not to fight amount to saying: “Fight the battle when the enemy wishes to, not when you do.” Because if you decide to remain in the field and not to fight a battle, you have no other sure protection than to put yourself fifty miles at least away from the enemy, and then to keep good scouts, so that if he comes toward you, you will have time to remove. Another plan in such a case is to shut yourself up in a city. Either of these plans is very injurious. With the first, your country is left as a spoil for the enemy; therefore a brave prince will prefer to tempt the fortune of combat rather than to lengthen the war with such damage to his subjects. With the second plan, your loss is evident, because it is likely that if you retire with an army into a city, you will find yourself besieged and in a short time will suffer hunger and will surrender. Hence, to avoid battle by these two ways is very damaging. The method Fabius Maximus used, of remaining in strong places, is good when you have so effective an army that the enemy will not have the courage to attack you in the midst of your advantages. Nor can it be said that Fabius avoided battle, but rather that he wished to enter it to his own advantage. Indeed if Hannibal had marched to attack him, Fabius would have waited for him and fought a battle with him, but Hannibal never dared to fight on Fabius’ terms. So battle was avoided as much by Hannibal as by Fabius. But if one of them had decided to fight without respect to conditions, the other would have had only one of three remedies: the two mentioned above, or to run away.
[ Philip of Macedonia as an example]
That what I say is true is evident from a thousand instances, and especially in the war that the Romans carried on with Philip of Macedonia, Perseus’ father. Philip, assailed by the Romans, deter., mined not to come to combat, and in order not to do so, decided at first to act as did Fabius Maximus in Italy; he put himself with his army on the summit of a mountain, well fortified, thinking that the Romans would not have courage to attack him. But going there and fighting with him, they drove him from that mountain; not being able to resist, he Bed with the greater part of his people. What
456 DISCOURSES J· 1 o, 11
kept him from being destroyed entirely was the difficulty of the country, which prevented the Romans from following him. Philip then, not wishing to engage in battle and being encamped with his army near the Romans, was obliged to flee. Having learned from this experience that, not wishing to fight, it was not enough for him to remain on the mountain tops, and not wishing to shut himself up in cities, he determined to take the other method, that of remaining many miles distant from the Roman army. Hence, if the Romans were in one province, he went to the other, and so always he went in where the Romans went out. And seeing at last that in lengthening the war in this way his condition grew worse and his subjects were burdened now by himself, now by the enemy, he determined to tempt the fortune of combat, and so came to a formal battle with the Romans.
[Circumstances determine the wisdom of combat]
It is, then, useful not to fight when conditions are as they were for Fabius’ army and, as I have just said, for that of Gneus Sulpitius, that is, when you have an army so good that the enemy does not dare attack you in your fortresses, and when the enemy is in your country without having set up a good base, so that he suffers from a scarcity of food. In that situation the plan is useful, for the reasons that Titus Livius gives: “He refused to commit himself to Fortune against an enemy whom time and a foreign land were daily making weaker.” But in every other situation, by no possibility can you avoid battle, except with dishonor and peril to yoursel£ For to flee as Philip did is like being defeated, and with more shame, in so far as there has been less proof of your vigor. Though he succeeded in saving him,, self, another would not have succeeded who was not aided by the country as he was. That Hannibal was not a master of war, nobody would ever say. Yet when he was opposed to Scipio in Africa, ifhe had seen any advantage in prolonging the war, he would have done it, and perhaps, since he was a good general and had a good army, he could have done it, as Fabius did in Italy. But since he did not, we must believe that some important reason moved him. So then, a prince who has an army assembled, and sees that for lack of money or of friends he cannot keep such an army a long time, is altogether mad if he does not tempt Fortune before his army begins to go to pieces, because ifhe waits, he certainly loses; ifhe makes the attempt, he may conquer.
[Reputation]
There is yet another thing to be pondered here. This is that a general wishes to gain renown even when he loses, and there is more renown in being overcome by force than by some other obstacle that makes you lose. So Hannibal would have been moved by this necessity. And on the other side (if Hannibal had deferred the battle, and Scipio had not had courage to attack him in strong places) Scipio, who had already overcome Syphax and gained so many cities in Africa, would not have allowed Hannibal to remain there as securely and easily as in Italy. This was not the situation of Han., nibal when he was opposed to Fabius, nor of the French who were opposed to Sulpitius.
[ An invader cannot avoid battle]
Still less can a general avoid battle when with his army he is attacking a foreign country because, if he intends to enter the land of the enemy, he must fight when the enemy comes against him. If he is besieging a city, he is so much the more obligated to battle. In our times that was the situation of Duke Charles· of Burgundy who, when besieging Morat, a Swiss city, was attacked and defeated by the Swiss. Likewise the French army besieging Novara was de., feated by the Swiss.

CHAPTER 11. HE WHO HAS TO STRIVE WITH MANY, EVEN WHEN HE IS INFERIOR, IF ONLY HE CAN REPEL THEIR FIRST ATTACKS, WINS
[How the Roman Tribunes were managed]
The power of the Tribunes of the People in the city of Rome was great, and it was necessary, as we have many times explained, because otherwise there would have been nothing to check the ambition of the nobility, which would have corrupted that republic much earlier than it actually did become corrupt. Nonetheless, because in every., thing, as we have said elsewhere, is hidden some evil of its own that brings forth new emergencies, there must be new laws to provide against such evil. Therefore, when the power of the Tribunes became overweening and dangerous to the nobility and to all Rome, trouble
would have resulted, dangerous to Roman liberty, if Appius Clau,, dius had not shown how to defend it against the Tribunes’ ambition. His device was that they find among the Tribunes one who was timid or who could be bribed or who loved the common good; that Tribune they would induce to oppose any plan of the others to put into effect some decision against the will of the Senate. This device was an important moderator of their great authority and many times was useful to Rome.1
[ A single united state will defeat powerful allied enemies]
This makes me observe that when many powers allied against one power are together much stronger than he, nevertheless more can be hoped from the power who is alone and less strong than from the many others, even though they are very strong. Because, putting aside all the things through which one alone is stronger than many (which are countless), it will always happen that by using a little cleverness the one will disunite the many and weaken that strong body. I do not need to bring up ancient examples, though there are many; I am sure there are enough modern ones in our time.
[Examples of the defeat of many by one]
In 1483 all Italy formed a league against the Venetians; they, entirely defeated and no longer able to keep their army in the field, bribed Lord Lodovico, who ruled Milan. Through such bribery, they made an agreement by which they not merely got back the cities they had lost but took possession of part of the Ferrarese terri,, tory. So those who lost in the war were victors in the peace. A few years ago, all the world made a league against France. Nevertheless, before the war ended, Spain broke away from the confederates and made a truce with her; hence the other confederates were obliged soon after to make a truce for themselves. Without doubt, then, when a war is undertaken by many against one, we should always reckon that the one will be the winner, ifhe is strong enough to repel the first attacks and delay until the right time comes.
[Concessions must be made early]
If the one ruler is not strong enough to delay, he is subject to a thousand dangers, as were the Venetians in r 508; if they had managed
2. Livy 6. 37-42.
to delay the French army and had had time to gain over to their side some of those leagued against them, they would have escaped that ruin. (Yet since they did not have armies efficient enough to delay the enemy, and therefore did not have time to detach any of them, they fell.) We see, indeed, that the Pope, when he had his possessions again, became their friend; so did Spain; and very gladly, if they could have done so, those two princes would have saved supremacy in Lombardy for the Venetians in opposition to the French king, in order to keep him from becoming so great in Italy. The Venetians, then, could have given up part in order to save the rest. To have done so early enough to make it appear not a necessity would have been a very wise plan. Yet after the beginning it was contemptible and perhaps of little value. Before the war began, however, few of the Venetian citizens could see their danger, very few could see the remedy, and nobody advised it.
To return to the first part of this Discourse, I conclude that just as
the Roman Senate had a medicine for the health of the country against the ambition of the Tribunes, because they were many, so any prince who is attacked by many will have a medicine against them, whenever he knows how to use with prudence measures suited for disuniting them.

CHAPTER 12. A PRUDENT GENERAL LAYS EVERY NECESSITY FOR FIGHTING ON HIS OWN SOLDIERS AND TAKES IT AWAY FROM THOSE OF THE ENEMY
[The power of necessity]
At other times we have indicated how useful to human actions necessity is and to what renown it has brought them, and that some moral philosophers have written that the hands and the tongue of man, two most noble instruments for making him noble, would not have worked perfectly or brought human actions to the height they have reached if they had not been urged on by necessity.
[ Necessity makes soldiers obstinate]
Since, then, the ancient leaders of armies knew the power of such necessity and the extent to which it made their soldiers’ spirits stub,..
born in fighting, they used every effort to have it impel their soldiers. And on the other hand they applied all their skill to freeing their enemies from it, and therefore many times opened to the enemy a road that they could have closed, and to their own soldiers closed a road that they could have left open. He then who wishes that a city be stubbornly defended, or that an army in the field should contend stubbornly, ought above everything to impose such necessity on the hearts of those who are going to fight. Therefore a prudent general who must attempt the capture of a city, measures the ease or difficulty of capturing it by learning and considering what necessity impels its inhabitants to defend themselves, and if he finds that great necessity impels them to defense, he judges capture difficult; otherwise he judges it easy.
[ Hatred causes bitter warfare]
For this reason cities after rebellion are reconquered with more difficulty than at their first conquest; at the outset, not having cause to fear punishment because they have given no offense, they easily yield; but when later they have rebelled, being aware that they have given offense, and as a result fearing punishment, they become diffi,, cult to conquer. This stubbornness also is produced by the natural hate neighboring princes and neighboring republics feel for each other. Such hate results from ambition to rule and jealousy of neigh,, hors’ power, especially among republics, as in Tuscany; this strife and rivalry always have made and always will make difficult the conquest of one by the other. Moreover, he who well considers the neighbors of the city of Florence and the neighbors of the city of Venice will not wonder, as many do, that in her wars Florence has spent more and gained less than Venice. The whole reason is that the cities near Venice were not so obstinate in defense as those near Florence. All the cities in the neighborhood of Venice were used to living under a prince and not in freedom. Those in the habit of serving often show little concern about changing their masters; in,, deed they are many times eager to do so. Thus Venice, though she had neighbors more powerful than those of Florence, yet finding those cities less stubborn, overcame them more quickly than Florence could-surrounded by nothing but free cities.
[ Fine promises deceive the multitude]
It is wise, then-to return to the early part of this Discourse-for a general when attacking a town to make every effort to remove from its defenders such necessity and consequently such stubbornness, promising pardon if they fear punishment, and if they fear for their liberty, showing them that he is acting not against the common good but against a few ambitious men in the city. This plan has many times made easier movements against cities and their capture. And though such pretenses are easily discerned, especially by prudent men, yet they often deceive the people, who, longing for immediate peace, close their eyes to all the traps hidden under such big promises. And in this way countless cities have become slaves, as did Florence in recent times. So it happened to Crassus and his army. Though he understood the empty promises of the Parthians, made to deprive his soldiers of any necessity for defending themselves, nevertheless he could not keep his men firm, since they were blinded by the offers of peace their enemies made, as can be read in detail in his Life.
[Necessary war]
I instance, too, the Samnites, who, through the ambition of some of them, contrary to the terms of the treaty, raided and plundered the fields of the Roman allies, and then sent ambassadors to Rome to ask for peace, offering to restore the property that had been taken and to give over as prisoners those who had caused the disorders and the plundering, but they were refused by the Romans. And on their return into Samnium without hope of agreement, Claudius Pontius, then general of the Samnite army, showed in a noteworthy speech that the Romans intended war in any case, and though on their part the Samnites wished peace, necessity made them go ahead with war. His words were: “A war has justice for those to whom it is necessary, and arms are sacred to those who save in arms have no hope” (Livy 9. 1). On such necessity he and his soldiers founded their hope of victory.
[ The power of necessity in Roman war]
In order not to have to return later to this matter, I shall bring up such Roman instances as are most worthy of note. When Gains Manlius with his army was opposing the Veientians, part of the
DISCOURSES 3. 12, 13
Veientian army got inside his stockade; whereupon Manlius with a regiment hurried to the rescue, and so that the V eientians could not escape, he occupied all the exits of the camp. Then the Veientians, seeing they were closed in, fought with such rage that they killed Manlius and would have overcome all the rest of the Romans if the prudence of a Tribune there had not opened to them a way for getting out. Here we observe that as long as necessity forced the V eientians to fight, they fought most savagely, but when they saw the way open, they thought more about fleeing than about fighting. The Volsci and the Aequi with their armies had entered Roman territory. The Consuls were sent against them. As a result, in carrying on the combat, the army of the Volscians, of which V etius Messius was head, was suddenly shut in between its stockades, which were occupied by the Romans, and the other Roman army. Seeing that he must either die or make his way with steel, he said to his soldiers: “Come with me, not wall or ditch but armed men oppose armed men; you are equal in courage; in the last and chief weapon, necessity, you are superior” (Livy 4. 28). So this necessity is called by Titus Livius “the last and chief weapon.” Camillus, the most prudent of all the Roman generals, being already inside the city of the Veientians with his army, in order to make its capture easier by taking from the enemy the last necessity for defending them,, selves, gave orders, in such a way that the V eientians heard him, that nobody should harm those who were without weapons. So, since weapons were thrown down, that city was taken almost without
blood.1 This method was afterwards used by many generals.
1. Livy 5. 21.

CHAPTER 13. IS A GOOD GENERAL WITH A WEAK ARMY OR A GOOD ARMY WITH A WEAK GENERAL MORE TO BE TRUSTED
[Generals need soldiers; soldiers need generals]
Coriolanus, when an exile from Rome, fled to the V olsci, whence, having raised an army to avenge himself on his fellow citizens, he marched on Rome. He then left the city, more through respect for his mother than on account of the Roman forces. On this passage, Titus Livius says it teaches that the Roman republic
succeeded through the valor rather of the generals than of the soldiers, if a reader considers that in the past the Volsci had been conquered and that later they were conquerors only when Coriolanus was their
generalr. And though Livy is of this opinion, nonetheless many
places in his History indicate that the excellence of the soldiers with, out a general accomplished marvelous feats and that they showed better discipline and more spirit after the deaths of the Consuls than before, as did the Roman army in Spain under the Scipios. This army, after the deaths of the two generals, through its valor not merely saved itself but overcame the enemy and retained that province for the republic. Thus going through the whole, we find many instances in which the ability of the soldiers alone has won the battle, and many others in which the ability of the generals alone produced the same effect. Hence we decide that the first has need of the second, and the second of the first.
[ A leader without an army, an army without a leader]
So it is well to consider, first, which is more to be feared: a good army badly led, or a good general supported by a bad army. In Caesar’s opinion, either one should be valued low. For when he went into Spain against Afranius and Petraeus, who had an excellent army, he said that he valued them low, “since he went against an army without a leader,” showing the weakness of the generals. On the contrary, when he went into Thessaly against Pompey, he said: “I go against a leader without an army.”
[ Armies train generals; generals train armies]
Another thing to be considered is whether it is easier for a good general to make a good army, or for a good army to make a good general. On that, I say that such a doubt seems settled, because many good men will more easily find or teach one man until he becomes good, than one will many. Lucullus, when he was sent against Mithridates, was wholly inexperienced in war; nevertheless that good army, where there were many excellent leaders, quickly made him a good general. The Romans, lacking men, armed many slaves and assigned them for drill to Sempronius Gracchus, who in a short time made a good army. Pelopidas and Epaminondas, as we say elsewhere, after getting Thebes their native city out of slavery to
1. Livy z. 40.
the Spartans, in a short time made the Theban farmers into excellent soldiers who could not merely repel the Spartan warriors but could defeat them. So soldiers and general stand on a level, because one good thing finds another. Nevertheless a good army without a good leader is likely to become overbearing and dangerous, as did the Macedonian army after Alexander’s death, and as did the veteran soldiers in the Roman Civil Wars. Hence I believe that more con..­ fidence can be put in a general who has time to instruct his men and opportunity to arm them than can be put in an arrogant army with a head whom it has riotously selected. Therefore I double the glory and renown of generals who not merely have defeated the enemy but, before they came to combat, have been obliged to instruct their armies and make them good. Such generals have shown double capacity-so rare that if such a task were given to many commanders they would as a result have much less honor and reputation than at present.

CHAPTER 14. THE EFFECTS OF NEW DE,. VICES THAT APPEAR AND NEW WORDS THAT ARE HEARD IN THE MIDST OF A BATTLE
The great importance in con.Hicts and battles of a new event, caused by something seen or heard for the first time, is shown in many places, and especially by this instance in the battle the Romans fought with the V olsci: Quintius, seeing one of the wings of his army yielding, in a loud voice ordered the men to stand firm because the other wing of the army was victorious. Having with these words given courage to his men and caused terror to the enemy, he won.1 Now if the effects of such words on a trained army are great, on a confused and badly trained one they are very great, because the whole army is moved by the same wind.
[ A Perugian instance]
I wish to bring up a striking instance in our times. A few years ago the city of Perugia was divided into two parties, the Oddi and Baglioni. The Baglioni were in power; the Oddi were exiles. By means of their friends, the Oddi got together an army and assembled
1. Livy 2. 64-
in some villages of theirs near Perugia; then with the aid of their party they one night entered that city, and without being discovered went on to seize the public square. Because at all the street corners that city has chains that keep it barred off, the soldiers of the Oddi had at their front a man who was breaking the locks with an iron hammer, to let the cavalry pass. When only the one opening into the public square was left to break, and the shout “To arms!,, had already been raised, the man breaking the locks was so impeded by the crowd behind him that he could not raise his arms enough to strike; hence, in order to do so, he said: “Move back.” When one rank after another passed along the word “Back,” it made the rear., most run away, and in turn the others, with such speed that they defeated themselves. Thus the plan of the Oddi came to nothing, because of so slight an unforeseen event.
[How an army differs from a crowd]
This affair suggests that regulations in an army are needed not so much to enable it to fight in good order as to prevent the slightest unforeseen event from throwing you into disorder. Crowds of people are useless in war for no other reason than that every noise, every word, every confusion, upsets them and makes them Hee. Therefore a good general, among his other rules, indicates those who are to take the word from him and pass it on, and he accustoms his soldiers not to trust any others, and his officers not to say anything except what he orders, because when this matter is not well observed, it often causes the greatest confusion.
[ Examples of puzzling devices in battle]
As to seeing new things, every general should make an effort to have something appear, when the armies are engaged, that gives courage to his men and takes it away from their enemies, because among the events that give you victory, this is very effective. As proof of this, one can bring up Caius Sulpitius, the Roman Dictator. Coming to battle with the French, he armed all the plunderers and worthless people of the army, made them mount the mules and other beasts of burden, with such arms and ensigns that they seemed cavalry, put them under these ensigns behind a hill and ordered them at a given signal, just when the combat was hottest, to leave their hiding place and come into the enemy’s view. This device so
arranged and carried out caused such terror to the French that they lost the day. Therefore a good general ought to do two things: one is to try to confuse the enemy with some of these new devices; the other is to be so well prepared that if such devices are used by the enemy, the general can expose them and make them come to nothing. So the King of India did to Semiramis: she, seeing that the King had a large number of elephants, in an attempt to frighten him and show him that she also had plenty, made many elephants from the hides of buffalos and cows and, putting them on camels, sent them ahead. But since the King penetrated the trick, he made that scheme of hers not merely useless to her but harmful. When Mamercus the Dictator was opposing the Fidenates, the latter, to frighten the Roman army, ordered that in the heat of the action a number of soldiers with Rames on their spears should come out of Fidenae, so that the Ro” mans, surprised by the novelty of the sight, would disorder their military formation.
[Devices may turn against their inventer]
On this I comment that when such devices have more of truth than of fiction, they can be staged before men, because if they have enough of the convincing, their Rimsiness cannot very soon be found out. But when they have more of the fictitious than of the true, they should not be used or, if they are used, should be kept at a distance, in such a way that they cannot quickly be discovered, as Caius Sulpitius did the mule riders. Because if they are flimsy, they are quickly found out when they come close, so that they cause you loss and not gain, as the elephants did to Semiramis and the Rames to the Fidenates. At the beginning the Rames disturbed the Roman army a little; yet the Dictator came up and called out to them that they should not disgrace themselves by running away from smoke like bees and that they should turn back against them; then he shouted: “With their Rames destroy Fidenae, which you have not been able to please with your favors” (Livy 4. 33). Thus that device became useless to the Fidenates and they lost the combat.

CHAPTER 15. ONE GENERAL AND NOT MANYSHOULDBEPUTINCOMMAND OF ANARMY; HOW SEVERAL COMMAND., ERS DO HARM
When the Fidenates rebelled and killed the colony the Romans had sent to Fidenae, the Romans, to deal with this outrage, set up four Tribunes with consular power. One of these they left to guard Rome, and three they sent against the Fidenates and the Veientians. The three, holding different views and disunited, got from the cam., paign dishonor but not injury; as to the dishonor, the Tribunes caused it; if they received no injury, the efficiency of the soldiers caused it. Hence the Romans, seeing this confusion, resorted to choosing a Dictator, so that one man would reorder what three had disordered. This teaches that to have several commanders in an army or in a city that is to be defended, is unprofitable. Titus Livius could not say that more clearly than with these words: “Three Tribunes with consular power teach that plural control in war is very ineffective; since each general held to his own plans and they were all different,
the enemy had a good opportunity” (Livy 4. 3I).
[ A Florentine instance]
Though this example is sufficient to prove the trouble made in war by too many commanders, I wish for greater clarity to bring up some others both modern and ancient. In 1500, after Louis XII the King of France recaptured Milan, he sent his soldiers to Pisa to restore her to the Florentines, who sent there as commissioners Gfo., vambatista Ridolfi and Luca di Antonio degli Albizzi. And because Giovambatista was a man of reputation and older, Luca left the complete control of everything to him. Though he did not show his ambition by opposing him, he showed it by remaining silent and by neglecting and belittling everything, in such a way that he did not aid the actions of the army with deeds or with counsel, as if he had been a man of no importance. But then the very opposite appeared. Giovambatista, as the result of some accident, had to return to Flor., ence, whereupon Luca, left alone, showed how strong he was in
courage, industry, and counsel, though all of these were lost while his companion was there.1
I wish again to bring up, in confirmation of this, words of Titus Livius, who tells that when the Romans sent Quintius and Agrippa his colleague against the Aequi, Agrippa wished the entire adminis… tration of the war to be in the hands of Quintius. Livy comments: “It is most beneficial in the administration of great things that the chief authority should be in one man” (3. 70). This is contrary to what these republics and princes of ours do today by putting into their offices, in order to administer them better, more than one com.. missioner and more than one head; this makes confusion beyond reckoning. If we seek causes for the ruin of the Italian and French armies in our times, this will be found the strongest. Certainly we can conclude that it is better to send on an expedition one normally prudent man only rather than two very able men as associates with equal authority.
1. Machiavelli was secretary to these commissioners.

CHAPTER 16. IN DIFFICULT TIMES TRUE ABILITY IS SOUGHT FOR; IN EASY TIMES ABLE MEN DO NOT HOLD OFFICE, BUT THOSE WHO THROUGH RICHES OR FAMILY ARE MOST POPULAR
[Nicias as an example]
It always has been and always will be true that in republics great and exceptional men are neglected in times of peace; at such times envy of the reputation their ability gives them raises in many citizens a desire to be not merely their equals but their superiors. On this there is a good passage in Thucydides the Greek historian, showing that when the Athenian republic had the advantage in the Pelopon… nesian War and had bridled the pride of Sparta and almost subjugated all the rest of Greece, she became so proud that she planned to conquer Sicily. This undertaking was debated in Athens. Alcibia… des and some other citizens advised the attempt, in their concern not with the public good but with their own reputation, since they planned to be in charge of such an expedition. But Nicias, the man of highest reputation in Athens, spoke against it. In addressing the
people, the chief argument he brought forward to give them faith in him was this: when he advised that war should not be made, he advised something not to his own advantage, because he knew that, when Athens was at peace, countless citizens were eager to be ad,, vanced ahead of him, but if they made war, he knew that no citizen would be superior or equal to him.
[In quiet times republics neglect capable men]
We see, then, that republics show this defect: they pay slight attention to capable men in quiet times. This condition makes such men feel injured in two ways: first, they fail to attain their proper rank; second, they are obliged to have as associates and superiors men who are unworthy and of less ability than themselves. This abuse in republics has produced much turmoil, because those citizens who see themselves undeservedly rejected, and know that they can be neglected only in times that are easy and not perilous, make an effort to disturb them by stirring up new wars to the damage of the republic. When I consider possible remedies, I find two: the first is to keep the citizens poor, so that, when without goodness and wis,, dom, they cannot corrupt themselves or others with riches; the second is to arrange that such republics will continually make war, and therefore always will need citizens of high repute, like the Romans in their early days. Because that city always kept armies in the field, she always needed able men. Hence she could not take a position from one who deserved it and give it to one who did not deserve it.
If sometimes Rome did so, at once she got into such great confusion
and peril that she quickly returned into the true way.
But other republics, which are not organized like her and which make war only when driven by necessity, cannot protect themselves from such an abuse. On the contrary, they will always run into it, and disturbances will always result when a citizen such as I have described, neglected but able, is inclined to revenge, and has some reputation and following in the city. The city of Rome for a time did protect herself, but she also, when she had overcome Carthage and Antiochus (as I have said elsewhere)1 and no longer feared her wars, assumed that she could entrust her armies to whomever she wished, not paying so much attention to efficiency as to those other qualities that give favor with the people. We see that many times
1, DISCOURSES 2, 1.
Paulus Emilius was defeated for the consulship and that he was not made Consul until the Macedonian war broke out. Since this was judged a dangerous war, it was committed to him with the approval of the entire city.
[ Antonio Giacomini]
In our city of Florence, when after 1494 there were many wars and all the Florentine citizens made a wretched showing, the city by chance came upon a man who demonstrated how they ought to manage armies. This was Antonio Giacomini. And as long as dangerous wars were to be carried on, all the ambition of the other citizens disappeared, and in the choice of commissioner and head of the armies he had no competitor. But when a war was to be carried on in which there was no fear and much honor and rank, he had many competitors; thus when they chose three commissioners to besiege Pisa, he was left out. And though it does not plainly appear that evil for the republic resulted from not sending Antonio there, yet it can easily be conjectured because, since the Pisans had nothing further to defend themselves with or to live on, if Antonio had been there, they would have been so much more strictly blockaded that they would have surrendered to the Florentines.2 But since they were assailed by commanders who did not know how to blockade them or to assault them, they kept going so long that the city of Florence bought them, when she could have had them by force. It is to be expected that such a slight would be very powerful with Antonio, and he needed to be patient and good indeed not to attempt to revenge himself, either with the ruin of the city, if he could, or with harm to some individual citizens. From this a republic ought to guard herself, as will be explained in the following chapter.
Jn his DISCOURSE TO THE MAGISTRACY OF THE TEN ON THE AFFAIRS OF
PISA, Machiavelli deals at length with the ways in which a Florentine army blockading the city could cut off her supplies. He touches also on direct assault.

CHAPTER 17. A MAN SHOULD NOT BE INJURED AND THEN ASSIGNED TO IMPOR, TANT ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROLr
A republic should be very careful not to put any important business under the charge of a man to whom someone has done a notable injury. Claudius Nero left the army with which he was facing Hannibal and with part of it went into the Marches to join the other Consul, in order to attack Hasdrubal before he could unite with Hannibal. Earlier when Claudius was opposing Hasdrubal in Spain, he shut his enemy into a place where he was obliged either to fight at a disadvantage or to die of hunger. Hasdrubal then so astutely diverted Claudius with certain suggestions for truce as to free himself and deprive Claudius of that chance for victory. This affair, when known at Rome, brought Claudius blame from the Senate and the people, and he was vilified all through the city, not without much dishonor and outrage. Then being later made Consul and sent against Hannibal, he adopted the aforementioned plan, which was so perilous that Rome was full of fear and excitement until news came of Hasdrubal’s defeat.
When Claudius was later asked why he adopted so dangerous a plan, on which without extreme necessity he had as it were staked the liberty of Rome, he answered that he had done it because he knew that ifhe succeeded he would reacquire such glory as he lost in Spain; ifhe did not succeed, and this plan of his had an opposite end, he knew that he would revenge himself on that city and those citizens who had so ungratefully and imprudently injured him. If passions of that sort for such injuries were so powerful in a Roman citizen, in those times when Rome was still uncorrupted, we can imagine how powerful they would be in a citizen of some other city that is not such as she was then. And because no certain remedy can be given for such troubles that rise in republics, it follows that an everlasting republic cannot be established; in a thousand unexpected ways her ruin is caused.
1. Livy 26. 17; 27. 34, 44.
472 DISCOURSES 3. 18
CHAPTER 18. NOTHING rs MORE MERITOR!… OUS IN A GENERAL THAN TO FORESEE THE ENEMY’S PLANS
[Instances of failure to know what an enemy is doing]
Epaminondas the Theban was accustomed to say that nothing was more necessary and more useful to a general than to learn the decisions and plans of the enemy. Because such knowledge is diffi.., cult to get, a commander merits so much the more praise when he works in such a way that he conjectures them. It is not so difficult to understand the purposes of the enemy as it sometimes is to under… stand his actions, and not his actions done at a distance so much as those in the present and nearby. For many times it happens that when a battle lasts until night, the victor believes he has lost, and the loser believes he has won. Such mistakes cause decisions opposed to the well…being of the man who makes them. That was true of Brutus and Cassius, who through such a mistake lost the war, because when Brutus won on his wing, Cassius, who lost on his, believed the whole army defeated, and in that error, despairing of safety, killed himsel( In our times, in the battle fought in Lombardy at Santa Cecilia by Francis King of France against the Swiss,1 when night came on, such of the Swiss as remained in order believed that they had conquered, since they did not know about those who were defeated and killed. This mistake kept them from saving themselves, since they waited to fight again in the morning, with such great disadvantage. And they also caused the army of the Pope and of Spain to accept their mistake and through that mistake almost to ruin itself, for on the false news of the victory, it crossed the Po, and if it had marched too far would have been captured by the French, who were victorious.
This same mistake was made in the Roman armies and in those of the Aequi. In that instance, when the Consul Sempronius with his army was opposing the enemy and battle was joined, the struggle lasted until evening, with various fortune on either side; and when night came, since both armies were half defeated, neither of them returned to its camp; on the contrary, each retired into the nearest hills, where they thought they were more secure. The Roman army
1. Usually known as the battle of Marignano. See also D1scouRSES 2. 18, 22.
was divided into two parts; one of these went with the Consul, the other with a certain Tempanius, a centurion, through whose valor that day the Roman army had not been defeated entirely. When morning came, the Roman Consul, without learning anything further of his enemies, moved toward Rome. The Aequian army likewise withdrew, for each believed the enemy had won and there, fore each retired without feeling any concern about leaving its camp as booty. When Tempanius, who was with the remainder of the Roman army, was also retiring, he learned from some wounded Aequi that their generals had gone, abandoning their camp. There, fore, upon this news he entered the Roman camp and saved it, then sacked the Aequian camp and returned to Rome victorious. This victory, it is clear, rested merely on which first learned of the enemy’s confusion. Here we observe that often two armies opposed to each other may be in the same disorder and suffer the same necessities; and then that one is victor which first understands the other’s necessity.
[ A comic Florentine instance]
I wish to give a local and modern instance of this. In 1498, when the Florentines had a large army in Pisan territory and pressed that city hard, the Venetians, who had undertaken her protection, not seeing any other way to save her, determined to divert the war by attacking Florentine territory from another side. Raising a powerful army, they came through the Val di Lamana, occupied the village of Marradi, and besieged the castle of Castiglione on the hill above. The Florentines, learning of this, determined to rescue Marradi and not to weaken the forces they had in the territory of Pisa. And having raised new infantry and organized new cavalry, they sent them in
that direction. Their leaders were Jacopo IV d’ Appiano, lord of
Piombino, and Count Rinuccio da Marciano. When these soldiers, then, were led to the top of the hill above Marradi, the enemy raised the siege of Castiglione and retired completely into the village. After these two armies had confronted each other for some days, both of them suffered much for food and for every other necessary. And neither one having courage to attack the other, and neither knowing the troubles of the other, on the same evening they decided-both of them-to strike camp the following morning and retreat, the Venetian army toward Bersighella and Faenza, the Florentine toward Casaglia and the Mugello. Then when morning came and both of the armies
474 DISCOURSES 3. 18,,20
were sending off their baggage, by chance a woman left the village of Marradi and came toward the Florentine army, since she felt safe through her age and her poverty, wishing to see some of her relatives who were in that army. Learning from her that the Venetian army was leaving, the leaders of the Florentine troops were made brave by the news and, changing their plan, moved toward the enemy as if they had dislodged them. Then they wrote to Florence that they had driven them back and won the war. This victory resulted from nothing else than their hearing earlier than their enemies that the hostile army was going away. This information, if it had come first to the other side, would have been used in the same way against our forces.

CHAPTER 19. WHETHER IN CONTROL,, LING A MULTITUDE INDULGENCE IS MORE NECESSARY THAN PUNISHMENT
The Roman state was disturbed by the hostilities of the nobles and the people; nevertheless, when war was upon them, they sent out in command of their armies Quintius and Appius Claudius. Ap … pius, being cruel and rough in commanding, was not obeyed by his men, so that he fled from his province almost defeated. Quintius, being kind and of a humane temperament, won the obedience of his soldiers and bore off the victory. This indicates that it is better, in ruling a multitude, to be humane rather than proud, merciful rather than cruel. Nevertheless, Cornelius Tacitus, with whom many other writers agree, in one of his aphorisms makes the opposite decision, saying: “In controlling a multitude, punishment is more effective than indulgence.”
[ A prince should avoid hatred by subjects]
Considering how these opinions can both hold true, I say: Either you have to control men who normally are your companions or men who are always your inferiors. When they are your companions, it is not possible simply to use punishment or that severity of which Cornelius speaks, and because the Roman people had in Rome equal authority with the nobility, anyone who became their leader for a limited time could not use cruelty and roughness in managing
1. Livy 2. 55-60.
them. And many times better results were gained by the Roman generals who made themselves loved by their armies and who man,, aged them with indulgence than by those who made themselves extraordinarily feared, unless indeed they were gifted with unusual ability, as was Manlius Torquatus. But he who commands subjects such as Cornelius speaks of, if they are not to become overweening and, because of your excessive tolerance, to kick you, needs to put attention rather on punishment than on indulgence. But this too he ought to moderate in such a way as to avoid hate, because to be hated is not for any prince’s advantage. The way to avoid hate is to let your subjects’ property alone, because no prince desires their blood except when compelled, if greed is not hidden under his desire; and such compulsion seldom comes. But desire for blood, when greed is mixed with it, appears continually, and there is never a lack of cause or desire for bloodshed, as I explain in another tractate where I discuss this matter at length.2 Quintius, then, deserved more praise than Appius, and the opinion of Cornelius, within its limits, and not under the conditions dealt with by Appius, deserves to be approved.
And because I have spoken of punishment and of indulgence, I think it not superfluous to show that a striking act of kindness was more effective with the Falisci than were arms.
2. PRINCE 17. Yet how could Machiavelli call a small part of a short chapter long?

CHAPTER 20. AN INSTANCE OF KINDNESS WAS MORE EFFECTIVE WITH THE FALISCI THAN ALL THE ROMAN POWER1
When Camillus had surrounded with his army a city of the Falisci and laid siege to it, the teacher of a school for the highest,,born youths of that city planned to get the favor of Camillus and of the Roman people. With the excuse of exercise, going with his pupils out of the city, he led them all to Camillus’ camp and into his presence, and offering the boys, told him that for their sake the city would give herself into his hands. Not merely did Camillus not accept his offer, but stripping that schoolmaster naked, binding his hands behind him, and putting a stick into the hands of each of the boys, he had them drive their teacher, with many blows, back to the
1. Livy 5. 27.
DISCOURSES 3· 20, 21
city. When this affair was known to those citizens, the kindness and honor of Camillus pleased them so much that without attempting to defend themselves longer, they decided to surrender. This true in..­ stance shows that sometimes a kind and benevolent act has much more effect on the minds of men than a fierce and violent action, and that often provinces and cities not opened by arms, implements of war, and every sort of human effort have been opened by an instance of kindness and compassion, of chastity or of liberality.
[Fabricius, Scipio, Cyrus]
In history there are many instances of this besides the one given. We see that Roman arms could not drive Pyrrhus from Italy, but that the liberality ofFabricius did drive him out, when he showed the King the offer to poison him made to the Romans by one of his intimates. We also see that Scipio Africanus did not get so much reputation in Spain from the capture of New Carthage as from that famous instance of chastity, when he returned the wife, young, beautiful, and untouched, to her husband. The report of that act gained him the friendship of all Spain.2 We see further how much the people desire this quality in great men and how much authors praise it, both those who narrate the lives of princes and those who present the rules by which they ought to live.3 Among these Xeno..­ phon takes great pains to show how many honors, how many victories, how much good reputation Cyrus attained by being kind and pleasant and by not giving in his conduct any instance of pride or cruelty or lust or the other vices that spot men’s lives.
Yet since on the other hand Hannibal gained great fame and great victories with opposite methods, I shall discuss in the next chapter the reasons for it.
2. Livy 26. 46-50.
Writers de regim.ine principum (on the conduct of princes); cf. PRINCE 15.

CHAPTER 21. WHY HANNIBAL, WHOSE PROCEDURE WAS UNLIKE SCIPIO’S, PRO.­ DU CED IN ITALY EFFECTS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF SCIPIO IN SPAINr
I judge that some will marvel on seeing that some generals, in spite of their very different practice, have nevertheless produced re.­ sults like those of men whose practice was that described above. Hence victories apparently do not result from the aforementioned causes. On the contrary, the methods just discussed seem not to bring you more power or better fortune, since opposite methods can bring fame and reputation. So in order not to get away from the men mentioned above and to explain better what I am trying to bring out, I say that Scipio, entering Spain, with that kindness and compassion of his quickly made that province his friend and made himself worshiped and loved by the people. On the other hand, Hannibal, entering Italy, with methods just the opposite-that is, with cruelty, violence, plunder, and every sort of perfidy-produced the same effects as Scipio did in Spain, for to Hannibal all the cities of Italy went over, all the peoples followed him.
[Fear more effective than love]
Reflecting on what caused this, we see many reasons for it. The first is that men are so eager for changes that most of the time there is as much desire for change among those who are well off as among those who are badly off, because, as I have said-and it is true-men are bored in good times and complain in bad ones. This desire, then, causes gates to open to any man who makes himself leader of a
revolution in a province. If he is a foreigner, people hasten to follow him; if he is a native, they join him, strengthening him and aiding
him. Hence, however he proceeds, he makes great gains in those places. Besides this, men are driven chiefly by two things: love and fear. Therefore a leader can command who makes himselfloved, just as he can who makes himself feared; but most of the time the leader who makes himself feared is better followed and better obeyed than he who makes himself loved.
Livy 21. 4, 21, 43-44; 27. 20; 39. 51.
DISCOURSES 3. 21, 22
[Extraordinary ability is the secret]
It therefore matters little which of these two roads a general travels, if only he is an able man and his ability gives him renown among the people. When his ability is great, as was that of Han… nibal and Scipio, it cancels all errors that result from his making himself too much loved or too much feared. From either one of the two courses can come difficulties great enough to overthrow a prince: he who is too eager to be loved gets despised; he who too much endeavors to be feared, if he exceeds the norm ever so little, gets hated. He cannot keep exactly the middle way, because our nature does not allow it, but he must with extraordinary ability atone for any excess, as did Hannibal and Scipio. Nonetheless, we see that both of them were damaged by their ways of acting, and at the same time were raised higher.
[Scipio’s humanity]
The height to which both of them were raised has been men., tioned. The damage to Scipio was that his soldiers in Spain rebelled against him, along with part of his friends. This came from nothing else than not fearing him, because men are so restless that if the smallest door is opened to their ambition, they at once forget all the love for a prince that his humanity has caused them to feel, as did the
soldiers and friends mentioned above. They went so far that Scipio, to cure this ill, was forced to use some of the cruelty he had avoided.
[Hannibal’s cruelty]
As to Hannibal, there is no special instance in which his well… known cruelty and bad faith injured him, but we can well suppose that Naples and many other towns that remained loyal to the Roman people so remained for fear of those qualities. We are well aware that his pitiless conduct made him more hateful to the Roman people than any other enemy that republic ever had. Hence, whereas when Pyrrhus was in Italy with his army, they revealed to him the man who planned to poison him, Hannibal they never forgave, though he was disarmed and exiled, until at last they caused his death. To Hannibal, then, through the common belief that he was pitiless and a breaker of his word and cruel, there came this disadvantage. But on the other hand he gained a very great advantage, admired by all
the historians, namely that in his army, though it was made up of various sorts of men, there never was any internal strife, either among the soldiers or against himsel£ This cannot be explained except by the terror caused by his personal traits; this was so great that, com,, bined with the renown his ability gave him, it kept his soldiers united and quiet.
[ Ability rather than method is what counts]
I conclude then, that it does not much matter which method a general practices, if only he is able enough to impart a good flavor to either way of behaving. As I have said, in either one there is defect and peril, if extraordinary ability does not correct it. So if Hannibal and Scipio, one with praiseworthy actions, the other with detestable ones, produced the same result, I think I should not fail to discuss also two Roman citizens who with different methods, both praise… worthy, attained equal glory.

CHAPTER 22. THE HARSHNESS OF MANLIUS TORQUATUS AND THE KINDNESS OF VALERIUS CORVINUS GAINED FOR EACH ONE THE SAME GLORY
Living in Rome at the same time were two excellent generals, Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus; these men were equal in ability, equal in victories and in fame, and each of them, as to the enemy, gained his standing with equal ability. But as to the armies and as to their dealings with the soldiers, they proceeded diversely, for Manlius with every sort of severity, without allowing his soldiers any break in their fatigue or labor, kept them under orders. Valerius, on the other hand, in every way and manner kind and full of familiar intimacy, treated them pleasantly. We see that in order to have the obedience of the soldiers, one killed his son, and the other never harmed anybody. Nonetheless, with such diverse conduct each one obtained the same result, both against enemies and to the advantage of the republic and ofhimsel£ For no soldier ever refused combat or rebelled or was in any way out of harmony with their wishes, though the orders of Manlius were so harsh that all other orders that went beyond measure were called Manlian ordersr.
1. Livy 8. 7.
[ Harshness versus kindness]
In this situation one is to consider four things. First, what drove Manlius to act so harshly? Second, why did Valerius act so hu, manely? Third, why did these diverse methods produce the same result? Finally, which is the better and, when imitated, more profita, ble? Anybody who considers well Manlius’ nature from the first mention of him by Titus Livius sees that he was a very strong man, devoted to his father and his native city and very respectful to his superiors. These facts are to be learned from the death of that French..­ man you know of, from his defense of his father against the Tribune, and from his words to the Consul before he entered the combat with
the Frenchman: “Without your command I shall never fight against an enemy, not ifl see victory certain” (Livy 7. 10). When a man of that sort comes to commanding rank, he reckons on finding all men like himself, and his strong spirit makes him command strong
things; that same spirit, after they are commanded, expects them to be carried out. It is a true rule that when you give harsh orders, you must be harsh in having them carried out; otherwise your expectation will be deceived. This teaches that if you expect to be obeyed, you must know how to command. Men who know that compare their capacities with those of the men who are to obey. When they see that such capacities correspond, then they give commands; when they see lack of that correspondence, they refrain from it. Therefore a prudent man was wont to say that if a state is to be held with force, he who uses force must correspond in strength with him who is subject to it. When such correspondence exists, we can believe that such use of force can continue; but when he who is subject to force is stronger than he who is using force, we must fear that any day such use of force will end.
[The stern commander]
But returning to our subject, I say that a man who commands hard things must be hard, and he who is hard and commands hard things cannot then let them be carried out with gentleness. He who lacks this hardness of spirit should guard himselffrom giving extraor..­ dinary orders, and in ordinary ones he can use kindness; for ordinary punishments are not charged to the prince but to the laws and the regulations. We should, then, believe that Manlius was forced to
proceed so severely by those extraordinary commands to which his nature inclined him. These are useful in a state because they bring back its laws to their beginning and to their ancient vigor. If a state were fortunate enough, as we said above,2 to have frequently a leader who with his example would renovate its laws, and would not merely stop it from running to ruin but would pull it backward, it would be everlasting. So Manlius was one of those who with harsh orders kept up military discipline in Rome, being impelled first by his nature, then by his desire that what his natural inclination had made him arrange should be carried out.
[The kind commander]
On the other side, Valerius could act kindly, since it was enough for him that the things usual in the Roman army should be carried out. This tendency, because it was good, was enough to bring him honor. To act according to it was not difficult and did not force Valerius to punish transgressors, both because there were none of them and because any there might be would, as I said, charge their punishment to the laws and not to the cruelty of the commander. Hence Valerius was able to represent as coming from himself every kind action through which he gained favor with the soldiers and satisfied them.
[Success demands unusual ability]
The result was that, both having the same authority, they brought about the same effects, though working in opposite ways. Those who try to imitate them may fall into those bad habits causing con., tempt and hatred that I mention above in treating Scipio and Han., nibal3-something you can avoid if you have unusual ability, but not otherwise.
[ Is sternness or kindness better?]
It now remains to consider which of these two methods of pro., cedure is most praiseworthy. I believe this debatable, because writers praise both methods. Nonetheless, those who write on how a prince ought to conduct himself4 side with Valerius rather than with Man.-
DISCOURSES J, 1,
D1scouRSES 3. 21. See also THE PRINCE, chap. 17.
Works de regimine principum or on the conduct of princes. For Machiavelli’s relation
lius; and Xenophon, mentioned above/ giving many instances of Cyrus’ kindness, is in close agreement with what Titus Livius says of Valerius. When he was Consul against the Samnites, and the day came when he had to fight, he spoke to his soldiers with the kindness he always practiced. On a kind speech of his Livy com… ments: “Never was a leader more friendly with the soldier, since among the soldiers of lowest rank he carried on all his duties un… grudgingly. In military sports also, when equals entered contests of swiftness or strength, he won or lost with the same courteous ex… pression; nor was anybody repulsed who offered himself as an equal; friendly in his deeds according to circumstances; in his words by no means less mindful of the liberty of others than of his own dignity; and (than which nothing is more popular) he carried on the magis… tracies with the same methods by which he gained them” (7. 33). In the same way Titus Livius speaks of Manlius with respect, showing that his severity in the death of his son made the army so obedient to the Consul as to cause the victory the Roman people won over the Latins. He goes so far in praising him that, after such a victory, having described all the course of the fight and shown all the perils the Roman people encountered in it and their difficulties in winning, he draws this conclusion: the efficiency of Manlius alone gave that victory to the Romans. And making a comparison of the forces of the two armies, he declares that the side would have conquered which had Manlius as Consul.6 Hence, considering all that the historians say about the two Romans, I find a decision between kindness and harshness difficult.
[ Harshness safer for the state]
Nevertheless, in order not to leave this matter unsettled, I say that for a citizen who lives under the laws of a republic, I believe Manlius’ procedure more praiseworthy and less dangerous, because his way is wholly for the benefit of the state and does not in any respect regard private ambition, since by his way a leader cannot gain partisans, for he shows himself always harsh to everybody and loves solely the common good. By so acting he gains no special
to them see Gilbert, MACHIAVELLI’S “PRINCE” AND !Ts FORERUNNERS (Duke Univ. Press, 1938).
D1scouRSES 3. 20. See also THE PRINCE, chap. 14.
Livy 8. 10.
friends, such as those we call partisans, as I put it above. Hence, no way of proceeding can be more useful than this or more desirable in a city, because it does not lack public advantage, and there cannot be in it any suspicion of private power. But in Valerius’ conduct we see the contrary, because if indeed with respect to the public it pro,, duces the same results, nonetheless a good deal of fear is caused through the special good will he gains with the soldiers, lest in a long period of power it produce bad results, opposed to freedom. If Publicola produced none of these ill effects,7 the reason was that the spirits of the Romans were not yet corrupt, and he was not long and continuously in command.
[ Kindness wiser for a prince but dangerous to a citizen]
But if we have to consider a prince, as Xenophon did, we would wholly take the side of Valerius and abandon Manlius; for a prince ought to seek in his soldiers and in his subjects obedience and love.
0 bedience results from his being an observer of established institu,, tions and being looked upon as able; love results from affability, kindness, pity, and from Valerius’ other qualities, which Xenophon says Cyrus also possessed. For a prince to be in high favor as an individual and to have the army as his partisan harmonizes with all the other demands of his position. But that a citizen should have the army as his partisan-this does not at all fit with the demand that he live under the laws and obey the magistrates. It appears in the an,, cient records of the Venetian republic that once when the galleys returned to Venice, some difference arose between the galley men and the people, with rioting and the use of arms, and the affair could not be quieted by the force of the officers or by respect for the citizens or fear of the magistrates. Then suddenly before the sailors came a gentleman who the year before had been their commander, for love of whom they departed and gave up the strife. This obedience created such suspicion in the Senate that a little later the Venetians, through either prison or death, secured themselves against him. I conclude, therefore, that the procedure of Valerius is useful in a prince but harmful in a citizen, not merely to his country but to himself: to her because such methods prepare the way for tyranny; to him because his city, having suspicious fears of his conduct, is
For his ambition, see bk. 1, chap. 28; Livy 2. 2, 6-7. P. Valerius Publicola lived more than a century earlier than Valerius Corvinus.
driven to secure herself against him to his injury. On the contrary, I affirm that Manlius’ conduct is damaging to a prince but profitable to a citizen, and especially so to his country. It also seldom causes injury, unless indeed the hate your severity brings upon you is in,, creased by the suspicion which, as a result of your high reputation, your other virtues bring upon you, as I shall show below in Cami\,, lus’ case.

CHAPTER 23. WHY CAMILLUS WAS DRIVEN OUT OF ROME
We have decided above that by proceeding like Valerius a man injures his country and himself, and by proceeding like Manlius he benefits his country and sometimes injures himsel( This is well established through the instance of Camillus, who in his conduct resembled Manlius rather than Valerius. Hence Titus Livius, speaking of him, says that “the soldiers hated and marveled at his
efficiency” (5. 26). What made him considered marvelous was his care, his prudence, his great courage, his excellent method in ad,,
ministering and commanding armies. What made him hated was that his severity in punishing the soldiers exceeded his liberality in rewarding them. Titus Livius brings up these causes for this hatred. First, he added to the public funds the money coming from the sale of the Veientian property, instead of dividing it with the spoil. Second, in his triumph he had his triumphal chariot drawn by four white horses. About this they said that through pride he wished to equal himself to the Sun God. Third, he vowed to give to Apollo
the tenth part of the Veientian plunder. If he were to fulfil his vow, he had to take the plunder from the hands of the soldiers who had already seized it.1
Here we see well and easily what makes a prince hateful to the people. The most important of these is depriving them of something profitable. This is very important, because when a man is deprived of things that bring profit, he never forgets them, but every slight necessity makes you remember them;2 and because necessities come every day, you remember them every day. The other thing causing hatred is to appear proud and puffed up; the people, especially the
1. Livy 5. 23.
z. Machiavelli shifts person, as often in THE PRINCE.
free, hate nothing worse. Even though that pride and that display cause them no trouble, yet they hate him who indulges in them. From such pride a prince ought to guard himself as from a shoal, because to bring hatred on himself without any return is in every way rash and imprudent.

CHAPTER 24. THE PRO LO NGA TION OF THE HIGHEST MILIT ARY AUTHORITY MADE ROME A SLAVE
On considering well the course of the Roman republic, we see two causes for that republic’s dissolution: first, the struggles provoked by the Agrarian Laws; second, the prolongation of supreme com., mands. If these things had been well understood from the beginning and the proper remedies applied to them, free government would have lasted longer and perhaps been more peaceful. Though the prolongation of supreme command apparently never caused rioting in Rome, nevertheless it is evident how much a city is injured by the authority that citizens obtain through such decrees. If the other
citizens whose magistracy was extended had been wise and good, as was Lucius Quintius, the city would not have been subject to this ill. His goodness appears in a notable instance. An agreement for a truce had been made between the people and the Senate, and the people had prolonged for a year the authority of the Tribunes, judging them strong enough to resist the ambition of the nobles. Then the Senate, in competition with the people and in order not to seem weaker than they, wished to prolong the consulate of Lucius Quintius. But he entirely rejected such a decree, saying that it was necessary to seek to get rid of bad examples, not to increase them with
another worse example; so he urged the choice of new Consuls.1 Such goodness and prudence, if possessed by all the Roman citizens, would not have let them introduce that habit of prolonging the magistracies, and from that they would not have come to the pro,. longation of supreme commands-a thing that in time ruined the republic.
1. Livy 3. 21.
[ The dangers of prolonged command]
The first whose command was extended was Publius Philo.2 When, as he was beseiging the city of Palaepolis, the end of his consulate came, the Senate judged that he had victory in hand; they therefore did not send his successor but made him Proconsul, so that he was the first Proconsul. This practice, though begun by the Senate for public good, in time made Rome a slave, because the farther the Romans went abroad with their armies, the more neces..­ sary they thought this extension of command and the more they used it. It resulted in two ills. One was that a smaller number of men had experience in command; therefore reputation became restricted to a few. The other was that when a citizen was for a long time commander of an army, he gained its support and made it his partisan, for that army in time forgot the Senate and considered him its head. In this way Sulla and Marius found soldiers who, in opposition to the public good, would follow them. In this way Caesar could conquer his country. If the Romans had never pro..­ longed the magistracies and the commands, they might not have come so quickly to great power, for their conquests might have been later, but they would have come later still to slavery.
2. Livy 8. 26.

CHAPTER 25. THE POVERTY OF CINCINNATUS AND OF MANY ROMAN CITIZENS
[Poverty and freedom]
We have argued elsewhere that the most useful thing a free state can bring about is to keep its citizens poor.1 Though it does not appear what arrangement produced this effect in Rome, especially since the Agrarian Law met so much opposition, nevertheless ex..­ perience reveals that, four hundred years after Rome had been built, her people were still in the utmost poverty. I cannot believe that any condition was stronger in producing this effect than the knowledge that poverty did not close your road to whatever rank and whatever honor, and that men went to seek Ability whatever house she lived in. Such a state of society evidently gave less desirability to riches.
1. D1scouRSES 1. 37, and the Index under poverty.
To give an instance, when Minutius, the Consul, with his army was besieged by the Aequi, terror filled Rome lest that army should be lost, so they decided to appoint a Dictator-their last resource in any hard situation. They chose Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who then was at his little farm, which he worked with his own hands. Titus Livius relates this affair in golden words: “It is worth listening to by those who contemn all human things in comparison with riches, and who find no place for great honor and for ability, unless wealth Rows in abundance” (3. 26). Cincinnatus was plowing his little farm, which did not exceed four jugera in extent, when the Senatorial legate came from Rome to announce his election as Die,, tator and to show him the present peril of the Roman republic. Putting on his toga, he went to Rome, got together an army, and set out to free Minutius. Having defeated and pillaged the enemy and freed the Consul, he did not allow the besieged army to share in the plunder, speaking these words: “I do not allow you to share in the plunder of those whose plunder you were to be” (Livy 3. 29). And he deprived Minutius of the consulate and made him legate, saying to him: “Remain in this rank until you learn to be Consul” (ibid). As his Master of the Horse, he had appointed Lucius Tarquinius, who because of poverty served on foot. This makes plain, as I have said, that in Rome poverty was honored, and that a good and able man, such as Cincinnatus, thought four jugera of land enough to support him.
[Poverty honors cities]
Important citizens were also poor in the time of Marcus Regulus, because when he was in Africa with the army, he asked leave from the Senate to return to take care of his farm, which his laborers were spoiling. In this narrative two things are noteworthy. One is pover, ty; with it Roman citizens were contented; to get honor from war was enough for them, and all the gain they left to the public. If Regulus had expected to enrich himself from the war, any damage to his fields would have given him little anxiety. The other noteworthy thing is to observe the noble minds of those citizens. When they were put at the head of an army, the greatness of their spirits raised them above every prince; they took no account of kings or of repub, lies; they were confused or terrified by nothing whatever; yet on returning to private stations, they became economical, humble, care,
fol of their little properties, obedient to the magistrates, respectful to their elders, so that it seems impossible that one and the same spirit could undergo such change. This poverty lasted, too, even to the times of Paulus Emilius, which were almost the last happy times of that republic;2 until then, a citizen who with his triumph enriched Rome nevertheless remained poor himsel( Poverty was still so much respected that Paulus, honoring a man who had conducted himself well in war, gave a son,-in,faw of his a silver cup, which was the first silver there was in his house. I could show with a long speech that poverty produces much better fruits than riches, and that one has honored the cities, the provinces, the religions, and the other has overthrown them, if the writings of other men had not many times made the subject splendid.
2. About 186 B.c. Rome after this date seemed to Machiavelli not admirable.

CHAPTER 26. HOW A STATE FALLS BECAUSE OF WOMEN
[Roman instances]
In the city of Ardea contention arose between the patricians and the plebeians over a marriage, for when a rich woman was ready to marry, a plebeian and a noble both asked for her; and since she had no father, her guardians wished to join her to the plebeian, her mother to the noble. This caused so much strife that it came to arms; all the nobility armed themselves to help the noble, and all the plebeians to help the plebeian. So when the plebeians were over,­ come, they left Ardea and sent to the V olsci for aid; the nobles sent to Rome. The Volsci were first; reaching Ardea, they encamped. The Romans came next and shut up the Volsci between the city and themselves, compelling them, overcome with hunger, to surrender at discretion. Then the Romans, entering Ardea and killing all the leaders of the disturbance, settled the affairs of that city.1
[Aristotle’s opinion exemplified]
In this passage several things are to be noted. First, it appears that women have caused much destruction, have done great harm to those who govern cities, and have occasioned many divisions in
1. Livy 4. 9.
them; for, as we see in this History of ours,2 the outrage to Lucrece took their position from the Tarquins. That other outrage, to Vir… ginia, deprived the Ten of their authority. So Aristotle gives among the first causes for the falls of tyrants some injury in a matter of women, either by whoring them, or raping them, or by breaking off marriages, as we have indicated in detail in the chapter where we discuss conspiracies.3 I say, then, that absolute princes and gover., nors of republics are to take no small account of this matter, but ought to consider the evils that can result from such an event, and find a remedy so early that the remedy will not bring injury and disgrace to their state or their republic. The Ardeans may be a warning; by letting that competition grow among their citizens, they came to division among themselves; in attempting to reunite, they sent for outside help-which is one of the chief starting…points for imminent slavery.
But let us pass to another notable thing, the method of uniting cities, of which we shall speak in the next chapter.
2. Livy’s HISTORY 1. 58; 3. 44.lf.
3. Chap. 6 of the present book.

CHAPTER 27. HOW TO ACT IN UNITING A DIVIDED CITY; THERE IS NO TRUTH IN THE OPINION THAT IN ORDER TO HOLD CITIES A RULER MUST KEEP THEM DIVIDED
[Fomenters of sedition must be killed]
From the example of the Roman Consuls who reconciled the people of Ardea we learn the method of consolidating a divided city. This is no other-nor can the disease be otherwise cured-than by killing the leaders of the disorders. For it is necessary to take one of three ways: either to kill them, as the Consuls did; or to remove them from the city; or to make them make peace, with the agreement that they will not attack one another. Of these three ways, this last is most harmful, least certain and most ineffective. For where much blood has run or there have been other similar injuries, a peace made by force cannot last, when every day enemies look each other in the face. For them to keep from injuring one another is difficult, since
every day, because of their intercourse, new causes of complaint rise among them.
[ A foolish theory applied to Pistoia]
Of this we cannot give a better instance than the city of Pistoia. That city was divided fifteen years ago, as she still is, into Panciatichi and Cancellieri; but then she was under arms and today she has laid them down. After many disputes, the parties came to bloodshed, to the ruin of houses, to the plundering of property and to every other sort of hostility. The Florentines, who tried to quiet them, always used the third method; and always greater disturbances and greater discords resulted. Hence, tired out, they came to the second method, that of removing the party leaders; some of them they put in prison, others they kept within limits in various places,1 so that the agree,. ment made could stand, and it has stood until this day. Yet without doubt the safest method would have been the first. But because such decisive actions have in them something great and noble, a weak republic cannot carry them out; they are so alien to her spirit that she scarcely brings herself to the second remedy.
[Modern ignorance and weakness]
So these are the errors I spoke of in the beginning, that the princes of our time make when they have to decide about great affairs.2 As a consequence they should be glad to hear how rulers in antiquity who had to decide about such matters conducted themselves. But men’s feebleness in our day, caused by their feeble education and their slight knowledge of affairs, makes them judge ancient punishments partly inhumane, partly impossible. They have modern notions, far remote from the truth, like that which the wise men of our city were in the habit of uttering, a while ago: Pistoia must be held with parties and Pisa with fortresses. So they do not perceive how profitless both of these policies are.
1. That is, they were exiled to places which they were forbidden to leave.
2. See the Preface to the D1scouRSES. The word princes here includes all persons with governmental authority, though it also hints that Machiavelli when composing was not intent on republics alone.
[ The evils of disunion in cities]
I shall omit fortresses because I speak of them at length above,3 and I shall discuss the harm that comes from keeping the cities you control divided. First, you cannot keep the friendship of both parties in such a divided city, whether you who govern be prince or repub… lie. For Nature decrees that men take sides in any division, and that one thing shall please them better than another. Hence, to keep part of a subject city discontented causes you to lose her in the first war that comes up, because to protect a city that has enemies without and within is impossible. If a republic governs her, there is no finer way
to make your own citizens corrupt and to cause divisions in your own city than to control a divided city,4 for each party seeks to get favors and each makes friends for itself with various sorts of bribery. Thus such division produces two very great difficulties. First, you never make the parties your friends, through inability to govern them well, since the government is often changed, being now with one, now with the other party. Second, such concern with parties neces… sarily divides your own state. Blondus, speaking of the Florentines and Pistolese, assures us of it, saying: “While the Florentines schemed to reunite Pistoia, they divided themselves.”5 Hence we easily im … agine the evil that results from such division.
[ Weak rulers try to divide and rule]
In 1502, when we lost Arezzo and all the Val di Tevere and Valdichiana, taken from us by the Vitelli and by Duke Valentino, a Monseigneur de Lant was sent by the King of France to restore to the Florentines all the cities they had lost. Finding in every town men who, on visiting him, said they were of the party of the Mar,, zocco,6 Lant greatly blamed this division, saying that if in France one of the King’s subjects should say he was of the King’s party, he would be punished, because such a remark would mean nothing else
D1scouRSES 2. 24; THE PRINCE 20. Lack of reference to THE PRINCE hints that Chapter 20 was not composed when this D1scouRSE was written. Since, however, the events just mentioned took place in Pistoia fifteen years before, they indicate composition of this Dis, COURSE in 1516. Machiavelli was in Pistoia as Florentine commissioner in 1501. Relevant letters appear in his diplomatic correspondence.
An instance of Machiavelli’s use of the impersonal you.
HISTORY, decade 2, bk. g.
Marzocco: the lion symbolizing Florence. Various letters on Arezzo appear in Machia,., velli’s official correspondence.
492 DISCOURSES 3. 27”29
than that persons unfriendly to the King lived in that city. That King expects all his cities to be his friends, united and without parties. All these methods and ways diverse from the truth come from the weakness of rulers; when they cannot hold their states through force and personal ability, they turn to such schemes. These sometimes are of some use in quiet times, but when adversity and hard times come, they show that they are deceptive.

CHAPTER 28. ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CITIZENS’ DEEDS, BECAUSE OFTEN UNDER A WORK OF MERCY THE BEGINNING OF TYRANNY IS HIDDEN
[An improper attempt to gain popularity]
When the city of Rome was afflicted with hunger, and the public stores were not enough to stop it, a certain Spurius Melius, very rich according to those times, got the idea oflaying in privately a stock of grain and at his own expense feeding the plebeians. Because of this, such a crowd of people became his partisans that the Senate, con… sidering the trouble that his liberality could produce, in order to suppress it before it got more power, set up a Dictator over him and had him put to death.1 Here we observe that many times works that seem good, and that cannot reasonably be condemned, become culpable and are very dangerous to a state, if they are not at an early hour corrected.
[Personal ambition should aid republics]
To discuss popularity in more detail, I say that a republic without citizens of reputation cannot last and cannot in any way be governed well. On the other hand, reputation gained by citizens is the cause of tyranny in republics. If reputation is to be regulated, there must be such an arrangement that citizens will get repute from popularity that aids and does not injure the city and her liberty. Therefore we should examine the methods by which they get reputation. These in fact are two, public and private. The public methods are when a person advising well and acting better, for the common good, gains reputation. To this honor, the way should be opened to citizens, and
1. Livy 4. 13-16.
for their advice and their actions rewards should be set up, with which they will be honored and satisfied. When reputations ob,. tained in such ways are genuine and simple, they never are perilous. But when they are gained in private ways-the other method men,. tioned above-they are very dangerous and altogether injurious. The private ways are the conferring of benefits on various private persons by lending them money, marrying off their daughters, protecting them from the magistrates, and doing them similar private favors. These make men partisans of their benefactors and give the man they follow courage to think he can corrupt the public and violate the laws.
[Honors for public service]
A well….ordered republic, therefore, opens the ways, as has been said, to those who seek support by public ways, and closes them to those who seek it by private ways, as Rome did. As a reward for men who worked well for the public, she established the triumphs and all the other honors she gave to her citizens. But for the over,. throw of those who with various excuses sought by private ways to make themselves great, she established accusations; when these were not enough, and the people were blinded by a false appearance of good, she established the Dictator, who with his kingly arm made those return within bounds who had gone outside them, as she did in punishing Spurius Melius. One such case that goes unpunished is enough to ruin a republic, because when she has such an example, she is with difficulty brought back into the right way.

CHAPTER 29. THE SINS OF THE PEOPLE ARE CAUSED BY THEIR PRINCES
[The ruler’s example]
By no means should princes complain about any sin committed by the people they have in charge, because such sins of necessity come either from a prince’s negligence or from his being spotted with like faults. Anyone examining the people who in our days have been supposed prolific in robberies and like sins sees that those sins origi,.. nated entirely with those who ruled them, who were of like nature. The Romagna, before Pope Alexander VI destroyed the lords who
494 DISCOURSES 3· 29, 30
ruled that district, exemplified the most wicked ways of living, be.. cause from the slightest cause the most serious slaughter and rapine would result. This came from the wickedness of those princes, not from the wicked nature of their subjects, as the rulers said it did. The princes, because they were poor and wished to live as though they were rich, were constrained to resort to a great amount of plundering and to carry it on in various ways. One of their dishonorable meth,, ods was to make laws forbidding certain actions; then they were the first who gave reason for non,,observance of those laws, nor did they ever punish those not observing them except when they saw that many of their subjects had become liable to penalties. Then they turned to punishment, not in zeal for the law that had been made, but in their eagerness to collect the penalty. From this resulted many evils, and above all, this, that the people were made poor and were not restrained. And those who were made poor strove, at the cost of those who were less strong than they, to enrich themselves. From this resulted all those ills mentioned above, the cause of which was the prince.
The truth of this is shown by Titus Livius. He narrates that the Roman ambassadors carrying the gift from the Veientian spoil to Apollo were captured by the pirates of Lipari in Sicily and taken to that city. When Timasitheus their prince learned what gift this was, where it was going and who sent it, he conducted himself, though born at Lipari, like a Roman, showing the people how sacrilegious it was to seize such a gift; so with the general consent he let the ambassadors go with all their goods. The words of the historian are these: “With religion Timasitheus filled the multitude, which is always like the ruler” (5. 28). And Lorenzo de’ Medici, in confirma.. tion of this idea, says: “What the ruler does, afterward the many do, because on the ruler all eyes are turned.”1
1. Lorenzo the Magnificent, LA RAPPRESENTAZIONE DI SAN GIOVANNI E PAOLO, 0PERE (Bari, 1914) 2. 100.

CHAPTER 30. IF A CITIZEN IN A REPUB; LIC WISHES TO MAKE SOME GOOD USE OF HIS INFLUENCE, FIRST HE MUST GET RID OF ENVY; AND HOW, WHEN THEE NEMYARECOMING, THE DEFENSE OF A CITY SHOULD BE ORGANIZED
[The ability of Camillus did not excite envy]
The Roman Senate, learning that all Tuscany had made a new levy in order to attack Rome, and that the Latins and the Hernicians, who had in the past been friends of the Roman people, had allied themselves with the Volscians, long,.standing enemies of Rome, judged that this war would be perilous. Since Camillus was Tri,. bune with consular power, he decided that they could get on without creating a Dictator if the other Tribunes, his colleagues, were willing to concede him supreme power. This the other Tribunes did willingly, for, as Titus Livius says: “They did not think that anything they yielded to his authority was taken away from their own authority” (6. 6). So Camillus, taking this obedience literally, com,. manded that three armies should be enrolled. Of the first, he himself was to be head, in order to attack the Tuscans. Of the second, he chose as leader Quintius Servilius, with orders to remain close to Rome, to oppose the Latins and the Hernicians, if they should move. Of the third, he put Lucius Quintius in command; this he enrolled in order to keep the city guarded and the gates and the assembly defended in any emergency. Besides this, he arranged that Horatius, one of his colleagues, should provide the arms and the grain and the other things demanded by times of war. He also put Cornelius his colleague in charge of the Senate and the public council, in order that he might be able to advise about the actions that every day would have to be attended to. Thus, for the safety of their city, the Tribunes in those times were ready to command and to obey.
[Envy yields to goodness]
This passage shows what can be done by a good and wise man, and how much good he can bring about, and how much he can benefit his country when, by means of his goodness and ability, he has extinguished envy, for envy many times prevents men from
working well, since it does not permit them to have the authority necessary in things of importance. For extinguishing such envy there are two ways: either through some emergency difficult and hard to deal with, in which each man, seeing himself perishing, lays aside all ambition and gladly runs to obey one he thinks can by means of his ability rescue him. Thus it happened to Camillus, who-having given so many proofs that he was a superior man, and having been three times Dictator, and having always managed that office to the public advantage and not to his own profit-had given men reason not to fear his greatness; and because he was so great and had such a reputation, they did not think it disgraceful to be sub, ordinate to him (and for that reason Titus Livius wisely says those words quoted above: “They did not think” etc.).1
[ A reformer must use violence against the envious]
In a second way envy is got rid of, when either through violence or in the natural course of events those die who have been your competitors while you have been coming to such reputation and to such greatness, for as long as they see that you have a higher reputa, tion than they, they never acquiesce and keep quiet. And when they are men used to living in a corrupt city, where education has not produced any goodness in them, they cannot because of any emer, gency reverse themselves; but to gain their desire and to satisfy their perversity of mind, they are content to see the ruin of their country. For subduing this envy there is no other method than the death of those affected with it. When Fortune is so propitious to an able man that the envious die naturally, without contention he becomes famous, since without obstacle and without offense he can show his ability. But when he does not have this good fortune, he has to plan in every way to get the envious out of his path, and before he does anything, he has to adopt methods for overcoming this difficulty. He who reads the Bible intelligently sees that if Moses was to put his laws and regulations into effect, he was forced to kill countless men who, moved by nothing else than envy, were opposed to his plans.
1. This ends the first method for getting rid of envy. The second should begin or, to cor.,, respond with the either, above, but the construction is characteristically changed.
[ Savonarola and Soderini]
This necessity was well recognized by Frate Girolamo Savona,. rola. It was also recognized by Piero Soderini, the Gonfalonier of Florence. The first ( namely the Frate) could not overcome envy because he did not have power enough and because he was not well understood by his followers who did have power. Nevertheless this envy did not continue through his ignorance, for his sermons are full of accusations against “the wise men of the world,” and of invectives against them; so he called those who envied him and opposed his measures. The second, Piero Soderini, believed that with time, with goodness, with his fortune, and by benefiting others, he could ex,. tinguish envy, for he was so young and had so much support as the result of his policy that he believed he could overcome any number who opposed him through envy, without any dissension, violence, and tumult. He did not know that Time waits for no one, goodness is not enough, Fortune varies, and Malice receives no gift that placates her. Hence both of them fell; and their ruin was caused by not knowing how or not being able to overcome envy.
[ Confusion prevents defense]
The other notable thing is tlie system Camillus arranged, both inside and outside Rome, for the safety of the city. And truly not without cause good historians, such as this one of ours, give certain events in detail and clearly, in order that those who come later may learn how in similar emergencies they can defend themselves. So this passage teaches that there is no more perilous or more useless defense than one made in confusion and without system. This is shown by the third army Camillus enrolled in order to leave it in Rome as a garrison for the city. For then as now many would judge that measure superfluous, since the Romans were ordinarily armed and warlike, and therefore would not need to be further enrolled; to have them take arms when necessity demanded would be enough. But Camillus-like the wise man he was-judged differently, be,. cause he never permitted a multitude to take arms except with a fixed order and in a fixed way. Therefore, according to this instance, a man who is in charge of a city’s garrison ought to avoid, as though it were a shoal, letting men take arms in confusion. He ought beforehand to enroll and select those he wishes to arm; and to in,.
dicate whom they are to obey, where they are to meet, where they are to go; and to command all those not enrolled to remain in their houses, to guard them. Those who keep such order in a city that is attacked can easily defend themselves; he who does otherwise will not imitate Camillus and will not defend her.

CHAPTER 31. STRONG REPUBLICS AND SUPERIOR MEN KEEP THE SAME SPIRIT AND THE SAME DIGNITY IN ALL FOR TUNESr
Among the splendid things that our historian makes Camillus say and do, in order to show what an excellent man is, he puts in his mouth these words: “As for me, the dictatorship did not exalt my spirits nor exile depress them” (Livy 6. 7). From this we learn that great men are always in every sort of fortune just the same; if that varies, now raising them, now putting them down, they do not vary, but always keep their courage firm and so closely united with their way of life that we easily see that Fortune does not have power over a single one of them. Quite different is the conduct of weak men, because they grow vain and are made drunk with good fortune, assigning all their prosperity to an ability which they have not dis,, played at any time. As a result, they become unbearable and hateful to all around them. From this situation, then, issues some sudden change in their lot, and when they look that in the face, they fall at once into the other defect and become despicable and abject. Con,, sequently princes of that sort, when in adversity, think more about running away than about defending themselves, since, having used good fortune badly, they are unprepared for any defense.
[ The Romans were superior to Fortune]
This virtue and this vice, which I say exist in individuals, also exist in republics; instances are furnished by the Romans and the Venetians. As to the first, no bad luck ever made them despondent nor did any good fortune ever make them overweening, as plainly appears after their defeat at Cannae and after their victory over Antio,, chus. By reason of this defeat, though it was very serious through being their third, they did not become low,,spirited but sent out armies; they did not consent to pay ransom for their prisoners,
1. Livy 37. 45.
contrary to their laws; they did not send to Hannibal or to Carthage to ask for peace. More than that, putting behind them all such cringing ways, they thought always about war, arming their old men and their slaves for lack of soldiers. When Hanno learned of this situation, as I said above, he showed the Carthaginian senate how little reckoning they must make of the defeat at Cannae.2 So we see that difficult times did not frighten them or make them humble. On the other hand, prosperous times did not make them overweening. For example, when Antiochus sent ambassadors to Scipio to ask a truce, before they came to battle and before Antiochus was defeated, Scipio gave him as terms of peace that he should retire into Syria and leave the rest to the decision of the Roman people. Antiochus, after refusing this truce, coming to battle, and being defeated, again sent ambassadors to Scipio, with authority to accept all the terms laid down by the conqueror. Yet Scipio did not re..­ quire other conditions than those he offered before he won, adding these words: “The Romans, if they are defeated, are not depressed in spirit, nor, if they conquer, do they grow arrogant.”
[ The Venetians were subject to Fortune]
The exact opposite of this was done by the Venetians. In good fortune, believing they had gained it with a courage and a wisdom they did not have,3 they grew to such arrogance that they called the King of France the son of San Marco; they did not respect the Church; they did not find Italy large enough for them, and they imagined that they were going to form a monarchy like the Roman. Then, when good l!lck abandoned them and they received a semi..­ defeat at V aila from the King of France, not merely did they lose all their territory by rebellion, but they gave a good part of it to the Pope and to the King of Spain in abjectness and despondency of spirit. They so debased themselves that they sent ambassadors to the Emper..­ or to make themselves his tributaries, and wrote letters to the Pope full of abjectness and humility to move him to compassion. To such discouragement they came in four days and after a semidefeat; be..­ cause, after their army had fought, in retiring about half of it got into combat and was defeated. Yet afterward one of their supervisors
Livy 23. 12.
3. A condensed expression. They thought they had gained their territory with courage anti wisdom, but they did not possess those qualities.
who escaped got to Verona with more than twenty.,.five thousand soldiers, foot and horse together. In such circumstances, if at Venice and in their institutions there had been any sort of courage and wisdom, they would easily have been able to reorganize and again to show their faces to Fortune, and to be ready to win or lose more gloriously or to have a more honorable peace. But the meanness of their spirits, caused by the nature of their institutions-not good in matters of war-made them lose at the same time their territory and their courage. So it will always happen to whoever conducts him.,. self as they did. For such arrogance in good fortune and cowardice in bad fortune results from your method of acting and from the education with which you have been brought up. This, when it is empty and weak, renders you like itsel( When your education has been quite different, it renders you too of another kind, and since it makes you know the world better, it makes you rejoice less at any.,. thing pleasant and feel less discouragement at anything harmful. Moreover what I say of one man alone can be said also of many living in the same republic, who attain to such excellence as its government permits.
[Good laws and good arms]
And though elsewhere4 I have said that the foundation of all states is good military organization, and that where this does not exist there cannot be good laws or anything else good, I think repetition not superfluous, because at every point in reading Livy’s History this certainty appears. An army evidently cannot be good if it is not trained, and it cannot be trained if it is not made up of your subjects. Because a country is not always at war and cannot be, she must therefore train her army in times of peace, and she cannot apply this training to others than subjects, on account of the expense.
[Camillus as an instance]
As we said above, Camillus had led his army against the Tuscans, and when his soldiers saw the size of the hostile army, they were all frightened, since they believed themselves too inferior to
4. Cf THE PRINCE 12; DISCOURSES 1. 4, 21. Machiavelli uses the same formula (altra voltaJ in referring to a passage within the DISCOURSES (3.34). It is not, then, necessary to suppose this a reference to THE PRINCE. If it is not, can this passage be earlier than THE PRINCE? See also ART OF WAR, preface; HISTORY OF FLORENCE z. 5.
The Unprepared Are Unfortunate
resist the enemy’s attack. When his army’s bad state of mind came to Camillus’ ear, he showed himself in public and, going through the army talking to various soldiers, got that notion out of their heads; so at last, without making any different arrangement in the army, he said: “What anybody has learned or is in the habit of doing, let him do” (Livy 6. 7). He who considers well this method and the words he used in animating them to go against the enemy, will observe that he could not have said any such things or done them to an army that had not first been organized and trained both in peace and in war. A general cannot trust soldiers who have not learned to do anything, and he cannot believe they will do anything good. Even if they were commanded by a new Hannibal, they would ruin him, be,, cause while a battle is going on a general cannot be everywhere; hence ifhe has not first arranged that in every place he has men who possess his spirit and even his methods and way of acting, he will inevitably be ruined.
[Courage and preparation master Fortune]
If, then, a city is armed and organized like Rome, and every day her citizens, both individually and in public, have occasion to test their ability and the power of Fortune, always in whatever weather they will have the same spirit and keep the same dignity. But when they are unarmed and rely merely on the rapid motions of Fortune and not on their own strength and wisdom, they will vary as she varies, and will always conduct themselves as the Venetians have done.

CHAPTER 32. METHODS FOR IMPEDING A TREATY
[How to forestall reconciliation]
Two colonies, Circeii and Velitrae, hoping to be defended by the Latins, rebelled against the Roman people. When the Latins were defeated and the colonists deprived of hope in them, many of their citizens advised that ambassadors be sent to Rome to ask con,, sideration from the Senate.1 This plan was upset by the authors of the rebellion, who feared that the entire penalty would come down on their own heads, for in order to get rid of all discussion of peace,
1. Livy 6. 21.
they stirred up the populace to take arms and raid Roman territory. Certainly when anybody wishes either a people or a prince entirely to give up any disposition to treaty, no means is surer or more lasting than to have them carry out some serious villainy against the one with whom you do not wish the treaty to be made, because always fear of that punishment which they think they deserve for the evil they have done, will keep such a treaty beyond consideration.
[Outrages not to be pardoned]
After the first war between the Carthaginians and the Romans, the soldiers in Sicily and Sardinia, whom the Carthaginians had employed for that war, when peace was made went into Africa. There, not being satisfied with their pay, they turned their arms against the Carthaginians. Selecting from among themselves two leaders, Matho and Spendius, they captured many Carthaginian cities and sacked many. The Carthaginians, in order to test first every other means than battle, sent to them as ambassador, Hasdrubal, a citizen who they thought would have some influence among them, since he had formerly been their general. When he arrived, Spendius and Matha, wishing to force all the soldiers never in the future to hope for peace with the Carthaginians, and thereby to force them into war, persuaded them that they had better kill him, along with all the other Carthaginian citizens who were their prisoners. Hence they not merely killed them but first tortured them with a thousand torments, adding to this wickedness an edict that all Carthaginians taken in the future would be slain in like manner. This decision and its execu.,, tion made that army cruel and stubborn against the Carthaginians.

CHAPTER 33. IN ORDER TO WIN A BATTLE, TO MAKE AN ARMY CONFIDENT BOTH IN ITSELF AND IN ITS GENERAL IS NECESSARY
[The competent general; religion]
An army that is to win a battle must be made so confident as to believe it will win in any case. It becomes confident when well armed and organized and when each man knows the others; such confidence and organization cannot appear except in soldiers who are born and live together. The general must be so esteemed that the
Religion Not Enough 5°3 men trust his prudence; and they always will trust it if they see him prepared, attentive, and courageous, maintaining well and reputably
the dignity of his rank. And he always will maintain his dignity if
he punishes offenses and does not make the soldiers labor without result, keeps his promises to them, presents them with an easy road to victory, and conceals or makes light of things that at a distance appear dangerous. These things, well carried out, give an army strong reasons for trusting him, and trusting, to conquer. The Roman practice was that their armies should gain this confidence from reli… gion. For this reason, with auguries and auspices they chose Consuls, carried on the conscription, marched away with the army, and came to battle. So without doing some of these things, a good and wise general would never undertake any action, reckoning that he could lose easily if his soldiers did not first learn that the gods were on their side; and if any Consul or other general of theirs had fought contrary to the auspices, they would have punished him, as they punished Claudius Pulcher.
[ Religion in a republic]
Though this matter appears in all the Roman histories, yet it is proved more surely by the words that Livy puts in the mouth of Appius Claudius. On complaining to the plebeians of the arro,. gance of the Tribunes of the People, and showing that they were allowing the auspices and other things pertaining to religion to become debased, he spoke as follows: “Those who wish may mock at religious ceremonies, saying: ‘What does it matter whether chickens eat, whether they come out of their coop slowly, whether a bird chirps=’ These are little things, but by not despising these little things, our fathers made this republic great” (Livy 6. 41). Indeed in these little things is that force for holding the soldiers united and confident which is the first cause of every victory.
[Valor indispensable]
Nevertheless to these things valor must be joined; otherwise they are useless. The Praenestians, having their army in the field against the Romans, encamped on the River Allia, where the Romans were defeated by the French. This they did to give confidence to their soldiers and to terrify the Romans because of the fortune of the place. And though this plan of theirs was commendable, for the reasons I
DISCOURSES 3. 33, 34
have presented above, nonetheless the outcome of the affair showed that true valor does not fear every little accident. This the historian says very well with words put in the mouth of the Dictator, who spoke to his Master of the Horse as follows: “You see that they, trusting to Fortune, have posted themselves on the Allia. But you, trusting in arms and courage, are to attack their center” (Livy 6. 29 ). For true valor, good organization, security derived from so many victories, cannot be destroyed by things oflittle importance, nor does an empty thing frighten them or something exceptional disturb them. This was plainly shown at the time when the two Manlii were Consuls against the V olsci: after they had rashly sent part of the army to find plunder, it happened that at the same time both those who had gone and those who had stayed behind were attacked; from this danger not the prudence of the Consuls but the valor of the soldiers themselves delivered them. On the incident Titus Livius speaks these words: “The soldiers, even without a leader, by their firm valor gained safety” (6. 3o).
[Skilful use of mystery]
I do not intend to omit a method used by Fabius to make his army confident when for the first time he led it into Tuscany, reckoning such assurance the more necessary on account of his having taken it into a new land, against new enemies: namely, speaking to the soldiers before the combat, he said, after mentioning many reasons through which they could hope for victory, that he could in addition tell them certain things that were good, and from which they would see that victory was certain, if it were not danger, ous to make them public. This method, when it is wisely used, deserves to be imitated.

CHAPTER 34. WHAT SORT OF REPUTATION OR REPORT OR OPINION MAKES THE PEOPLE SIDE WITH A CITIZEN; AND WHETHER THEY ASSIGN OFFICES WITH GREATER DISCRETION THAN A PRINCE
[Piety gains popularity]
We tell above how Titus Manlius, who later was called Tor, quatus, saved his father, Lucius Manlius, from a charge made against
him by Marcus Pomponius, Tribune of the People.1 Though his method of rescue was somewhat violent and improper, nonetheless his piety toward his father was so pleasing to the people generally that not merely did they not blame him, but when they had to choose the Tribunes for the legions, they put Titus Manlius in the second place. Because of this success, I believe it well to consider the method used by the people in judging men in their assignment of offices, and to ask whether, from what we see, all that has been decided above is true, namely, that the people are better assigners than a prince.2
[ How to gain reputation in a republic]
I declare, then, that the populace in its assignment follows what public report and reputation says of someone-when it does not, from his known actions, learn something different-or it follows its inference or opinion about him. These two things either are derived from the fathers of such men-because, since they have been great and powerful in the city, everyone believes that their sons must be like them, until through their deeds the people understand the con, trary-or the ways of the man we speak of causes them. The best ways such a man can follow are to associate with serious men of good habits, who are looked upon as prudent by everybody (and because there can be no better evidence about a man than his habitual associates, he who has virtuous associates deservedly gains a good name, for he must be in some way like them). Or assuredly3 this general reputation can be gained through some extraordinary and noteworthy action, even though private, that has ended honorably. Of the three things that originate a good reputation, none furnishes a better reputation than this last. The first kind, from relatives and fathers, is so untrustworthy that men are cautious about it and in a short time it vanishes, if the worth of the man himself who is to be judged does not match it. The second, in which you are estimated from your habits, is better than the first, but is much inferior to the third, because so long as you yourself give no indications of ability, your reputation is founded on belief, very easily destroyed. But the third one, since its origin and basis are fact and your deeds, gives you
Livy 7. 5. See DISCOURSES 1. 11.
DISCOURSES 1. 58.
3. The reader expects the alternative And to; but Machiavelli changes the construction to
Or assuredly.
as it originates such a great name that afterward you must actually do many things contradicting it before you can annul it. Men born in a republic should, then, follow this formula, and early in life strive to become prominent through some unusual action. Many Romans in their youth did this either by proposing a law for the common benefit, or by bringing a charge against some powerful citizen as a transgressor of the laws, or by doing something else noteworthy and strange which would make them talked about.
[A prince should follow the examples of Manlius and Scipio]
Not merely are such actions essential as a start in giving a man a reputation but they are also essential for preserving and increasing it. To do so, he must produce new wonders, as through his whole life Titus Manlius did, because after defending his father so valiantly and extraordinarily, and by that deed getting his first reputation, in a few years he fought with that Frenchman and, killing him, took from him the collar of gold that gave him the name of Torquatus. This was not enough, for later, by then middle..-aged, he put his son to death for fighting without permission even though he overcame the enemy.4 These three actions, then, gave Manlius a greater name and through all ages made him more famous than did any triumph or any victory, though he was distinguished for these as much as any Roman. The reason is that in his victories he had many like him; in these individual acts he had very few or none. Scipio the Elder did not gain so much glory from all his triumphs as from two early deeds: while still a youth, he protected his father on the Ticino; after the defeat of Cannae, with unsheathed sword he valiantly made many Roman youths swear that they would not abandon Italy, as they had already decided among themselves to do. These two actions were the beginning of his reputation and became steps to his triumphs in Spain and in Africa. His reputation was further increased when he sent back the daughter to her father and the wife to her husband in Spain.5 Such a course of conduct is essential not only to citizens who hope to gain fame in order to secure positions in their republic, but is also essential for princes who are to keep up their reputations in their princedoms, because nothing makes them so much esteemed
Livy 7. 10; 8. 7.
Livy 21. 46; 22. 53; 26. 50.
as to display extraordinary ability in some rare action or saying, in keeping with the common good, that shows the lord as high minded
or liberal or just, and gets to be a sort of proverb among his subjects.6
[ The people judge merit better than do princes]
But to return to the place where we began this Discourse, I say that the people, when they first give an office to a citizen, if they base themselves on those three causes mentioned above, do not have a poor basis. Afterward, when many examples of a man’s good conduct make him better known, the people have a firmer basis, so that in such a case they hardly ever are deceived. I speak only of those positions that are given to men in the beginning, before they are understood through solid experience, or when they pass from one activity to another unlike it. In this, both as to false opinion and as to improper influence, the people always make fewer mistakes than princes do. Yet it can happen that the people will be deceived about a man’s reputation, standing, and deeds, thinking them greater than they actually are. That, however will not happen to a prince, be,, cause he will be informed and warned by those who advise him. So in order that the people too will not lack such advisers, good or,, ganizers of republics ordain that when the highest offices of the city (where it would be dangerous to put inadequate men) are to be filled, if popular opinion seems directed toward an inadequate choice, every citizen has the right (and it is to be considered an honor) to announce in the public assembly the shortcomings of the candidate; then the people, not lacking knowledge of him, can decide better. That this was the custom at Rome is proved by the speech of Fabius Maximus, made to the people in the second Punic War, when in the election of Consuls the votes were moving toward the choice of Titus Ottacilius; Fabius, judging him incompetent to manage the consulate in those times, spoke against him, showing his incompe,, tency; thus he deprived Titus of that office and turned the people’s choice to one who better deserved it. In the choice of magistrates, then, the people judge men according to the indications they think most reliable; when they can be advised like princes, they err less than princes. Any citizen who wishes popular support should gain it early, with some noteworthy action, as did Titus Manlius.
This paragraph seems like an early study for THE PRINCE 21.

CHAPTER 3 5. THE DANGERS ENC OUN., TERED IN ACTING AS LEADER IN ADVISING SOMETHING; THE MORE UNUSUAL IT IS, THE GREATER THE DANGERS
[Dangers to a prince’s adviser]
The dangers of acting as leader in something new that is important to many, and the difficulty of managing and completing such a thing, and of keeping it going when completed, are matters too time consuming and too lofty for discussion. Hence, saving them for a more fitting place, I shall speak only of those dangers which citizens, or a prince’s advisers, undergo in taking the lead in a serious and important decision, when all the advice on the matter will be charged to them. Such advising is dangerous because, since men judge things by their results, all the evil produced by an undertaking is charged to the man who advised it; if good results, he is indeed com,, mended; but by a great deal the reward does not weigh as much as the harm.
[Turkish and Roman instances]
The present Sultan Selim, called the Grand Turk, after pre,, paring (as some say who come from his lands) for a campaign against Syria and Egypt, was encouraged by one of his bashaws whom he kept on the frontiers of Persia to go against the Sophy. Influenced by this advice, he went on that campaign with a numerous army; and coming to a very level region, where there are many deserts and few streams, and meeting the difficulties that long ago caused the ruin of many Roman armies, he was so afflicted by them that, though victor in the war, he lost there a large number of his soldiers. Hence, enraged against the author of the advice, he killed him. We also read that many citizens have given encouragement to some under,, taking and, because it turned out badly, have been sent into exile. Certain Roman citizens made themselves leaders in the choice in Rome of a plebeian Consul. It happened that the first who went out with the armies was defeated; from this those advisers would have suffered harm, if there had not been great strength in the party in whose behalf that decision was made.1
1. Livy 6. 42; 7. 1.
[ Give advice modestly]
It is, then, something very certain that those who advise a republic and those who advise a prince are put in the following straits: if they do not, without reservatio·n, advise things that they believe useful, either for the city or for the prince, they fail in their duty; if they do advise them, they put themselves in danger oflife and position, since all men blindly judge good and bad advice by its outcome. After considering how they can avoid both this reproach and this danger, I see no other way than for an adviser to be moderate and not to seize upon any of the plans brought forward as his own undertaking, and to speak his opinion without passion, and without passion modestly to defend it, so that the city or the prince who follows it does so voluntarily, and does not seem to enter upon it as pushed by your urgency. When you act thus, it is not reasonable that a prince or a people should wish you ill because of your advice, since they have adopted it without opposing the wishes of many other advisers. The
danger arises whenever many oppose you, for if your plan results
badly, they unite to ruin you. And if by such moderation you miss the glory gained by being alone against many in urging something that results happily, your course still has two advantages. One is that it lacks danger. The other is that if you advise a thing modestly, and through opposition your advice is not taken, yet from other people’s advice some calamity results, you obtain the utmost glory. And though you cannot enjoy glory resulting from the distress either of your city or your prince, nevertheless it has some value for you.
[ The duty of giving advice]
Other advice I believe I cannot give on this matter, because to advise men to be silent and not to speak their opinions would be to make them useless to their republic or their prince and would not shield themselves from danger, since in a short time they would be.. come suspected. And it could even happen to them as to the friends of Perseus, King of the Macedonians: after he was defeated by Paulus Aemilius and was fleeing with a few friends, it chanced as they were:discussing past events that one of them told Perseus of many errors that had caused his ruin. Turning to him, Perseus said: “Traitor, so you have put off telling me until now when I have no further remedy!” And with these words, he killed him with his own
hands. And so that man suffered punishment for having kept silent when he should have spoken and for having spoken when he should have kept silent; he did not escape the danger by not giving the ad,, vice. So I believe it is best to keep and observe the limits given above.

CHAPTER 3 6. WHY THE FRENCH HA VE BEEN AND STILL ARE CONSIDERED TO BE MORE THAN MEN WHEN BATTLES BEGIN, AND LATER TO BE LESS THAN WOMENI
The savage valor of that Frenchman at the River Anio, who challenged any Roman to fight with him, and then the combat fought between him and Titus Manlius,2 reminds me of what Titus Livius says many times, namely, that the French at the beginning of a combat are more than men, and as the fighting goes on and on they become less than women. On considering the reason for this, many conclude that such is the nature of the French, which I believe is true. But it is not therefore true that this nature of theirs, which makes them valorous at the beginning, cannot be so controlled by art as to keep them fiery to the end.
[Armies are of three kinds. (1) Ardor with discipline]
To prove this, I say armies are of three kinds. The first possesses ardor with discipline, because from discipline come ardor and effi,, ciency. Such was the Roman army, for all their histories show that in their army there was good discipline, produced by long,,continued military training. In any well disciplined army nobody carries on any activity except according to rule. We see that in the Roman army, which, since it conquered the world, should be a model for all other armies, the soldiers did not eat, they did not sleep, they did not trade,3 they did not perform any action either military or domestic without the Consul’s order. Armies that do otherwise are not real armies, and if they accomplish some things, they do it by ardor and impetuosity, but not by efficiency. Yet when efficiency is disciplined,
1. Livy 10. 28.
z. Livy 7. 10.
3· My copy of the Giunta edition of 1531 reads mercantava. The word probably refers to buying food.
it uses its ardor in the right way and at the right time, and no emergency daunts it or takes away its courage, because good disci..­ pline fed with the expectation of victory preserves courage and ardor. And this expectation never fails as long as discipline is unshaken.
[(2) Ardor without discipline]
The opposite happens in armies that possess ardor but not disci..­ pline, such as those of the French. In combat they usually failed if they did not win by their first charge. After that, because the ardor in which they trusted was not supported by disciplined efficiency, so that they had nothing but ardor on which to rely, they failed when their ardor grew cold. The Romans on the contrary, fearing dangers less because of their good discipline, and having no doubt of victory, fought firmly and stubbornly with the same courage and the same efficiency in the end as in the beginning. More than that, stimulated by arms, they grew all the time more fiery.
[(3) Armies without either ardor or discipline]
The third type of army possesses neither natural ardor nor ac..­ quired discipline, such as are the Italian armies of our times, which are wholly useless; if they do not encounter an army that through some accident runs away, they never win. Without bringing up other instances, we can see every day that they give evidence of having no efficiency. So because by means of the testimony of Titus Livius, everybody may learn what good military discipline is and what bad discipline is, I bring up Papinius Cursor, for when he was about to punish Fabius, Master of the Horse, he said: “Nobody would have any respect for men or for gods; the commands of the generals, the auspices would not be attended to; without leave of absence the scattered soldiers would wander about in friendly regions and in hostile ones; forgetful of their oath, on their own authority, when they pleased they would give themselves their discharge; they would leave the standards deserted; they would not come together on com..­ mand nor could they be found, day or night; in a bad or in a good place, with or without the orders of the general, they would fight; and they would pay no attention to signals or orders; like a gang of thieves, they would form a blind and chance,directed army, rather than one devoted and oath,bound” (Livy 8. 34). So this passage easily lets us see, then, whether the soldiery of our days is blind and
chance…directed or oath…bound and devoted, and how much it lacks any resemblance to what can be called an army, and how far it is from being fiery and disciplined like the Roman, or fiery only, like the French.

CHAPTER 37. IF LITTLE CO MBATS BEFORE BATTLE ARE NECESSARY; AND HOW TO FIND OUT ABOUT A NEW ENEMY AND YET A VOID THESE LITTLE CO MBATS
[Bad is always mingled with good; aid from Fortune]
As we have said elsewhere, in the actions of men-besides the other difficulties in trying to bring something to perfection-in con,. nection with good there seems always to be something bad, which so easily grows up along with the good that to avoid bad while striving for good seems impossible. This is apparent in everything men do. Therefore to achieve something good is difficult unless Fortune, aiding you, with her power overcomes this usual and natural difficulty. I have been reminded of this by the combat of Manlius and the Frenchman, of which Titus Livius says: “This combat had great influence on the outcome of the entire war, because the Gallic army, in terror, retired into the country of Ti bur and then
into Campania” (7. n). Hence I believe, on one side, that a good
general should avoid, completely, doing even any slight thing that can have a bad effect on his army. Because to begin a fight in which all your forces are not used but all your fortune is risked is altogether rash, as I said above when I condemned the guarding of passesr.
[ Slight combats as tests]
On the other hand, I believe that wise generals, when about to encounter a new enemy of high reputation, have their soldiers test such an enemy with slight combats before they come to battle in order that by understanding and dealing with him they may get rid of the fear excited by his fame and reputation. A general’s ability in this is very important, because necessity almost forces you on, since you seem to go to obvious defeat unless first, with small tests, you
1. DISCOURSES 1. 23.
have succeeded in removing from your soldiers’ minds all fear caused by the enemy’s reputation.
Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with their armies against the Samnites, new enemies, for in the past never had either side tested the other’s arms. On this Titus Livius writes that Valerius had the Romans fight some slight actions with the Samnites, “lest a new war and a new enemy frighten them” (7. 32). Nevertheless there is very great danger, if your soldiers are beaten in such combats, that their fear and discouragement will increase, and the results will be contrary to your intention, that is, you will frighten them, though you planned to assure them. Indeed this is one of those places in which good and bad are so close together that you easily get one when you think you are getting the other.
[It is injurious to lose what one has planned to defend]
On this I say that a good general watches very diligently that nothing occurs through which some accident can take away the courage of his army. That which can take away its courage is to lose early; therefore the good general guards himself from little combats or allows them only with very great advantage and with sure hope of victory. You ought not to attempt to hold passes where you cannot assemble your entire army. You ought not to garrison cities unless they are such that if you lose them their loss will necessarily result in your ruin. And those you do garrison should be so managed, both as to their garrisons and as to your army, that if there is an attempt to capture them, you will be able to make use of all your forces. The others you ought to leave undefended, because whenever you lose a thing you have abandoned, if your army is still afoot, you do not lose your reputation in the war or your hope of winning it. But when you lose a thing you have planned to defend and that everybody expects you to defend, then come the harm and the loss, and, like the French, you have almost lost the war through something of slight importance. Philip of Macedon, father of Perseus, a soldierly man and of great importance in his times, when attacked by the Romans judged that many of his towns could not be garrisoned; hence he abandoned them and laid them waste.2 This was the act of a man who, being prudent, judged it more damaging to lose his reputation through inability to defend what he set out to defend than, by leaving
z. Livy 32. 13.
it in the power of the enemy, to lose it as something abandoned. The Romans, when after the defeat of Cannae their affairs were in a bad state, refused assistance to many of their dependents and subjects, allowing them to defend themselves as best they could.3 Such de,. cisions are much better than to undertake their defense and then not to defend them, because by failure a state loses friends and forces, by refusal it loses friends only.
[ Testing combats to be fought at an advantage]
But returning to the little combats, I say that if a general is actually forced by the newness of the enemy to engage in some com,. bats, he ought to engage in them with such great advantage that he will not be in any danger of losing them; or indeed he may do as Marius did (which is the better plan) when he was moving against the Cimbri, very fierce peoples, who came to plunder Italy. Since their coming caused great consternation through their fierceness and their numbers and through their having already beaten a Roman army, Marius judged that before he came to battle he needed to do something to make his army lay aside the terror roused by their fear of the enemy. Hence like a very prudent general, more than once he put his army in a place where the Cimbri with their army were going to pass. Thus he enabled his soldiers, within the fortifications of their camp, to observe that enemy and accustom their eyes to the sight of them, so that seeing a disorderly multitude, laden with baggage, with ineffective weapons and part of them without armor, they would reassure themselves and become eager for combat. That plan, as Marius adopted it wisely, so others should imitate it dili,. gently, in order not to run into the dangers I speak of above and not to be like the French, “who, frightened by a thing of little impor,. tance, moved to the region of Tibur and into Campania.”
And because we have brought up Valerius Corvinus in this Discourse, I wish through his words to show in the following chapter what a general ought to be.
3. Livy 23. 5.

CHAPTER 38. THE QUALITIES OF A GENERAL WHOM HIS ARMY CAN TRUST
[How a general should act]
As we said above, Valerius Corvinus was serving with his army against the Samnites, new enemies of the Roman people. So, in order to reassure his soldiers and make them understand the enemy, he had his men start some slight combats. And since this was not enough for him, he addressed them before the battle; in his speech he showed with complete effectiveness how low an estimate they ought to put on such enemies, urging in support the soldiers’ ability and his own. We can learn from the words Livy gives him what a general must be if his army is to trust him. He spoke thus: “Then also you should consider under whose leadership and control the battle is to be entered, whether you are to listen to him merely as a splendid spellbinder, ardent only in words, ignorant of military affairs, or whether he knows how to handle weapons, to march ahead of the standards, and to show activity in the thickest press of battle. My deeds, not my words, soldiers, I wish you to follow; to ask from me not merely instruction but even example, for I with this right hand have won three consulates and the greatest glory” (Livy 7. 32). These words, well considered, teach everybody how he should act if he is to hold the rank of general. And he who is of another sort will in time find that such rank, if through Fortune or ambition he reaches it, will take reputation away but will not give it, because offices do not renown men; men renown offices.
[ The training of a new army]
At the beginning of this Discourse I should also indicate that if great generals have employed unusual means to stiffen the courage of a veteran army when it was to confront a new foe, ingenuity is the more necessary to the commander of a new army that has never looked an enemy in the face. Because if an unwonted enemy rouses terror in an old army, so much the more must every enemy rouse it in a new army. Yet many times good generals have prudently over… come this difficulty, as did Gracchus the Roman and Epaminondas the Theban, whom we have mentioned in other places; with new armies they overthrew armies of veterans thoroughly trained. The
method of these generals was for a few months to train their men in mock battles and accustom them to obedience and discipline. After that, with the utmost confidence they employed them in actual com,, bat. No military man, then, need despair of making good armies if he does not lack men. Indeed any prince who abounds in men and lacks soldiers should complain not of the worthlessness of his men but only of his own sloth and imprudence.

CHAPTER 39. A GENERAL SHOULD UNDER,, STAND TOPOGRAPHY
[Hunting like war]
Among the things necessary to a commander of armies is the understanding of positions and countries, because without this knowl,, edge both universal and particular, a commander cannot properly carry out anything. Indeed though all branches of knowledge re,, quire experience if they are to be perfectly understood, this one demands experience to the utmost. This experience or this under,, standing of particulars is gained more by means of continual hunting than through any other activity. Hence the ancient writers say that the heroes who ruled the world in their time were brought up in the forests and in hunting, because hunting teaches us, in addition to this knowledge, countless things necessary in war. So Xenophon in his Life of Cyrus shows that when Cyrus was about to attack the King of Armenia, in explaining that campaign he reminded his followers that this was just another of those hunts in which they had many times been with him. He reminded the men he sent into ambush on the mountains that they were like those who went to stretch nets on the summits, and the men he sent to ride through the plain that they were like those who went to drive the animal from its lair in order that when pursued it would run into the nets.
[ The hunter learns topography]
This I say to show that hunting expeditions, as Xenophon makes plain, are images of war; therefore to men of rank such activity is honorable and necessary. Nor can this knowledge of different re,, gions be gained in any convenient way except through hunting, because hunting makes him who engages in it know in detail the lay
of the land where he hunts. And as soon as a man has made himself thoroughly familiar with one district only, he then easily learns all new regions, because every region and every part of one have some similarity with others, in such a way that from the knowledge of one it is easy to pass to the knowledge of another. But only with difficulty or rather never, except after a long time, can a man not thoroughly experienced in one district understand another.
[ A general’s eye for topography]
He who has such experience knows at a glance how that plain lies, how that mountain rises, how far that valley extends, and all such things of which he has in the past gained solid understanding. That this is true Titus Livius shows us by the example of Publius Decius, when he was Tribune of the Soldiers in the army that Cornelius the Consul led against the Samnites. When the Consul had got into a valley where the army of the Romans could be shut in by the Samnites and appeared to be in great danger, Publius said to him: “Do you see, Aul us Cornelius, that summit above the enemy It is the castle of our hope and safety, if (since the blind Samnites have neglected it) without delay we take it” (7. 34). Before giving these words by Decius, Titus Livius says: “Publius Decius, Tribune of the Soldiers, saw one hill rising very abruptly, hanging over the camp of the enemy, difficult of access to a column with baggage, not at all hard for light..-armed men” (7. 34). So after the Consul had sent Publius to its summit with three thousand soldiers, and he had saved the Roman army and was planning, when night came, to leave and save also himself and his soldiers, Titus Livius has him say: “Go with me, while there is some light left, to find out where the enemy has put guards, so our exit will be clear.’ Clad in a soldier’s cloak so that the enemy would not notice that the leader was moving about, he examined everything” (7. 34). He who considers this entire passage, then, sees that for a general to know the nature of various regions is very useful and necessary. If Decius had not known and understood them, he could not have judged what advan..­ tages the occupation of that hill would bring to the Roman army, nor could he have made certain, from a distance, whether that hill was accessible or not, and when he had got on it and wished to leave it to return to the Consul, with the enemy around him, he could not from a distance have distinguished the roads by which he
518 DISCOURSES 3· 39-“41
could get away and the places guarded by the enemy. Hence we necessarily conclude that Decius was perfect in such knowledge. This enabled him by occupying that hill to save the Roman army. So he knew how, when he was attacked, to find the way for saving himself and those who were with him.

CHAPTER 40. TO USE FRAUD IN CARRYING ON WAR DESERVES FAME
Although to use fraud in all one’s actions is detestable, neverthe..­ less in carrying on war it is praiseworthy and brings fame; he who conquers the enemy by fraud is praised as much as he who conquers them by force. This appears from the judgment given on it by those who write the lives of great men, for they praise Hannibal and the others who have been extraordinary in actions of that sort. Since everybody has read plenty of examples, I shall not give any. I shall say only that I do not believe fraud deserves fame when it makes you break promises you have given and pacts you have made, because such fraud, though it sometimes wins for you position and kingly power, as was explained above,1 will never win you glory. I am speaking of fraud used against an enemy who does not trust you, such as appears especially in the conduct of war. Of this kind was Hannibal’s when at the Lake of Perugia he pretended Bight in order to surround the Consul and the Roman army, and when, in order to get out of Fabius Maximus’ power, he set on fire the horns of his cattle.2
Similar to these frauds was that used by Pontius, general of the Samnites, to shut up the Roman army in the Caudine Forks. Having concealed his army in the mountains, he sent some of his soldiers in shepherd’s clothing with a large herd to the plain.3 These, being taken by the Romans and asked where the Samnite army was, agreed, according to Pontius’ instructions, in saying that it was at the siege of Nocera. Believing this, the Consuls shut themselves up among the Caudine precipices, and after they had gone in, they were soon besieged there by the Samnites. This victory, gained by
D1scouRSES 2. 13. Cf THE PRINCE 8. Is THE PRINCE later than this Dis … COURSE:
2. Livy 22. 4, 17.
3. Livy g. 2.
fraud, would have been very glorious for Pontius if he had heeded his father’s counsel that the Romans should be either generously preserved or all killed, but the middle course should not be taken, for it “neither provides friends nor takes away enemies” (Livy 9. 3). This course is always ruinous in matters of state, as I explain above.4
4. DISCOURSES Z. 23.

CHAPTER 41. ONE’S COUNTRY SHOULD BE DEFENDED WHETHER WITH DISGRACE OR WITH GLORY; SHE IS PROPERLY DE… FENDED IN ANYWAY WHATS OEVER
AsI said above, the Consul and the Roman army were besieged by the Samnites. When the latter proposed to the Romans disgrace, fol conditions ( namely, to send them under the yoke and let them go back to Rome unarmed), the Consuls were as though dazed, and all the army was in desperation. Then Lucius Lentulus, the Roman legate, said that he believed that no expedient whatever for saving their country was to be rejected; since the life of Rome consisted in the life of that army, he thought it should be saved at all events. One’s country is properly defended in whatever way she is defended, whether with disgrace or with glory. If that army were saved, Rome would have time to cancel the disgrace; if it were not saved, even if it should die gloriously, Rome and her liberty were lost.1 So his advice was followed.
This idea deserves to be noted and acted upon by any citizen
who has occasion to advise his country, because when it is abso, lutely a question of the safety of one’s country, there must be no consideration of just or unjust, of merciful or cruel, of praiseworthy or disgraceful; instead, setting aside every scruple, one must follow to the utmost any plan that will save her life and keep her liberty.
This theory determines the words and actions of the French when they defend the majesty of their king and the power of their kingdom, for they hear no speech more impatiently than one which says: “Such a decision is shameful for the king.” They say that their king cannot be disgraced by any policy of his, whether in good or in adverse fortune, because if he loses, if he wins, they say it is entirely a kings’ affair.
1. Livy 9. 4.
520 DISCOURSES 3· 42, 43

CHAPTER 42. PROMISES MADE UNDER COM… PULSION SHOULD NOT BE KEPT
After the Consuls, with their disarmed soldiery and with the disgrace they had received, returned to Rome, the first who said in the Senate that the peace made at Caudium ought not to be kept was the Consul Spurius Postumius who said that the Roman people were not obligated, but that nevertheless he himself and the others who had made the peace were obligated; and therefore the people, if it wished to be free from every obligation, must give into the hands of the Samnites as prisoners himself and all the others who made the agreement. With such firmness he stuck to this belief that the Senate accepted it, and sending him and the others as prisoners to Samnium, declared to the Samnites that the treaty was not valid. In this in.1 stance Fortune was so favorable to Postumius that the Samnites did not hold him; when he had returned to Rome, Postumius was more renowned among the Romans after losing than Pontius was among the Samnites for winning.1
Here two things are to be noted. One is that fame can be gained in any action whatever. In victory it normally is gained; in defeat it can be gained either by showing that such loss has not come about through your fault or by doing immediately some prudent and courageous action that cancels it. The other is that it is not disgrace.., fol not to keep promises that you are forced to make. Forced promises in public matters, when the force is removed, will always be broken, without disgrace for him who breaks them. Of this we read examples in all the histories, and every day in the present times we see them.
[When princes do not keep promises]
And not merely are forced promises not kept among princes when the force is removed, but also all other promises are not kept when their causes are removed. Whether this is praiseworthy con.1 duct or not, and if such methods should be used by a prince or not, we debate at length in our tractate On the Prince;2 therefore at present we shall say nothing on it.
1. Livy 9. 8-12.
2. THE PRINCE 18. Machiavelli here uses the Latin title DE PRINCIPE; for a variant see 2.11 above.

CHAPTER 43. THAT MEN BORN IN ANY REGION SHOW IN ALL TIMES ALMOST THE SAME NA TURES
[The world the same]
Prudent men are in the habit of saying-and not by chance or without basis-that he who wishes to see what is to come should observe what has already happened, because all the affairs of the world, in every age, have their individual counterparts in ancient times.1 The reason for this is that since they are carried on by men, who have and always have had the same passions, of necessity the same results appear. It is true that human activity is at one time more efficacious in this region than in that, and more in that than in this, according to the nature of the training from which the people acquire their manner of life. Future things are also easily known from past ones if a nation has for a long time kept the same habits, being either continuously avaricious or continuously unreliable, or having some other similar vice or virtue.
[The qualities of the French and the Germans]
He who reads of early events in our city of Florence and con.., siders as well those of recent times will find the German and the French people full of avarice, pride, cruelty and treachery, because all four of these things at different times have greatly injured our city. As to treachery, everybody knows how many times Florence gave money to King Charles VIII, and he promised to hand over to her the fortresses of Pisa, yet he never did hand them over. In this affair that King showed his treachery and his great avarice. But let us pass over these recent things. Everybody knows what happened in the war the Florentine people fought against the Visconti, dukes of Milan. When the Florentines were deprived of other possibilities, they planned to bring the Emperor into Italy, so that with his in… Ruence and his forces he would attack Lombardy. The Emperor promised to come with many soldiers and to carry on war against the Visconti and to protect Florence from their power, if the Florentines would give him a hundred thousand ducats when he started and a hundred thousand more when he was in Italy. To these conditions
1. Cf.the preface ro CLIZIA.
522 DISCOURSES 3· 43, 44
the Florentines agreed. Yet though they paid him the first sum and then the second, when he had reached Verona he turned back with,.. out doing anything, pretending that they had impeded him by not carrying out their agreements with him. Hence, if Florence had not been forced by necessity or conquered by passion, and had read or learned the ancient habits of the barbarians, she would not have been deceived by them at this and many other times, for they have always been of one sort and have under all conditions and with everybody shown the same habits.
[ The qualities of the ancient French]
So they did in ancient times to the Tuscans. These, oppressed by the Romans and many times put to Right and defeated by them, seeing that with their own forces they could not sustain the Roman attack, agreed to give the French who lived in Italy on this side of the Alps a sum of money, on their promise to unite their armies with the Tuscan armies and march against the Romans. What resulted was that the French, after getting the money, would then not take arms, saying that they accepted it with the condition not that they would fight the Tuscans’ enemies but that they would abstain from plun… dering their territory. Thus the Tuscans, through the avarice and treachery of the French, were deprived at once of their money and of the aid they hoped for.2
Thus it appears from this instance of the ancient Tuscans and from that of the Florentines that the French have always used the same methods. From this it easily can be inferred how much princes can trust them.
Livy 10. 10.

CHAPTER 44. BYVIOLENCE AND AUDAC..­ ITY WE MANY TIMES GAIN WHAT WITH ORDINARY METHODS WE NEVER WOULD GAIN
[Do not allow time for consideration]
When the Samnites were attacked by the Roman army and were not strong enough to keep their army in the field facing the Romans, they determined to leave all their cities in Samnium guarded and to
move their entire army into Tuscany, which was at truce with the Romans, to see if through such a movement they could by the pres,, ence of their army induce the Tuscans to take up arms again, though they had refused this to the Samnite ambassadors. In the speech the Samnites made to the Tuscans, especially in showing for what rea,, sons they had taken up arms, they used a striking expression, namely that “they had rebelled because peace is harder for slaves than war is for the free” (Livy IO. 16). Thus, partly with persuasions, partly through the presence of their army, they induced the Tuscans to take up arms again. From this I infer that when a wise prince hopes to obtain something from another, he does not, if the opportunity allows, give the other prince time for consideration, but manages to make him see the necessity for quick decision; that is, the other prince sees that refusing or putting off will cause sudden and dangerous anger.
[Pope Julius’ impetuosity]
This method was well used in our times by Pope Julius against the French, and by Monsieur de Faix, general for the King ofFrance, against the Marquis of Mantua. Pope Julius, planning to drive the Bentivogli from Bologna, judged that for his purpose he needed French forces and the Venetians must remain neutral. Having made trial of both and got uncertain and shifty replies, he determined, by giving them no time, to make them come to his view. So leaving Rome with all the soldiers he could gather, he went toward Bologna, and sent to the Venetians to tell them to remain neutral and to the King of France to send him forces. Hence both of them, limited by lack of time and seeing that they would cause the Pope evident anger if they delayed or refused, yielded to his wishes. The King sent aid and the Venetians remained neutral.
[De Foix’s promptness]
Monsieur de Foix, when in Bologna with his army, hearing of the rebellion at Brescia, decided to recapture the place. He had two roads, one through the King’s territory, long and slow; the other, short, through Mantuan territory. And not merely did he have to pass through the territory of that marquis, but of necessity he would go into certain narrow places between swamps and lakes, of which that region is full, which with fortresses and other means were locked
and guarded against him. Hence, deciding to go by the shorter road, de Foix, in order to overcome every difficulty and not to give the Marquis time for thought, at once moved his army by that road and requested the Marquis to send him the keys of the passage. The Marquis, overcome by this rapid decision, sent him the keys; yet he never would have sent them if Foix had conducted himself more timidly, since the Marquis was in league with the Pope and the Venetians, and one of his sons was in the Pope’s power-things that gave him many honorable excuses for refusal. But when assailed by that rapid determination, he yielded, for the reasons mentioned above. So the Tuscans yielded to the Samnites, on account of the presence of the army, taking up those arms they had at other times refused to employ.

CHAPTER 45. WHETHER IN BATTLES THE BETTER PLAN IS TO RECEIVE THE ENEMY’S ATTACK AND, HA YING RECEIV,, ED IT, TO CHARGE HIM, OR AT THE BE.- GINNING TO A TT ACK HIM WITH FURY
Decius and Fabius, the Roman Consuls, with two armies were confronting the armies of the Samnites and the Tuscans; since they came to combat and to battle at the same time, we can learn from such an action which of the two different ways of proceeding used by the two Consuls is better.1 Decius with great vehemence attacked the enemy with all his power. Fabius merely resisted them, judging the delayed attack more useful and reserving his vehemence to the last, when the enemy had lost their first ardor for fighting and, as we say, their wind. From the outcome of the affair, we see that Fabius was much more successful with his plan than was Decius. The latter was disordered in the first assaults in such a way that, seeing his division in flight rather than otherwise, in order to gain in death the glory he had not attained by victory, in imitation of his father he sacrificed himself for the Roman legions. Learning this, Fabius­ that he might not gain less honor while living than his colleague had gained by dying-pushed forward all the forces he had reserved for such a necessity, and thereby won a most complete victory. From
1. Livy 1 o. 28, 29.
this we see that Fabius’ way of proceeding is safer and more to be imitated.

CHAPTER 46. WHY AT ANY ONE TIME THE HABITS OF A FAMILY IN A CITY ARE UNIFORM
It seems that not merely one city has certain methods and customs different from those of another, and produces men who are either more vigorous or more effeminate, but that in the same city such differences exist between one family and another. This is true in all cities, and in the city of Rome we read of many instances: the Manlii were hard and stubborn, the Publicoli were kind and loved the people, the Appii were ambitious and hostile to the plebeians; and similarly many other families had their qualities distinct from the others. These differences cannot come solely from their blood, be., cause that will vary with diverse marriages; it must come from the different training in one family and in another. It is very important that a boy of tender years hears praise or blame of a certain thing, because it will of necessity make an impression according to which he will govern his conduct in all periods of his life. If this were not so, it would have been impossible for all the Appii to have the same ambition and to be disturbed by the same passions, as Titus Livius notes of many of them.1 The last instance is that when one of them was Censor, and at the end of eighteen months his colleague, as the law directed, laid the magistracy down, Appius would not consent to lay it down, saying he could hold it five years, according to the law first enacted on the Censors. Though over this affair many assemblies were held, and many disturbances raised, nonetheless there never was such a solution that he consented to lay it down, though he was opposing the will of the people and of the greater part of the Senate. Anybody who reads the speech he made against Publius Sempronius, Tribune of the People, will observe all the Appian haughtiness, and all the goodness and kindness practiced by countless citizens in order to obey the laws and conform to the authority of their country.
1. Livy 2. 21, 23, 56, 58; 3· 32-58; 5· 2; 9· 33,34·

CHAPTER 47. A GOOD CITIZEN FOR LOVE OF HIS NATIVE CITY WILL FORGET PRIVATE INJURIES
Marcus the Consul was with the army opposed to the Samnites; when he was wounded in battle, and his soldiers therefore were in some danger, the Senate decided that it must send Papirius Cursor there as Dictator, to make up for the disability of the Consul. It was necessary that the Dictator be named by Fabius, who was Consul with the armies in Tuscany. Fearing that he would not be willing to name Papirius, who was his enemy, the Senators sent two ambas, sadors to beg that, laying aside his private hatred, he would for the benefit of the state consent to name him. Fabius did so, moved by love for his native city, though with silence and in many other ways he indicated that such a nomination was hard for him to bear.1 He may be an example to all who wish to be considered good citizens.
1. Livy g. 38.

CHAPTER 48. WHEN AN ENEMY SEEMS TO BE MAKING A GREAT MISTAKE, WE SHOULD BELIEVE IT HIDES A TRICK
When Fulvius was lefi as Legate with the Roman army in Tuscany, since the Consul had gone to Rome for some ceremonies, the Tuscans, to see if they could catch him by a stratagem, put an ambush near the Roman camp and sent some soldiers in the dress of shepherds, with large flocks, who were to come into the view of the Roman army. So disguised, they approached the stockade of the camp. The Legate, puzzled by their presumption, which he thought
unreasonable, managed to discover their deception. Thus the Tuscan plan was ruined.1 It is fitting to observe here that the general of an
army should put no faith in a mistake the enemy make openly; it always hides some stratagem, since it is unreasonable for men to be so incautious. But ofien the desire for victory so blinds men’s percep, tions that they see nothing except what appears to their advantage. The French, afier defeating the Romans at the Allia, when they reached Rome and found the gates open and without guards, waited
1. Livy 10. 3, 4.
all that day and that night without going in; they feared a stratagem and could not believe there was in Roman hearts such cowardice and imprudence that they would abandon their native city.2
[ A Florentine instance]
When in I 508 the Florentines were besieging Pisa, they held as prisoner Alfonso del Mutolo, a Pisan citizen. He promised that if he were free he would deliver to the Florentines one of the gates of Pisa. He was freed. Then, to carry the business along, he came many times to speak with the appointees of the Florentine commissioners, coming not secretly but openly and accompanied by Pisans, whom he left waiting while he talked with the Florentines. He did this in such a way that his treacherous purpose could be inferred, because it was unreasonable, if his dealings were honest, that he would carry them on openly. But their wish to take Pisa so blinded the Florentines that, going according to his arrangements to the Lucca Gate, to their disgrace they left there many of their leaders and other soldiers, as a result of the said Alfonso’s simulated treachery.
2. Livy 5. 39.

CHAPTER 49. A REPUBLIC, IF SHE IS TO BE KEPT FREE, REQUIRES NEW ACTS OF FORESIGHT EVERY DAY; AND FOR WHAT GOOD QUALITIES QUINTUS FABIUS WAS CALLED MAXIMUS
[Rome’s severity in punishment]
It must be, as I have said before, that every day in a large city emergencies will occur that have need of a physician, and in propor… tion as they are more important, a wiser physician is needed. If ever in any city there were such emergencies, they occurred in Rome­ strange and unexpected ones. Such was the emergency when it seemed that all the Roman wives had conspired against their hus… bands to kill them-there were so many who did poison them and so many who had prepared poison for doing so. Such was also the conspiracy of the Bacchanals, discovered in the time of the Macedo,. nian war, in which actually thousands of men and women were concerned. If it had not been discovered it would have been danger,.
ous to the city, or if the Romans had not been accustomed to punish large numbers of those who did wrong. If countless other indica,. tions did not show the greatness of that republic and the power of her deeds, the punishments she inflicted on wrong….doers would show them. She did not hesitate to punish with death a whole legion at
once, and an entire city, and to banish eight or ten thousand men under penalties so strange that they could not be carried out by one man alone, much less by so many. For example, those soldiers who
fought unsuccessfully at Cannae she banished to Sicily, requiring them to find lodgings outside the cities and to eat standing up.1
[Decimation as a military punishment]
Of all her actions the most terrible was the decimation of an army, in which by lot one out of every ten men in a whole army was put to death. It is not possible, chastising a multitude, to find a punishment more terrifying than this. When a multitude commits a crime in which the one responsible is not evident, all cannot be pun,. ished because there are too many. To punish part of them and leave part unpunished would wrong those who are punished, and the unpunished would have courage to do wrong another time. But if the tenth part are killed by lot, when all deserve it, he who is pun,. ished grieves for his fate; he who is not punished fears that another time the lot will fall on him, and is careful not to do wrong.
The poisoners and the Bacchanals, then, were punished as their crimes deserved. Though in a republic these sicknesses produce bad effects, they are not fatal, because there is almost always time to cure them. But there is not time in those sicknesses that have to do with the government. If they are not cured by a prudent man, they ruin the city.
[ Quintus Fabius Maximus]
In Rome, through the liberality practiced by the Romans in giving citizenship to foreigners, so many children were born in new families that soon such numbers of them obtained the right to vote that the administration was growing uncertain and moving away from the policies and men formerly important. When Quintus Fabius, who was Censor, realized this, he put all those new families-
1.. Livy 8. 1.8; 39. 41.; 23. 25.
the cause of the difficulty-into four tribes, so that, shut into a small space, they could not infect all Rome. This matter was clearly under., stood by Fabius, who applied to it, without any revolution, a good
remedy, so well received by that commonwealth that he deserved to be called great.1
2. Livy 9. 46.
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others
Allan Gilbert, translator

From the praise for the 1965 edition:
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“The publication of this handsome edition of all Machiavelli’s major works, together with many of the secondary ones either previously untranslated or difficult to obtain, is an event of major importance for English-speakingscholars in the humanities and social sciences; and students of the history of political thought owe a particular debt of gratitude to Professor Gilbert. …
“Political theorists already familiar with Professor Gilbert’s Prince and ‘i
selections from other works and the letters will of course be especially
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grateful to him for his rendering of the Discourses, which is by far the best available. But in addition to this, they wtll rejoice to find under one roof other works, some of which are difficult or impossible to obtain. “Allan Gilbert is unquestionably the most accurate and reliable translator of Machiavelli into English; the publication of this edition is an altogether happy occasion.”-Dante Germino, The Journal of Politics
“A most remarkable achievement.”-Felix Gilbert, Renaissance Quarterly